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Summary 
In this thesis, I study Australian press reporting of the Bougainville War (1988-1997).  My 
focus is the reporting in three newspapers which are commonly understood to be part of the 
‘quality press’: the Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age.  I concentrate on their 
reporting of three incidents which occurred in 1996, in the southwest of Bougainville.  Two 
of these incidents (which occurred at Simbo and Malabita) look like significant abuses of 
human rights and the other involved a battle between the BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army) and PNGDF (Papua New Guinea Defence Force) troops (at Kangu Beach).  The 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) government also alleged that human rights abuses took place 
during that battle.   
I ask two questions:  
· How did the three newspapers report these incidents?   
· How can we best understand this process of reporting?   
I argue that there was a dichotomous pattern in the reporting.  The three newspapers 
portrayed the victims of the BRA (at Kangu Beach) more sympathetically than they portrayed 
the victims of the PNGDF (at Simbo and Malabita).   
I further argue that both the ‘liberal’ model – which emphasises factors such as journalists’ 
access to reliable sources – and the ‘political-economic’ model – which emphasises factors 
such as the government’s role as a major source for news – provide some understanding of 
the process of press reporting.  However, I argue that the political-economic approach, as 
exemplified by Herman and Chomsky (1988), provides the most satisfactory way to 
understand this process.  The news presentation, in this case, is best understood as reflecting 
domestic power interests in Australia.   
I firstly review the literature on mass media reporting of war before turning to a detailed 
description and analysis of the reporting of the three cases.  In this description and analysis, I 
use a theoretical framework which draws mainly on the political-economic approach of 
Herman and Chomksy (1988) and the cultural approach of Cerulo (1998).   
 x 
I then discuss the reporting using evidence from interviews with the key journalists who 
covered the incidents in 1996.  To understand the reporting, I compare the heuristic value of 
two approaches to the study of war reporting: the ‘liberal’ (conventional) approach, which 
sees the mass media as playing an adversarial role in society and the ‘political-economic’ 
approach, which sees the mass media as playing a legitimising role.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1963, the Nasioi people of central Bougainville, a small island in the South Pacific (see 
maps, figs 0-1 and 0-2, pp. 2-3, below) faced a huge threat to their traditional culture, 
economy and natural environment.  That year, Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia Explorations 
(CRAE) began exploring their land for gold and copper.  In 1963, Bougainville was part of 
the Australian administered UN trust territory, New Guinea.   
Eventually, in 1969, encouraged by the Australian administration and against the wishes of 
the population (Age, 16 September 1997, p. 9) workers began to establish a giant gold and 
copper mine.  The mine was to cause much environmental and social devastation (Applied 
Geological Associates, 1989).  It also fuelled the growth of a longstanding independence 
movement in Bougainville (Pembshaw, 1992).  
The political conflict over the territory and the mine reached a head in November 1988, when 
a small group of Bougainvillean activists blew up power pylons, forcing the closure of the 
mine. They wanted the PNG government to negotiate both about compensation for the mine 
and about independence.   
However, the PNG government, faced with this threat to the integrity of its nation-state, 
sought to reassert its control and immediately dispatched a riot squad, the Police Mobile 
Response Unit.  Later, they would send in PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) regular troops. 
According to the United Nations (1996) and Amnesty International (1990), these security 
forces committed many human rights abuses in 1988.   
By early 1989 the indigenous people of Bougainville had formed the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) to fight the central government forces.   
The Australian government and Australian defence forces personnel were to become directly 
involved in the Bougainville War (O’Callaghan, 1999a, Cronau, 1993, Watts, 1994, John, 1999, 
Sharp, 1997).  As early as 1990, the PNGDF formed, trained, provided weapons to, directed 
and paid local militias.  These groups, named the ‘Resistance’, were to play a major part in the 
military operations, which were designed to quash the separatist movement.   
Figure 0-1: Papua New Guinea’s area of direct military interest.  Source: Dibb and Nicholas (1996, p. xii). 
  
 
Figure 0-2: Map of West Pacific Islands.  Adapted from  Map of West Pacific Islands (1998) produced by U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/australia/West_Pacific . 
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There were many documented cases of serious human rights abuses throughout the war (U.S. 
Department of State, 1998, Amnesty International, 1990, 1994, 1997, United Nations, 1996). 
The fighting ended in 1997 with the signing of the Burnham peace agreement and since then 
the peace process has proceeded apace.  In early 2001 the parties agreed to a number of 
conditions as part of an ongoing peace settlement: that the ‘Resistance’ and BRA hand in 
weapons to be stored in locked containers, under the supervision of the United Nations; that 
a referendum on independence for Bougainville be held in 10-15 years; that an interim 
autonomous Bougainville government, with its own police force, be formed whilst the central 
government maintain responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and banking (National, 
2002b).  The PNG parliament is expected to pass legislation enabling the peace settlement to 
be realised as this thesis goes to press (Moruata, 2000). 
Without prejudging the precise role of the Australian media in the diplomatic and military 
policies and interventions of the Australian government, it would seem that there is value in 
exploring the activities and significance of the Australian press in reporting this war. 
While there are many aspects of this conflict, I have chosen to concentrate on three events.  
Two of these, by conventional standards, constitute prima facie cases of serious human rights 
abuse.  The other was a battle during which, the Papua New Guinea government alleged, 
human rights abuses took place.   
In 1996 three mass killings occurred in the context of Papua New Guinea’s counterinsurgency 
operations, in southwest Bougainville.  In the first incident ten to twelve civilians, including 
women and children, were killed by PNG troops and ‘Resistance’ (pro-government militia) 
members at Simbo village, in January.  The second incident occurred at the Kangu Beach 
‘care centre’ (resettlement camp).  PNGDF guards had been abusing detainees, including the 
wives of ‘Resistance’ members.  In September, the militia unit finally defected to the BRA and 
with them attacked the guards and dissolved the camp.  The combined BRA/ex-‘Resistance’ 
group killed thirteen security force members.  The PNGDF claimed that some of the victims 
were disarmed before being killed and photographic evidence indicated that two of the bodies 
were later mutilated.  In the final incident, nine civilians were killed in a mortar attack on a 
church by the PNGDF at Malabita, in November.   
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Two questions: Firstly, how did the Australian quality press report these incidents?  Secondly, 
how are we to understand this process of press reportage? 
Throughout this war elements of the mass media, including the press, reported on both the 
military operations and diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.  In this regard, the 
Australian press played an important role in bringing this conflict to the attention of 
Australian ‘public opinion’ and to the policy-making community. 
Whilst there are a few writers (Pellegrini, 1994, Cronau, 1994, LaFitte, 1992, Watts, 1994, 
1996a, 1996b, 1999c, Watts and Porszolt, 1993) who have briefly dealt with Australian mass 
media reporting of the Bougainville War, the topic has received little scholarly attention1.  In 
this thesis, I offer the first detailed and systematic analysis of the role of Australian media 
reporting of the Bougainville War.  There are several related rationales for addressing mass 
media reporting of the three incidents in 1996. 
Firstly, the mass media can help to mobilise public opinion to protest against and possibly 
stop violent abuses.  It can inform the public about the situation and create an environment 
where they will be more likely to take direct action.  For example, in the 1970’s Australian 
unions placed bans on South African ships in protest against apartheid.  It is likely that the 
workers and union leaders, in this case at least in part, learnt about the apartheid situation 
from the mass media.  
While governments plainly have and rely on their own diplomatic and military intelligence 
sources as a guide to their actions, the press also provides an important source of information 
to governments and can play an important role in shaping political support for – or 
opposition to – particular foreign policies.  
The role of the media in mobilising support for particular diplomatic and military intervention 
was revealed recently by news coverage in Australia about East Timor, where one third of the 
population was killed (directly or indirectly) by the Indonesian military in the years 1975 to  
                                                                 
1 I have found a substantial number of books about the Bougainville War, especially for the period from 1988 to 1992, (the 
first three years) and from 1998 (after the war ended, with a crisis in Papua New Guinea surrounding the use of British and 
South African mercenaries in Bougainville and the subsequent implementation of an Australian sponsored peace process).  
However, I have found  no books on the role of the Australian media.  
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1996. The foreign affairs committee of the Australian parliament (cited in Pilger, 1998) made 
a conservative estimate that 200,000 people were killed in East Timor during those years.  
In terms of lives lost, the case of Bougainville is comparable to East Timor, considering the 
time scale and population. According to Claxton (1998) there were 10,000 to 20,000 deaths, 
mainly of civilians, in Bougainville (five to ten percent of the population) over a period of 
nine years.2  However, in the case of East Timor, the deaths occurred over 25 years.  
Considering the time scale, the proportion of deaths is equivalent to 25 per cent of the 
population over 25 years – making it comparable to East Timor.  The comparison is made 
more poignant when one considers the capacity of the Suharto regime to impose state terror.  
The CIA once claimed that Suharto’s performance in 1965, in this regard, was comparable to 
that of the Nazis in World War II (cited in Chomsky, 2000, p. 64). 
Bougainville has been the subject of domination by the West since the late nineteenth 
century.  Germany and England agreed that it should come under the dominion of the 
German Empire in 1899.  It fell to Australia during World War I and was held briefly by 
Japan during World War II.  After World War II, it became part of the territory of New 
Guinea, which was mandated to the Australian government.  Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
became independent in 1975 and Bougainville became part of this state in 1976.  However, 
since 1975 Australia has maintained a ‘special relationship’ with PNG.  Australia supplies 
about $300 million per year in aid and maintains close defence, commercial, political and 
cultural ties with PNG (Connell, 1997).  
Between 1988 and 1997 the Australian government gave diplomatic and military support to 
PNG’s counterinsurgency operations (Watts, 1994, John, 1999, Sharp, 1997, Cronau, 1993)3.   
                                                                 
2 Most of these were caused by the economic and communications blockade which was enforced by the PNGDF (Claxton, 
1998).  Some civilians were killed by the BRA, but reports by the United Nations (1996) and Amnesty International (1994, 
1997) indicate that the majority of civilians killed by direct violence were victims of the central government forces.  These 
victims were killed by such means as indiscriminate bombing and strafing and summary execution.(United Nations, 1996, 
Amnesty International, 1994, 1997) 
3 The Australian senate committee which inquired into Australia’s defence relationship with Papua New Guinea in 1991 
found that: 
Australia has supported the unity of Papua New Guinea and has played a major role in the training and equipping of the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force, including the controversial supply of helicopters that were used on Bougainville. These issues have 
precluded Australia from playing a significant role in finding a solution to the crisis. (Australia, 1991, p. 183) 
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From the early years of the war the Australian government maintained a strategic objective to 
protect PNG’s sovereignty over Bougainville4.  However, in 1993 the Australian government 
began to withdraw support and instead sought a political solution for the conflict after PNG’s 
war effort began to falter (Gillespie, 1999a).  These changes in policy direction gained 
momentum in March 1996, with the election of the Liberal government.  According to Watts 
(1997a), the new government was more active than their predecessors in seeking a political 
solution.  Australian support for the war dwindled more in mid 1996.  The success of the 
BRA on the battlefield convinced many policy makers in Canberra of the futility of continued 
military operations (Watts, 1997a).  In contrast, PNG Prime Minister Chan continued to 
favour the use of military options (Watts, 2000b).  Despite the tensions in its relationship with 
PNG over these tactical issues,5 the Australian government was still committed to the 
strategic objective of maintaining PNG’s sovereignty over Bougainville.  As Australian 
defence planner and academic, Paul Dibb, stated at the PNG Update Forum, held at 
Parliament House in Canberra in November 1996: 
It is in Australia's national interest that we continue to see a cohesive, unified, non 
seccessionist Papua New Guinea.  Fragmentation would involve all sorts of potential 
geopolotical problems.  (cited in McLellan, 1997, p. 10) 
Moreover, the Australian government continued to provide military support which Sharp 
(1997) and John (1999) argued was crucial for PNG’s operations in Bougainville in 1996.  
                                                                 
4 According to the 1991 Australian senate committee:  
Australia's concern with Bougainville is twofold; first is a general concern for the integrity of Papua New Guinea and the 
stability of the area; second, the interests of Australian mining companies have been central to the conflict. (Australia, 1991, p. 
183) 
Australian foreign minister Evans stated on ABC radio, in January 1990 that in relation to the Bougainville War: 
From a purely self interested Australian regional security perspective, the fragmentation of PNG is something we ... would 
like to see avoided at all costs'.  (cited in Watts, 1994, p. 24, emphasis in text) 
One action that Evans presided over soon after this statement was issued was the change in defence arrangements between 
Papua New Guinea and Australia.  According to Evans and Grant (1991, p. 171) these arrangements were made with a view 
to ‘gradually shifting the balance of support from an external to an internal focus’ to shift the focus of the PNGDF from 
external to internal defence (that is defending the state from insurrection).  This policy was formulated soon after concern 
about Bougainville ‘became acute in 1990-91’ when both governments ‘embarked on a joint reassessment of the whole 
pattern of defence and security co-operation’. (Evans and Grant, 1991, p. 171)   
According to the Australian senate inquiry into Australia's defence relationship with Papua New Guinea (Australia, 1991, p. 
183), the Australian Government ‘made no secret of its strong support for the Papua New Guinea Government’ in relation 
to the war on Bougainville.  Furthermore, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (cited in Australia, 1991, 
p. 191) stated that: 
Australia has a strategic interest in the unity of Papua New Guinea, the maintenence of the authority of the central government, 
the restoration of law and order on Bougainville and the continuing viability of the existing and (potential) substantial Australian 
investment in the Papua New Guinea economy. 
5 These tensions are discussed in O’Callaghan (1999a).  
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Past Australian governments supported the interests of Australian multinational mining 
corporation, Conzinc Rio Tinto Australia (CRA, which has since been taken over by its UK 
parent company, Rio Tinto).  This corporation played a key role in the conflict.  According to 
Oliver (1991) the Australian government supported the initial counterinsurgency operations 
in part to protect the viability of CRA’s mine at Panguna.  Furthermore, John Momis, a PNG 
parliamentarian, argued that CRA and the former colonial administration were to blame for 
the conflict, as he said: 
This crisis was something that was created by the Australian colonial administration and 
multi-national company Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia. … In their zeal to raise revenue 
and to enable PNG to be independent, they dismally failed to take into account the 
importance of rights of people to land and to own resources and to participate actively in 
work that the mine created. The colonial administration and Conzinc Rio Tinto must 
accept the blame for the imposition of this problem on PNG.  They were not prepared to 
listen to the duly elected leaders of Bougainville. Their only motive was a profit motive. 
(Address to the PNG parliament, cited in the National, 2001)6 
Given the importance of Australia’s role in the war, there is clearly some value in exploring 
the role of the press in helping to produce this policy conclusion.  There are some more 
personal reasons for my interest in this issue.  I have been actively involved for some years in 
working on various campaigns to support the people in Bougainville in their bid for 
independence and I was interested to survey the press reporting of this conflict from its 
inception. 
Secondly, there are some important theoretical issues at stake.  As Meehan, Mosko and 
Wasko (1994) argue, there is a need in critical communication studies to synthesise political-
economic and cultural approaches to the mass media.  There is something of a gulf between 
                                                                 
6 A group of landowners from the Panguna area have recently launched a class action in the US against RioTinto Zinc (RTZ, 
the former parent company of CRA, which has since taken over CRA).  The landowners allege that the company played a key 
role in the war and are demanding compensation.  According to their  lawyer, Steve Berman:  
The suit claims the company engaged in a joint venture with the PNG government to maintain a copper mine on the 
island, which resulted in international environmental violations and crimes against humanity stemming from a military 
blockade motivated by civilian resistance to the mine.  (Hagens-Berman, 2000)  
The PNG government has opposed the lawsuit by introducing legislation to stop it proceeding and writing to the Australian 
and US governments in protest against the court proceedings (Watts, 2002).  The Australian government also wrote to the 
US government, agreeing with the PNG government that ‘the US “should not sit in judgement on the acts of government of 
other states” and that the action could “give rise to recriminations”, thereby endangering the Bougainville peace process.’ 
(Roberts, quoting the PNG Ambassador to the US, Mr Igara, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 2002, 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/03/22/australia.htm )  In late March, the US court dismissed the case against Rio 
Tinto stating that the proceedings might adversely affect US foreign policy interests (it would affect the relationship between 
PNG and the US).  However, the judge imposed a condition on the PNG government not to impose any legal bar to prevent 
the case proceeding in PNG (Korimbao, 2002).  Steve Berman (cited in Korimbao, 2002) said that apart from the political 
issues raised by the court, the case could still proceed in the US.    
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these two approaches.  The cultural approach tends to emphasise issues such as ethnicity and 
gender, whereas the political-economic approach tends to emphasise ‘structural’ factors such 
as ownership of media corporations and the role of governments (Meehan, Mosko and 
Wasko, 1994).  My aim is for this thesis to contribute to this synthesising project.   
Another issue is the social role of the mass media.  Many writers in the ‘liberal’ tradition 
(discussed in chapter one, below) assume that, in the reporting of war, the mass media play an 
‘adversarial role’ (Adubato, 1997).  It is not surprising that many Australians hold this view, 
given that the mass media often promote their adversarial role in the reporting of many 
political issues.  Examples such as the recent reporting of the ‘children overboard’ affair serve 
to confirm this view.  During the Australian federal election campaign in 2001, the incumbent 
Liberal government promoted the false story that asylum seekers threw children overboard 
after being intercepted in the Indian Ocean whilst attempting to enter Australia.  Recently, 
there have been many press reports which have been critical of the government in this regard 
(for example, see Age, 4 March, 2002, p. 15).  However, many writers, particularly those in the 
‘political-economic’ tradition (discussed in chapter one, below), argue that in reporting war 
the mass media play a ‘legitimising’ rather than ‘adversarial’ role (Adubato, 1997).  Writers 
such as Mills (1959), Chomsky (1989, 1993, 1996, 2000), Kellner (1995) and Herman (1999) 
argue that despite the existence of critical commentary, the general thrust of reporting 
typically reinforces the political agenda of privileged segments of society.   
Finally, there is debate over explanations for bias in mass media reporting of war.  As I 
discuss in chapter one, below, writers in both the ‘liberal’ and ‘political economic’ traditions 
agree that the mass media often present a biased representation of war.  However, these 
writers differ in their explanations for this pattern of reporting.  Writers in the ‘liberal’ 
tradition argue that such reporting is due to circumstances beyond the control of the media.  
An example is when the military attempt to manipulate and control the media in times of war 
(Young and Jesser, 1997).  In contrast, writers in the ‘political-economic’ tradition (such as 
Herman and Chomsky, 1988) argue that the mass media are complicit with the government 
and military in presenting a biased view.   
The primary data used in the study comes from two sources. The published press reports and 
interviews with journalists.   
I study the reporting in three Australian newspapers, which are commonly understood to be 
part of Australia’s quality press: the Australian, the Age and the Sydney Morning Herald.  I focus 
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on these publications because they have a distinct and politically important readership – well-
educated middle-class Australians.  Furthermore, they cover the majority of the Australian 
newspaper market: New South Wales (the Sydney Morning Herald); Victoria (the Age) and all 
over the nation (the Australian).  They also provide a large enough, but manageable, sample. 
Between 1997 and 2000, I interviewed the key journalists who reported the Bougainville War.  
I spoke with the three main journalists who covered the three incidents in question: Mary 
Louise O’Callaghan (the Australian), Paul Ruffini (whose Australian Associated Press stories 
appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age) and Lucy Palmer who wrote for the Sydney 
Morning Herald in the latter half of 1996.  I also spoke with three media workers who did not 
write for these newspapers: Sean Dorney (ABC), Max Watts (a freelance journalist and a 
correspondent for several European media outlets7 ) and Wayne Coles-Janess (a filmmaker, 
who visited the scenes of one of the three incidents and interviewed eyewitnesses from two of 
them, in Bougainville, in 1997).  The interviews were semi-structured and I focussed on 
several themes concerning their experiences in reporting the war, especially the three 
incidents in 1996.  These themes were: 
· Reasons for the particular ways in which the three newspapers portrayed the violence; 
· how decisions were made about the use of some sources in preference to others;  
· why some topics were included and others excluded;  
· the role of vested interests such as government departments. 
I will use these two sources (interview data and press reports) to examine press reporting in 
the light of relevant theories of media in advanced industrial societies such as Australia. This 
will help to answer my two research questions: How did the Australian quality press report 
the three incidents?  In a context of scholarly debate about the role of the media, how do we 
best understand this process of press reportage? 
In chapter one, I will review literature in three areas: The Bougainville War and the Australian 
media; mass media and modern societies, in particular, Australia; and mass media reporting of 
                                                                 
7  Watts wrote regularly for: Neues Deutschland (Berlin Daily); Woz (Die Wochenzeitung, Zuerich Weekly); Akin (Vienna 
Monthly).  He also wrote occasionally for Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt/National Daily);  Junge Welt (Berlin Daily); Blaettchen 
(German Bi-Weekly); Reporteurs Sans Frontieres (Paris);  US Radio Pacifica (Watts, 2001). 
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wars like the Bougainville War, in Australia and other modern countries.  I will ask how this 
literature can help us to study reporting of the three incidents. 
In chapters two and three, I will discuss the reporting of each of the incidents in turn, in the 
light of the literature discussed in chapter one.  Chapter two will be an analysis of the 
reporting of both the Simbo incident (where ten to twelve civilians were killed by central 
government forces) and the Kangu Beach incident (where 13 security force members were 
killed).   In chapter three, I will analyse the reporting of the case of Malabita (where nine 
civilians were killed by the PNGDF).    
In chapter four, I will summarise the findings of my analysis of reporting and discuss how we 
can best explain them.  I will argue that: firstly, there was a dichotomous pattern whereby the 
three newspapers portrayed victims of the BRA more sympathetically than victims of the 
PNGDF; secondly, that the political-economic approach to mass media reporting of war, as 
exemplified by the Herman and Chomsky (1988) propaganda model, provides the most 
satisfying explanation for this pattern of press reportage.   
 12 
Chapter one 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
By common consent, the ‘mass media’ are understood to constitute a significant component 
of modern social, economic, political and cultural life.  From Matthew Arnold (1966) to 
Baudrillard (1995), critics have argued that the media have a significant role in shaping some 
of the most distinctive features of culture and even social reality itself.  The media have 
likewise been presumed to play a major role in representing the key political, diplomatic and 
military events of our time, while some writers have insisted that the media, on occasion, 
become part of those political processes.  It should not be surprising that the explanations, 
characterisations and evaluations of the role and significance of the media are diverse.  
My research project is situated in the field of critical communication studies (see Meehan, 
Mosco and Wasko, 1994 and McChesney, 1994).  My aim in this chapter is to review the 
literature which will help us to study Australian press reporting of violent incidents which 
occurred in 1996, in the course of the Bougainville War.  In this review I want to renew the 
theoretical debates addressing the social role of the mass media in advanced state-capitalist 
societies.  I will address the mass media, as opposed to the ‘alternative’ media.  According to 
Martin (1995), the mass media are controlled by relatively few people compared to the 
number in their audiences. In contrast, the alternative media are more subject to control at a 
grass-roots level and are more financially dependent on their audiences (Martin, 1995).   
Because the issue of power is central to mass media reporting of war, I will concentrate on 
the role of the mass media in power relations in society.  As McQuail (1994) argues, power is 
an important theme in the study of mass media and society.  I will review the literature on the 
role of the mass media in society, mass media reporting of wars in Australia and other 
modern countries and Australian mass media reporting of the Bougainville War8.  I categorise 
the theoretical approaches to the study of media reporting of war into four areas: liberal, 
political-economic, post-structuralist and cultural.  
                                                                 
8 As I indicated in the introduction to this thesis, there has been little study done specifically on Australian mass media 
reporting of the Bougainville War.   
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The ‘liberal’ approach 
Those writers who belong to the liberal tradition, have generally promoted what 
McQuail (1994, p. 69) calls the ‘pluralist media model’.  He argues that writers in the 
pluralist tradition tend to adopt the key assumption that no one ruling group 
dominates society.  An important element of the  liberal view is the democratic 
postulate – that the media, in modern societies, play a counterbalancing role to the 
power of state institutions such as the military, the bureaucracy and the parliament. 
This proposition is consistent with the way traditional liberal democratic theory 
represents the media as the ‘fourth estate’ – an independent institution which checks 
the power of the sovereign, the parliament and the judiciary.  A corollary of the 
‘counterbalancing’ view of the media, is the ‘oppositional’ media theory.  According to 
Adubato (1997, p. 29) this has been a dominant school of thought in the literature on 
state-media relations during wartime.  He observes that writers in this school of 
thought see the media as performing a role as a ‘watchdog’ on the government on 
behalf of the citizenry.  
Many conventional studies of the media deploy many of the themes found in the 
liberal tradition.  They tend to avoid criticism of the media’s role in the capitalist 
system.  As McChesney (1998, p. 4) argues, such work: 
…presupposes capitalist society as a given and then discounts structural factors in 
explaining behaviour. 
Likewise, Young and Jesser (1997), writing in the liberal tradition, in their study on the 
media and the military avoid discussion of certain ‘structural’ factors.  These factors 
include the concentration of media ownership and the mutual interests of mass media 
corporations, governments and the military (which are assumed in studies in political-
economic tradition, discussed below).  
Many writers, who work in the liberal tradition, such as Marshall and Kingsbury (1996, 
pp. 185, 191-92) concede that in times of war, military and government officials 
attempt to control and manipulate the mass media. Likewise, Young and Jesser (1997), 
writing in the  
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same tradition, argue that since the end of the Vietnam War, the military in Australia have 
tended to impose greater restrictions on – and manipulate – the media to its aims in the  
preparatory and early stages of the conflict9).  Similarly, O’Callaghan (1999a) argued that 
because of the blockade of Bougainville by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), 
Australian journalists were unable to get access to reliable information about the war.  She 
argued that this was a major reason why the Australian mass media often ignored the war.  
However, the emphasis of ‘liberal’ writers on government intervention, rather than the 
response of the mass media leads to an incomplete analysis of the media’s role in times of 
war.  Many writers (Kellner, 1992, Adubato, 1997, Cronau, 1994, Watts, 1999c, Pilger, 1998) 
challenge this ‘liberal’ position suggesting that there are other factors, besides government 
intervention, which affect war reportage.  These studies show the limitations of O’Callaghan 
(1999a) who does not address Australian mass media behaviour when reliable information did 
emerge from Bougainville, despite the blockade. Cronau (1994) argues that there were 
influences other than the blockade influencing media reporting in Australia.  He supports his 
argument with evidence that the mass media ignored or played down newsworthy 
information when it did emerge.  Cronau (1994, p. 160), a former ABC television journalist, 
gave the example of an Australian film crew breaching the blockade in 1994 and returning 
with a ‘journalistic coup.’  They had filmed interviews with Bougainville Interim Government 
(BIG) President, Francis Ona, Vice President, Joseph Kabui, Commander-in-Chief of the 
BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army), Sam Kauona and other leaders of the independence 
movement.  However, the filmmakers said that television news programs and several current 
affairs programs in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne showed little interest (cited in Cronau, 
1994).  Similar evidence was provided by Watts (1994), who observed that the Australian 
media ignored broadcasts by Radio Free Bougainville, whilst the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation used them regularly. Furthermore, Australian human rights lawyer Rosemarie 
Gillespie gathered dozens of statutory declarations and took video evidence of human rights  
                                                                 
9 Similarly, media workers in the US claimed that they were unable to perform their ‘watchdog’ role when reporting the Gulf 
War because of the military regulation of sources.  Adubato (1997, p. 78-79) found that: 
Many in the media complain that they were denied access to the ‘real story’ of Operation Desert Storm. … the majority of 
media executives, senior producers and correspondents at ABC and CNN, say they did all they could to report as much of 
the war as possible. 
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abuses during three trips to Bougainville (Gillespie, 1999a).  Watts (1999c) observed that the 
mass media paid little attention to Gillespie’s information.  
Despite the significant manipulation and control of the media by military and government 
officials in times of war, writers in the liberal tradition argue that the media continues to play 
an adversarial role.  For example, Marshall and Kingsbury (1996, p. 32) argue that power 
within the media in Australia is exercised in a fragmented way:  
… the media work within social power networks, but in a relative [sic] loose and 
unstructured way.  There is no evidence of a hegemonic control of which the mass media 
are a part.  We do not question that the mass media generally have the capacity to create 
the multiple realties …  However, we will seek to show that…power is not monolithic but 
rather… subjected to limitations and resistance by others and to manipulation by power 
holders and would-be power holders. 
Similarly, Marshall and Kingsbury (1996, pp. 185, 191-92), argue that during wars the power 
of the media are open to the potential challenge of independent news-gathering by journalists.  
They cite the example of the influence of television on the course of the Vietnam War.  As 
Marshall and Kingsbury (1996, p. 192) argue: 
In the Vietnam War, American news managers were able to keep the realities hidden for a 
long period by restricting the movement of reporters in the major war zones… Yet, 
eventually, in a positive demonstration of media power, television’s graphic on-the-spot 
reporting of what came to be known as ‘the living-room war’ was a strong factor in the 
decision by President Lyndon Johnson to end his political career and in America’s 
eventual decision to withdraw from Vietnam.  
However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the Australian mass media played a 
truly adversarial role in reporting the Vietnam War.  Marshall and Kingsbury (1996) do not 
use any evidence to support their assertion that television reporting led to the end of the 
Vietnam War.  Furthermore, most empirical studies (for example, Tiffen, 199010) have found 
that the Australian media supported the Australian and U.S. government agenda for the war  
                                                                 
10 According to Tiffen (1990, p. 112) despite the fact that Australian news coverage ‘often departed from the short term 
propaganda aims of the American government’, the mass media did not play an adversarial role in reporting the Vietnam 
War.  As Tiffen (1990, p. 137) argues:  
The debates about oppositional media are greatly overdrawn in America, but in Australia it would be ludicrous even to 
raise the issue.  The Australian news media lost the war of trying to cover Vietnam.  The political irresponsibility of being a 
junior ally combined with the majority of the Australian press’s whole-hearted support for the government produced an 
acquiescent, unquestioning media which failed to challenge the assumptions which led to tragedy and failure. 
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(McGregor, 1998, p. 129).11 
Similarly, in the only detailed empirical studies on the case of the Bougainville War, the 
findings suggest that the Australian media did not play an oppositional role.  Cronau (1994) 
argues that the media neglected their watchdog role by reporting only some parts of the story 
of the war.  After reviewing the literature, analysing press reports and interviews with 
journalists, Cronau, 1994, p. 173) argued that:  
…we repeatedly hear that the conflict is ‘an internal matter for the PNG government’ 
despite ‘the universal human rights of the Bougainville population’, and ignoring ‘the vital 
strategic interest of Australia in PNG that sees Australia providing helicopters, arms, 
ammunition, patrol boats, mercenary pilots, military advisers and technical personnel, 
training, and logistical intelligence’.  
He concludes as follows:  
In making decisions about which parts of the story to tell, much of the mainstream 
Australian media have chosen sides. The misery and destruction of Bougainville, away 
from the eyes of the world, is a sign of the dangers of the media’s neglecting the watchdog 
role.  A better understanding of the forces which mould our media may make a 
contribution towards providing the open scrutiny that is the oxygen of democratic 
government.  (Cronau, 1994, p. 173) 
Watts (1999c), who covered the war as a freelance journalist for several European 
publications, analysed several cases12 of mass media reporting and spoke to journalists and 
editors. He argued that the Australian ‘establishment’ media ‘played an essential role in 
keeping the Australian public acquiescent…about the [Bougainville] war’ (Watts, 1999c, p. 
34).  However, compared to the literature on Australian reporting of other wars, especially 
those in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, these studies are brief and few in number.   
                                                                 
11 McGregor (1998, p. 129), argued that::  
Most studies clearly show how in both news reporting and editorial opinion, the support of western intervention in Viet 
Nam (e.g. Tiffen, Chinn, Brooks, Peterson).  Most Australian media reproduced - voluntarily - the shared rhetoric and 
point-of-view of the Australian and USA governments: the media was [sic] overwhelmingly pro-war, anti-communist and 
anti- the anti-war movement.  (In Australia, even after the election of the Whitlam government in 1972, on an anti-war 
policy, most of the media remained pro-war.)  
More recently, Torney-Porlicki (1999) in a recent book examining Australian war journalism in South East Asia also supports 
Tiffen’s (1990) view. 
12 For example, he argues that Australian aid to Bougainville was ‘targeted.  That is, …a deliberate and major part of the 
Australian/PNG war plan for the reconquest of Bougainville’  (Watts, 1999c, p. 32).  He argues that media reporting 
assumed ‘such aid was going to those in need’ and that not once did the mass media report or explain this ‘targeting’ of aid 
(Watts, 1999c, p. 32).   
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Studies on Australian mass media reporting of the Gulf War13 and the East Timor conflict 
suggest some support for the liberal view.  In contrast to studies on media reportage of the 
Bougainville and Vietnam wars, there is much disagreement concerning the role of the 
Australian mass media in reporting the East Timor conflict. Tiffen (2001, p. 104) argued that 
the mass media at times opposed the Australian government, though ‘too often the media 
took their cues about newsworthiness form what was “in play” in Canberra and Jakarta’.  In 
contrast, Burchill (Age, 15 March, 2000, p. 17) and Pilger (1998) both argued that the 
Murdoch press, including Australia’s only national newspaper, clearly supported the agenda of 
the Australian and Indonesian governments, in their reporting of the East Timor conflict.  
Thus, there is some question about the exact role played by the Australian mass media in 
recent conflicts.    
Writers in the liberal tradition, such as Young and Jesser (1997) and Marshall and Kingsbury 
(1996), point to the existence of criticism of the government in war reporting as evidence that 
the mass media play an oppositional role.  However, the fact that some journalists criticise the 
government does not necessarily imply that the media play an oppositional role.  As Chomsky 
(in Wintinock and Achbar, 1994) points out, most criticism in the mass media serves to 
legitimise government agendas, because it is kept within certain bounds.  Pilger (1997, p. 23) 
illustrates this point by referring to the observations of a group of Russians who toured the 
U.S. long before the end of the Soviet Union: 
They were astonished to find, after reading the newspapers and watching television, that 
all the opinions on the vital issues were the same.  ‘In our country’, they said, ‘to get that 
result we have a dictatorship.  We imprison people.  We tear out their fingernails.  Here 
you have none of that.  How do you do it?  What’s the secret?’ 
Moreover, Chomsky (in Achbar, 1994) argues that criticism of tactical issues only also serves 
to maintain the pretence of an oppositional media.  
The strength of the liberal approach is that it provides useful ideas for analysing how the 
media can sometimes challenge the power of the military and the government, for example, 
                                                                 
13 In the case of the Gulf War, Pilger (1997) argued that the Western media, including the Australian media, played a 
legitimising role.  However, Tiffen (1992) is less convinced of this.  He disagreed with ‘the most fundamental criticism’ made 
by anti-war critics: that the media became ‘an arm of government, presenting an officially promoted view of the war.’  
(Tiffen, 1992, p. 134) He attributes the poor performance to circumstances and technology rather than complicity with the 
government agenda.  Tiffen (1992, p. 134) concluded as follows:  
The long range of the weaponry and the central importance of the air war put the media into a forced dependence upon 
military and political sources whose ability and willingness to inform were selective.  The media were also necessarily 
captive to the uncertainties and changing expectations which attend all major conflicts.  
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by journalists independently gathering news.  A serious weakness with the liberal approach is 
that many scholars have found the mass media often supportive of the Australian government 
agenda in the reporting of war.  Moreover, such reporting often cannot be simply attributed 
to the efforts of the military to manipulate and control the media.  This challenges one of the 
fundamental assumptions in the liberal approach, that the mass media in Australia play an 
oppositional role to government.  
The political-economic approach 
Writers in the ‘political-economic approach’ adopt a ‘dominant model’, viewing mass media as 
playing a key role in the domination of society by a small, privileged minority.  As McQuail 
(1994, p. 69) says, a dominant model: 
…sees media as subservient to other institutions, which are themselves interrelated.  Media 
organizations, in this view, are likely to be owned or controlled by a small number of 
powerful interests and to be similar in type and purpose.  They disseminate a limited and 
undifferentiated view of the world shaped by the perspectives of ruling interests.  
Audiences are constrained or conditioned to accept the view of the world offered, with 
little critical response.  The result is to reinforce and legitimate the prevailing structure of 
power and to head off change by filtering out alternative voices. 
Writers in this tradition also emphasise ‘structural’ factors, which according to McQuail (1994, 
p. 9) means that they focus on the relationship between ‘media systems and organisations’ and 
social structures in society.  McChesney (1998, p. 3) observes that writers in this tradition are 
concerned with:  
…how ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. advertising) and government policies 
influence media behaviour and content.  This line of inquiry emphasises structural factors 
and the labor process in the production, distribution and consumption of communication.  
(McChesney, 1998, p. 3) 
In line with their adoption of the dominant model, writers in the political-economic tradition 
(for example Schiller, 1992, Kellner, 1992, Herman and Chomsky, 1988) argue that the media 
play a legitimising role when reporting war.  This contrasts with the view of writers in the 
liberal tradition who argue that the mass media play an adversarial role.  
Theoretical support for the political-economic approach to war reporting stems from a 
variety of traditions, including neo-Marxist (Schiller, 1984, Parenti, 1989, 1993) and power 
elite (Mills, 1959, Domhoff, 1990).  Many of the assumptions in political-economic writing 
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are also held by writers in other critical approaches such as critical theory (Gramsci, 1957, 
Kellner, 1992, 1995) liberal humanism (such as Carey, 1995) and radical pluralism (such as 
Lindblom, 1977). For the purposes of this thesis, I will concentrate on an important exemplar 
of the political-economic approach, Herman and Chomsky (1988) ‘propaganda model’. 
Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 306) claim that the mass media are ideological institutions 
that: 
…carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by reliance on market forces, 
internalized assumptions, and self censorship, and without significant overt coercion.  
They offer convincing evidence that the mass media play a legitimising role by comparing 
countless cases of mass media reporting of war.  They observe that the presentation of news 
in the mass media conforms to a consistent dichotomous pattern.  Herman and Chomsky 
(1988, p. 33) used the concept of ‘worthy and unworthy victims’ to describe this pattern: 
A propaganda system will consistently portray people abused in enemy states as worthy 
victims, whereas those treated with equal or greater severity by its own government or 
clients will be unworthy.   
They observe that, typically, the mass media pay much attention to the victims of official 
enemies, giving them coverage which tends to excite and enrage the reader.  In other words, 
these victims become ‘worthy’ of our sympathy and attention.  In contrast, ‘unworthy victims’ 
are likely to be ignored or their suffering downplayed.  They are portrayed as less ‘worthy’ of 
our sympathy.  An example of dichotomous reporting is the recent mass media reporting of 
the bombing of New York’s twin towers on September 11 2001.  As Pilger (2001, 
http://www.zmag.org/pilgertruthes.htm) observes, the mass media focus on the victims of 
the twin towers whilst ignoring the victims of the U.S. and its friends in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
…more Iraqi children die every month, mostly as a result of the Anglo-American 
embargo, than the total number of dead in the twin towers, a truth that is not allowed to 
enter public consciousness.  The killing of Iraqi infants, like the killing of Chechens, like 
the killing of Afghan civilians, is rated less morally abhorrent than the killing of 
Americans.  
Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 33) argue that by focussing on victims in enemy states rather 
than those who are victimised by the U.S. and its friends, the mass media serve domestic  
 20 
power interests14.  Pilger (2001, http://www.zmag.org/pilgertruthes.htm) argues that the mass 
media’s dichotomous treatment of U.S. – as opposed to Afghan and Iraqi – victims is 
influenced by U.S. foreign policy interests in Afghanistan: 
The twin towers attacks provided Bush's Washington with both a trigger and a remarkable 
coincidence. Pakistan's former foreign minister Niaz Naik has revealed that he was told by 
senior American officials in mid-July that military action against Afghanistan would go 
ahead by the middle of October.  The US secretary of state, Colin Powell, was then 
travelling in central Asia, already gathering support for an anti-Afghanistan war 
‘coalition’.  For Washington, the real problem with the Taliban was not human rights; 
these were irrelevant.  The Taliban regime simply did not have total control of 
Afghanistan: a fact that deterred investors from financing oil and gas pipelines from the 
Caspian Sea, whose strategic position in relation to Russia and China and whose largely 
untapped fossil fuels are of crucial interest to the Americans.  In 1998, Dick Cheney told 
oil industry executives: ‘I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as 
suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian.’ 
To explain the consistent dichotomous pattern in news presentation, Herman and Chomsky 
(1988) looked to ‘structural’ factors: ownership, advertising, sourcing, ‘flak’ and ideology.  
They referred to these as the ‘five filters’ through which information must pass before it 
emerges as news which is ‘fit to print’.  As Herman (1998, p. 192) states:  
The crucial structural factors derive from the fact that the dominant media are firmly 
embedded in the market system.  They are profit-seeking businesses, owned by very 
wealthy people (or other companies); and they are funded largely by advertisers who are 
also profit-seeking entities and who want their ads to appear in a supportive selling 
environment.  The media are also dependent on government and major business firms as 
information sources; and efficiency and political solidarity to prevail between the 
government, major media and other corporate businesses.  Government and large non-
media business firms are also best positioned (and sufficiently wealthy) to be able to 
pressure the media with threats of withdrawal of advertising or TV licences, libel suits and 
other direct and indirect modes of attack [‘flak’].  The media are also constrained by the 
dominant ideology, which heavily featured anticommunism before and during the Cold 
War era and was mobilized often to cause the media to refrain from criticising attacks on 
small states labeled communist.  (My emphasis) 
                                                                 
14  Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 33) wrote:  
Whilst the focus on Cambodia in the Pol Pot era (and thereafter) was exceedingly serviceable, as Cambodia had fallen to 
the communists and useful lessons could be drawn by attention to their victims, the numerous victims of the U.S. 
bombing before the communist takeover were scrupulously ignored by the U.S. elite press.  After Pol Pot’s ouster by the 
Vietnamese, the United States quietly shifted support to this ‘worse than Hitler’ villain, with little notice in the press, which 
adjusted once again to the national political agenda.  
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Several writers (Connell, 1977, McGregor, 1997, Ward, 1995, Carey, 1995) who have studied 
the Australian mass media provide evidence which supports the Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
model.   
Carey (1995), a colleague of Chomsky, studied corporate propaganda in Australia and the U.S. 
during the 20th century.  He argued that the media in both countries supported propaganda 
campaigns which were aimed at advancing the political objectives of privileged segments of 
the population15. 
Writers from outside of the political-economic tradition have also provided support for the 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) model.  Ward (1995) explored reporter-source relations in 
Australian newspapers.  He found that journalists were readily captured by sources and that 
government and corporate sources were able to shape news.  White (cited in Ward, 1995, p. 
177) suggests that journalists, as a matter of course, use government press releases despite not 
trusting them.  This, he argues, is a shift from the previous practice to ‘distrust and discard’ 
such material. In 1983, the Hawke government established its own media unit, the ‘National 
Media Liaison Service’ (NMLS) which, according to Ward (1995, p. 170) 
has wielded a considerable influence over the ways in which [Parliamentary Press] Gallery 
members report federal politics, by providing them with, in effect, information subsidies.  
Paul Kelly, a former Gallery correspondent and now editor-in-chief of the Australian, once 
described aNiMLS [the pejorative term for NMLS] as a ‘defacto research unit for the press 
gallery’…. 
The only detailed studies (Cronau, 1994, Watts, 1996a, 1999c, Watts and Porszolt, 1993) of 
Australian mass media reporting of the Bougainville War also support the Herman and 
Chomsky (1988) model.  For example, Cronau (1994, p. 173), using a combination of the 
political-economic approach and the cultural approach (discussed below, p. 27) reviewed 
literature, analysed news reports and interviewed several Australian journalists who covered 
the Bougainville War.  He argued that the majority of reporting in the Australian mass media, 
such as the ABC and the Sydney Morning Herald, was influenced by factors relating to the 
political economy of the media, as explained by Herman and Chomsky (1988). 
                                                                 
15 Carey (1995) argued that after the election of the Whitlam government (in 1972), Australian business elites became more 
convinced that propaganda was necessary to promote their political aims.  He presented evidence of the extensive use of 
business propaganda:  For example that around 50% of the content of newspapers was written directly from corporate public 
relations news releases.  He also argued that the change in public debate towards the agenda of ‘economic rationalism’ was a 
direct result of intentional propaganda programs.  Organisations like the Business Council of Australia who funded the right 
wing think tanks designed and carried out these programs.  Some of these programs, known as ‘treetops propaganda’, were 
directed at academics and journalists.  
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The propaganda model has been subjected to many criticisms.  However, for reasons of space 
I will only deal in detail with the most important of these:  
Firstly, that the model is a conspiracy theory.  
Secondly, that it relies on a distinction between truth and ideology. 
Thirdly, that it is functionalist and deterministic. 
Marshall and Kingsbury (1996) claim the propaganda model is a conspiracy theory, quoting 
critics such as the editor of the New York Times who appeared in Wintonick and Achbar’s 
(1992) film on Chomsky’s ideas, Manufacturing Consent.  They argued that since there was little 
evidence of conspiracies in the media in Australia, the model is not applicable to our mass 
media.  Interestingly, they ignored Chomsky’s (in Achbar, 1994, pp. 61, 113-14) convincing 
rebuttal of these criticisms, which appeared in the same film.  Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 
xii) clearly state that the model is not based on conspiracy theories, but is closer to a guided 
market analysis (see also above, p. 20).  Likewise, Herman (1998, p. 195) refutes the claim 
arguing that such critics make a  
…superficial assumption that, as the media comprise thousands of ‘independent’ 
journalists and companies, any finding that they follow a ‘party line’ serving the state must 
rest on an assumed conspiracy.  (In fact, it can result from a widespread gullible 
acceptance of official handouts , common internalized beliefs, fear of reprisal for critical 
analysis, etc.)   The apologists can’t abide the notion that institutional factors can cause a 
‘free’ media to act like lemmings in jointly disseminating false and even silly propaganda; 
such a charge must assume a conspiracy.   
Other refutations of the ‘conspiracy theory’ criticism can be found in Herman (1998, p 195-
6). 
Regarding the second criticism, Foucault argued that political and theoretical action based on 
a distinction between truth and ideology was impossible.  This eliminates most arguments 
about truth, which have stemmed from liberal humanist and Marxist politics. (Barker, 1993).  
Foucault (1984) argues that:  
It is not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be [a] 
chimera, for truth is already power), but of detaching the power of truth from forms of 
hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.  
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Notwithstanding the central role of ideology in the propaganda model, Herman and 
Chomsky’s (1988) methodology is not based on the truth/ideology dichotomy.  In their case 
studies, where they do point to distortion in news coverage, they point out that they are not 
interested in whether the media tells the truth.  Instead, they compare sources which are 
ordinarily defined as legitimate (such as United Nations reports, Amnesty International 
reports, court judgements and government documents) with the versions which are printed in 
the press. 
The third criticism of Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) model is that it is deterministic and 
functionalist.  According to Herman (1999) analysts such as Schlesinger, Curran, Golding, 
Eldridge and Graham Murdock criticise the model on these grounds.  However, he argues 
that of these, only Schlesinger both summarises the elements of the model and discusses 
Herman and Chomksy’s (1988) evidence. Schlesinger (1989. p. 301) acknowledges that their 
case studies make valuable points, but concludes that the model is a  
…highly deterministic vision of how the media operate, coupled with a straightforward 
functionalist conception of ideology. 
Herman (1998) argues that this criticism is based on a straw-person argument, since any 
model has deterministic elements.  He argues that determinism is only a problem if it can be 
shown that a model is not logically consistent, operates on false premises or is a poor 
predictor of determined variables.  He observes that the critics have agreed that the case 
studies are powerful.  However, he argues that they have not shown where the alleged 
determinisms lead to error.  Furthermore, he says, they have not pointed to any alternative 
models that will do a better job.   
The allegation of determinism ignores that the model seeks to provide only a broad 
framework. Herman (1998, p. 199) acknowledges that the model is dealing with 
extraordinarily complex sets of events, that it ‘requires modification depending on many local 
and special factors’ and that it ‘may be entirely inapplicable in some cases’.   However, this 
does not diminish the model as a tool for analysis.  As Herman (1998, p. 199) argues, the 
model is useful in important cases and is defensible unless a better model is provided.   
The second part of this criticism, that the model is functionalist, also does not invalidate use 
of the model.  Herman (1988) argues that the strength of the model is that it describes a 
complex process whereby the media serves the elite.  He argues that this is merit, because it 
shows a dynamic and self-protecting system.  Furthermore, he argues that the critics are 
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inconsistent in that they sometimes seem to seek more functionalism.  He observes that 
Eldridge and Schlesinger, who have criticised the model on these grounds, contradictorily 
point to analyses that focus on ‘how media sources oganise media strategies’ (cited in 
Herman, 1998, p. 200).  He argues that according to these writers, focussing on 
microcorporate strategies are legitimate but focussing on global corporate strategies are 
‘illegitimate functionalism’ (Herman 1998, p. 200).  
Other criticisms of the model are adequately refuted by Herman (1998, p. 196-200)  
I have outlined the political-economic approach to the study of the mass media, focussing on 
an exemplar, the Herman and Chomsky (1988) propaganda model.  The strength of the 
model is that it takes into account a range of societal factors16.  However, we need to avoid 
using the model in the determinist fashion that critics of Herman and Chomsky (1988) have 
warned against.   
The importance of theoretical models such as Herman and Chomsky (1988) is that they aid 
the construction of a better society by conceptualising structures of domination and 
resistance.  As Kellner (1995, p. 25) argues: 
Critical social theories are weapons of critique and instruments of practice, as well as 
cognitive maps.  Critical theory points to aspects of society and culture that should be 
challenged and changed, and thus attempts to inform and inspire political practice.  
Practice-oriented theory also posits certain goals and values that are to be realized and 
sketches ways to transform society to make it better, to increase human freedom and 
happiness. They provide vocabularies that help mobilize responses to social problems and 
issues, and thus aim at intervention in the public sphere.  
The Herman and Chomsky (1988) model has been rigorously and thoroughly developed, 
applied in relevant studies and criticisms of the model have been convincingly refuted or can 
be accommodated into the present study.  Thus, the model provides a very satisfactory tool 
for analysing press reporting of violent incidents in the Bougainville War. 
                                                                 
16 As McChesney (1998, p. 3-4) argues:  
The political economy of communication cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of all communication activity, but 
it can explain certain issues extremely well and it provides a necessary context for most other research question in 
communication. 
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The post-structuralist approach 
Writers in the post-structuralist tradition reject reference to social structures in social theory 
and instead emphasise discourse.  As Barker (2000, p.  18) argues, post-structuralists reject: 
… the idea of an underlying stable structure which founds meaning through fixed binary 
pairs (black-white; good-bad).  Rather, meaning is unstable, being always deferred and in 
process.  Meaning cannot be confined to single words, sentences or particular texts but is 
the outcome of relationships between texts, that is, intertextuality.   
The post-structuralist approach ‘recognises differences and ambiguities in communication’ 
and ‘power relations which may be encoded in messages’. (Marshall and Kingsbury, 1996, p. 
22) Writers typically understood to be part of the post-structuralist tradition include Foucault 
(1984) and the post-modernists, Derrida (cited in Marshall and Kingsbury, 1996) and 
Baudrillard (1995). 
Foucault (1984) argues that truth cannot be divorced from power.  Rather, he argues, truth is 
attached to various forms of hegemony, ‘social economic and cultural’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 74-
5).  Foucault (1984) argues that the media form a key institution in the production of ‘truth’ 
and that in ‘societies like ours, the political economy of truth is characterized’ by a number of  
‘important traits.’  One of these, is that ‘truth’ is:  
…produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great 
political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media). (Foucault, 1984, p. 
73, my emphasis)  
The strength of post-structuralist theory is that it leads us to question the value of social 
theory as an absolute truth.  As Kellner (1995, p. 24) argues: 
Post-structuralist theory has made us aware that theories are constructs, products of 
specific social discourses, practices and institutions and thus do not transcend their social 
fields.  Traditional theories that claim to provide a foundation of truth which transcends 
the interests of particular theories, have been widely rejected, as have positivist theories 
which claim that science provides a privileged mode of truth to which all theory should 
aspire.  Against positivism, it is generally agreed that there is no such thing as an 
immaculate perception, that seeing, interpreting, explaining and so on are all mediated by 
theoretical discourses and embedded in theoretical assumptions.  
Yet this does not mean that Foucault argues to abandon social theory altogether, as Kellner 
(1995, p. 24) argues:  
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…with Foucault, it is perhaps better to conceive of theories as instruments, as providing 
tools in a toolkit, or… as weapons used to attack specific targets.   
One important example of the post-structuralist approach to war reporting is the work of 
Baudrillard (1995) who studied the mass media reporting of the Gulf War.  According to 
Baudrillard (1995), the ‘Gulf War’ was merely a ‘technological simulacrum’ – a product of the 
mass media – which was made in the interests of U.S. imperialism, rather than an actual event 
which took place in the Middle East.  Baudrillard (1995, p. 76) argues that:  
This Gulf War is … a sham, so paltry: the point is not to rehabilitate other wars, but rather 
that the recourse to the same pathos is all the more odious when there is not even an alibi 
of a war.  
The presumption of information and the media here doubles as the political arrogance of 
the Western empire.  All those journalists who set themselves up as bearers of the 
universal conscience, all those presenters who set themselves up as strategists, all the 
while overwhelming us with a flood of useless images.  
The elements of his argument are as follows:  
1. There are certain agreed and defined characteristics of war, for example, that it is a 
military confrontation between adversaries.   
2. These characteristics were not part of what actually took place in Iraq during ‘Operation 
Desert Storm’.  In fact, this operation involved, primarily the bombing of thousands of 
people who were defenceless or at least, virtually so.  
3. The ‘Gulf War’ as a media event was not reflective of what actually happened. 
4. Therefore, the ‘Gulf War’ did not take place.  
There are a number of problems with Baudrillard’s (1995) approach.  Firstly, Baudrillard 
(1995) deals only with text without explicit reference to a reality which may exist outside of 
text.  As Norris (cited in Cloud, 1994, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?Did=000000005964061&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=
24&Sid=4&RQT=309) argues, by adopting the relativist philosophical and textual stance of 
other postmodernists, Baudrillard (1995) has ‘abdicated grounds in which to evaluate the war’.  
He argues that:  
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…the problem with various poststructuralist intellectual movements …is their treatment of 
language and texts as entities without reference to a world we might designate as ‘real’. 
Secondly, Baudrillard (1995) makes the questionable assumption that the mass media 
construct truth which is not at least partly based on actual events.  This fails to account for 
instances of mass media reporting of the war which do just that.  For example, during the 
Gulf War, Peter Arnett (cited in Adubato, 1997) of CNN (Cable News Network) reported on 
February 13, 1991, the U.S. bombing of the bunker/shelter at Amiriya.  CNN aired Arnett’s 
report despite the fact that it challenged the agenda of the U.S. government.  Likewise, Barnes 
(1994, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?Did=000000006104221&Fmt=3&Deli=1&Mtd=1&Idx=
28&Sid=2&RQT=309&L=1 ) dismisses ‘Baudrillard’s fanciful claims about the Gulf War 
being only a CNN production’.  
I am not arguing that by airing segments such as Arnett’s report, the mass media presented a 
version of the Gulf War which was not divorced from the interests of power.  As Adubato 
(1997) found, Arnett’s critical reporting was not typical of mass media coverage of the Gulf 
War.  However, I argue that journalists drew, at least in part, on real events when reporting 
the Gulf War and not solely on the requirements of U.S. political domination, as Baudrillard 
(1995) suggests.  
Thirdly, Baudrillard (1995) is inconsistent in dealing with the concept of ‘truth’.  In the post-
structuralist tradition, he asserts that we should not be trapped into establishing the ‘truth’ of 
the ‘war’ (cited in Patton, 1995, p. 14).  Yet a belief in such truth is implicit in Baudrillard’s 
(1995) argument.  He argues that the ‘Gulf War’ presented in the media was different to what 
actually happened.  This presupposes that he knows what ‘actually happened’ and in turn, 
implies that it is important to know this ‘truth’ about the war.  
The strength of the post-structuralist approach is that it reminds us of the connection 
between truth and power and that we need to use social theory as a tool for analysis rather 
than to find the absolute truth.  However, there are serious doubts that a strictly textual 
approach favoured by post-structuralists is the most satisfying one for a study of war 
reporting.  
The cultural approach 
 According to McChesney (1998, p. 4) the cultural approach:  
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…is often concerned with the relationship of media ‘texts’ to audiences and both of them 
to existing class and social relations, but it is mostly uninterested in examining the 
structural factors that influence the production of media content.   
McQuail (1994) includes writers such as Carey (1988), Hall (1977) and Fiske (1989) in this 
approach.  I have also included Saussure (cited in Barker, 2000) and Hartley (1982).  
Said (1978, 1981) is an important scholar in the cultural tradition.  He extended the discourse 
analysis of Foucault17, studying how truth intersects with European domination of the Third 
World.  He studied academic and media discourse about the third world and in particular how 
it represents political conflicts. According to Said (1978, 1981), concepts such as ‘Orientalism’ 
and ‘Islam’ have been discursively constructed under the regime of Western institutions.  As 
such, these constructs should be seen as part of the domination of the West over the Third 
World.    
According to Said (1978, p. 2),  ‘Orientalism’ refers to the Western academic tradition and 
style of thought which is based on the premise of the distinction between East and West 
(Said, 1978, p. 2).  The concept can be understood as the ‘corporate institution for dealing 
with the orient’ or as ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over 
the Orient.’  (Said, 1978, p. 3). 
Given its history of domination by imperialist European powers (see above, p. 6), 
Bougainville would be a very interesting case to use Saidian analysis.  Potential questions for 
such an analysis could include how much was the reporting of the events and their context 
couched in racist or essentialist terms?  How much has the imperialist relationship between 
Australia and Bougainville influenced the discourse in the press on the Bouganville War? 
An example of Saidian analysis is that of LaFitte (1991, 1992) who identified aspects of 
Australian media reporting which essentialised the Bougainville War.  LaFitte (1992) noted 
that in Australia, there was an absence of a public debate of any serious attempt to read the 
indigenous Melanesian culture. He asserted that reporters’ questions, about the use of 
Australian helicopters in the commission of human rights abuses in Bougainville, had been 
predicated on the assumption that:  
                                                                 
17 See Said, 1978, p. 3, where he describes the influence of Foucault on his thoughts about orientalism and Said, 1981, where 
he introduces the concept of Islam, which is based on orientalism. 
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Australia, as a civilised nation, must uphold standards of conduct to which Papua New 
Guinea could not be expected to adhere… we are the upholders of civilized norms, they 
are the savages.  (LaFitte, 1992, p. 5) 
This is reminiscent of the orientalist duality of the West and the Third World of which Said 
(1978) writes.  
Cerulo (1998), also writing in the cultural tradition, has developed an interesting model of 
media portrayal of violence.  Her work is in the tradition of narration researchers such as 
James Carey, Michael Gurevitch and Gaye Tuchman (Cerulo, 1998).  She argues that in the 
reporting of political conflict, the media can portray violence as either legitimate or 
unacceptable.  Cerulo (1998, p. 5) found that specific sequences were used, which conveyed 
the stories from different perspectives, as she writes:  
Victim sequences present violence from the perspective of the injured party.  In contrast, 
performer sequences unfold violent events from the perspective of the person who 
commits the act.  Contextual sequences prioritize the circumstances surrounding a violent 
act.  Finally, doublecasting sequences highlight individuals who play a dual role – both the 
victim and the perpetrator of violence. (Emphasis in text.) 
Thus, Cerulo (1998) provides a potential way of describing the representation of the 
Bougainville war by analysing sequences.  She also offers an explanation for the way 
journalists choose certain sequences rather than others.  Cerulo, (1998, p. 6) claims that 
cultural conventions influenced the choice of sequences: 
…strong cultural conventions – conventions linked to narrators' perceptions of audience 
morality – lead storytellers to systematically invoke particular sequences at different times.  
Specifically, storytellers sequence heinous, unacceptable acts – acts I refer to as deviant 
violence – in ways that differ dramatically from justifiable, acceptable acts – [which I call] 
normal violence.  Similarly, ambiguous violence – acts too difficult to classify – enjoy 
their own unique formatting style. (Emphasis in text.) 
She argues that the tendency of journalists to invoke particular sequences in different contexts 
was influenced by their socialisation, especially their training.  
In cases of overt war, violence is presented as either ‘normal’ or ‘deviant’ depending on which 
side is the perpetrator.  She considered the examples of the dropping of the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  In the latter case, President Roosevelt, 
as part of his address, said:  
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(‘contextual’ or ‘doublecasting’) sequence is used.  In the case of terrorism, she found that in 
some cases, it was depicted as ‘normal’ violence and others, as ‘deviant’ violence.  
A problem with Cerulo’s (1998) use of terms such as and ‘ethnic violence’ and ‘terrorism’ is 
that they have often been used subjectively in media discourse.  For example, Chomsky and 
Herman (1979) argued that the conventional definition of ‘terrorism’ is dependent on 
domestic power interests.  Hence, Pilger (2001) observed that the mass media referred to the 
September 11 attack on the NY Twin Towers as ‘terrorism’.  He contrasts this with the illegal 
U.S. involvement in the ‘Contra’ terror against Nicaragua in the 1980s.  In the latter case, the 
U.S. became the only state to ever be convicted in the World Court for international terrorism 
– yet the mass media does not refer to these U.S. international crimes as ‘terrorism’. 
Another problem with Cerulo’s (1998) model concerns her reasons for why journalists use 
certain sequences in certain circumstances.  Her explanation, cited above, is ‘that cultural 
conventions – lead storytellers to systematically invoke particular sequences at different 
times.’  This is vague. It begs the question of what is ‘culture’ and ignores the fact that culture 
is made up of many different and conflicting elements.  
Cerulo (1998) offers a neat tool for analysis which can be used to describe the reporting in 
newspapers of incidents of violence in the Bougainville War.   However, as I have argued 
above, there are problems with using her model for both describing and understanding 
reporting of war.  
Discussion 
In this thesis, I aim to continue the project of Meehan, Mosko and Wasko (1994) who sought 
to use a synthesis of political-economic and cultural approaches to the study of mass 
communication and society. Meehan, Mosco and Wasko (1994, p. 348) advocate an ‘holistic 
approach to study of culture and communication – an approach firmly rooted in political 
economy.’  I will adopt a framework for describing and explaining reporting which is 
grounded in political economy, uses cultural theory, but which takes account of post-
structuralist theory.  I will also use elements of the liberal approach.   
My framework draws principally on Herman and Chomksy (1988), who write in the political-
economic tradition, and Cerulo (1998), who writes in the cultural tradition.  An analysis of 
press reporting of the Bougainville War using Said (1978, 1981) would promise to be most 
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interesting.  However, for reasons of space, I will only be able to use one approach from the 
cultural tradition.  I have chosen the Cerulo (1998) model, which, as I have argued above, 
provides a highly satisfactory tool for analysis.  In using these models, I am conscious of the 
warning of post-structuralist writers, that, the models are tools for analysis rather than paths 
to absolute truth.  I use elements of the liberal approach because it is helpful in explaining 
processes in press reporting which may not be accounted for by the ‘structural’ factors which 
are outlined by Herman and Chomsky (1988). 
I use several of the models described above to address the research question, how did the 
Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age report three violent incidents in 1996?  I will 
use Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) concept of ‘worthy and unworthy victims’ to analyse 
certain elements of the reporting.  The results of this analysis will have implications for the 
role which the newspapers played in reporting the three incidents.  If the newspapers 
consistently portrayed the victims of the PNGDF as ‘unworthy’ compared to the victims of 
the BRA, this would suggest that the newspapers played a legitimising rather than adversarial 
role. I will analyse certain elements of the reporting using Herman and Chomsky (1988), 
Cerulo (1998) and Hartley (1982).  These elements are as follows: 
1. Attention and prominence.   
2. Rhetoric. 
3. Use of various sources. 
4. Critical stance of the newspapers toward PNG officials. 
5. The portrayal of the moral aspects of the violence. 
Firstly, attention and prominence.  I will examine how much attention has been given to the 
incident, taking note of how many items were published and their size.  I will also anlayse 
headlines and placement of items to determine the amount of prominence given to stories 
about each incident.  As Herman and Chomsky (1988) observed, ‘unworthy victims’ are likely 
to be ignored in comparison to ‘worthy’ victims who are likely to be the focus of many news 
items, often for a long period.  They also argued that stories of ‘worthy victims’ are likely to 
appear on the front-page of newspapers and be featured in headlines.    
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Secondly, I will examine the rhetoric of reporting.  This will include aspects such as the 
vocabulary, details and context used when reporting an incident.  According to Saussurre 
(cited in Barker, 2000, p. 67) narrators select from a paradigmatic field of signs and thus 
produce a certain meaning for the story.  Hartley (1982, p. 20) gives the following example:  
(Paradigmatic) 
Soldiers 
Freedom fighters 
Terrorists 
à   à   à    à    à    à   today attacked       à   à   à    
volunteers          liberated 
gunman 
 
Using the words ‘terrorists attacked’ suggests that the perpetrators were engaged in an 
unacceptable act of violence.  Herman and Chomsky (1988) would suggest that the press 
would be more likely to use these words, rather than ‘soldiers liberated’, in reporting about 
‘worthy victims’.  According to Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 43) details and context can be 
used as well as vocabulary to emphasise the suffering of the victims and to ‘generate the 
maximum emotional impact on readers’.  For example, in the case of the political murder of, 
a Polish priest – a ‘worthy victim’ – by the Polish Police in 1984, during the Cold War, the 
New York Times (cited in Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. 45) reported that: 
The priest’s bent legs were tied to a noose around his neck in such a way that if he 
straightened them he would be strangled.  
The third element is the use of sources.  I will analyse press reporting in light of claims, 
evidence and analyses obtained from a wide variety of sources, most of which were accessible 
by the mass media.  Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that in reporting ‘unworthy victims’ 
the mass media are less likely to use unofficial sources, but rather rely on government 
accounts.  I will examine how journalists used unofficial and dissident sources, such as the 
Bougainville Interim Government (BIG), Amnesty International and Bougainvillean refugees 
as opposed to the PNG government and the PNGDF (Papua New Guinea Defence Force). 
The fourth element of reporting I will describe is criticism of the PNG government and 
military.  I will examine how critical the three newspapers were in relation to the three 
incidents.  In doing so, I will follow examples offered by Tiffen (2001) and Herman and 
Chomksy (1988).  Tiffen (2001, p. 46) in addressing the Australian mass media reaction to the 
Dili massacre, observed that  
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…most news media reported Indonesian statements, but sometimes also quoted witnesses 
who refuted the claims about the provocation and violence by demonstrators. 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) provide a more complex analysis of media criticism of 
government.  For example, in their analysis of the critical stance of the U.S. media toward 
U.S. policy in Vietnam, they distinguished between strategic and tactical criticisms of 
government policy.  Strategic criticisms related to the survival of the ‘state capitalist’ system 
and the major goals of the government.  In contrast, they argued that tactical criticisms were 
concerned with how the U.S. government and military set out to achieve these objectives.  
They found that the media mainly accepted and promoted the strategic objectives without 
question.  Often this was done by assuming certain premises – such as that the U.S. had a 
right to use military aggression against the Vietnamese.  Tactical issues, such as whether or 
not the Vietnam War was too costly was, later in the war, debated in the media. However, the 
general premise of the U.S. right to use aggression (which related to the survival of the U.S.-
imperial system) was never in question.  
In my analysis in chapters two and three, I will examine the extent to which the three 
newspapers offered a critical stance toward PNG officials.  In particular, I will focus on how 
much the press: 
· Made counterposing statements to those from PNG officials; 
· adopted a critical stance toward strategic as opposed to tactical issues of Australian 
foreign policy.   
Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that in reporting ‘unworthy victims’ the press will be less 
likely to criticise the domestic government on strategic issues of foreign policy.  The analysis 
which I have discussed above will test this aspect of the model in relation to Australian 
foreign policy in 1996.  Furthermore, this part of the analysis will give a clear indication of to 
what extent the three newspapers played an oppositional role in reporting the three incidents 
in 1996.  
The fifth element of reporting that I will describe will be the legitimacy of the violence.  I will 
examine this in each case by using Cerulo’s (1998) model.   I will focus on leads and headlines 
and discuss the implications as to how the three newspapers viewed the violence in moral 
terms. Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) model suggests that the press would judge violence 
perpetrated by the PNGDF to be more legitimate than that perpetrated by the BRA.  
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and the number of front-page articles. 
I will also present quantitative evidence comparing the sequencing used in reporting the 
various incidents.  I will present one table showing the sequences used in leads and another 
for the headlines.  From this, we may see if the three newspapers presented the violence of 
one side as more legitimate than the other side.  I will demonstrate that the newspapers 
portrayed violence perpetrated by the PNGDF as more legitimate than that perpetrated by 
the BRA (Bougainville Revolutionary Army).  This suggests that the victims of the PNGDF 
were portrayed as ‘unworthy’ compared to the victims of the BRA. 
Thus, I will present qualitative and quantitative evidence to describe, compare and contrast 
the reporting in each of the cases, using a range of measures.  The overriding aim will be to 
demonstrate whether the newspapers portrayed the victims of the BRA in the battle of Kangu 
Beach as more ‘worthy’ than the victims of the PNGDF in the two massacres at Simbo and 
Malabita.  I will demonstrate in chapters two to four that there was a dichotomous pattern in 
the reporting of the three incidents.  The three newspapers consistently portrayed victims of 
the PNGDF as less ‘worthy’ than victims of the BRA. 
Turning to the second research question – how do we best understand the process of press 
reportage of the three incidents?  I use two approaches: the political-economic approach as 
exemplified by Herman and Chomsky (1988) and the liberal approach.  According to writers 
in the liberal tradition, the mass media play an adversarial role in society.  However, they 
concede that in reporting war, certain circumstances limit the ability of the mass media to play 
this role.  As Young and Jesser (1997) argue, these circumstances are often a result of 
deliberate attempts by governments and military forces involved in the war to manipulate and 
control reporting.  Writers in the political-economic tradition argue that the media play a 
‘system supportive’ (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) or legitimising role in war reporting.  They 
argue that the mass media are complicit in this role rather than being passively controlled or 
manipulated by governments and military forces.  My analysis in chapter four, which is aimed 
at understanding the process of press reporting, will proceed by comparing the heuristic value 
of both the political-economic and liberal approaches to war reporting.  I will use the findings 
from the descriptive analysis of press reporting together with evidence obtained from 
interviews with journalists who reported the three incidents.  
As I discussed above (p. 31), Cerulo (1998) does not provide a comprehensive and satisfying 
explanation for the sequencing patterns found in press reporting.  On the other hand, using 
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both the liberal and political-economic approaches will provide an understanding of the 
process of press reporting which will adequately reflect the complexity of those processes.  
_____________________________________ 
I have argued that the most useful framework to adopt in this thesis is one which is grounded 
in political economy, uses the cultural and liberal approaches and takes account of the post-
structuralist approach.  To describe the pattern of reporting, I will use Herman and 
Chomsky’s (1988) concept of ‘worthy and unworthy victims’, complemented by Cerulo’s 
(1998) analysis of sequencing in narratives and Hartley’s (1982) analysis of vocabulary.  This 
will have implications as to the extent to which the three newspapers played a legitimising – 
rather than counterbalancing – role in their reporting of the three incidents.  To explain the 
pattern of reporting, I will compare the approaches of Herman and Chomsky (1988) and 
Young and Jesser (1997).  This discussion will address the following theoretical issues:  
· The extent to which the pattern of reporting can be explained by the manipulation 
and control of information by the PNG and Australian governments. 
· the extent to which reporting can be explained by ‘structural’ factors, such as the 
role of government as a source of news, rather than other factors, such as the lack 
of reliable information.   
I now turn to an analysis of reporting in three newspapers of the first two incidents, which 
occurred at Simbo and Kangu Beach.  
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Chapter two 
REPORTING OF INCIDENTS AT SIMBO AND KANGU BEACH 
 
On 25 January 1996, between ten and twelve civilians were killed by the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force (PNGDF) and their allied militia – the ‘Resistance’ – at Simbo village, near 
Buin, in south Bougainville (see map, Fig 2-1, below, p. 39).  Eight months later, in early 
September 1996, eleven PNGDF troops and two of their allied militia were killed by the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and ‘Resistance’ members who had defected to 
them, during a battle at Kangu Beach on the southern tip of the island (see Fig. 2-1, below, p. 
39).   
In this chapter I ask, how were these two, quite different, incidents reported in the Age, the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian?   
I draw on a range of theoretical frameworks which I identified in chapter one as having some 
prospective interpretive value.  I compare how the victims of Simbo and Kangu Beach were 
portrayed in the three newspapers.   
Using Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model, I argue that the victims of the 
PNGDF at Simbo were portrayed as ‘unworthy’ compared to the victims of the BRA at 
Kangu Beach, who were portrayed as ‘worthy’.  In other words, there was a dichotomous 
pattern of reporting, whereby the Kangu Beach victims were portrayed more sympathetically 
than the Simbo victims were.  This has implications for the role of the three newspapers in 
reporting the two incidents.  Giving too much sympathy to the victims at Simbo could have 
challenged the Australian government agenda for Bougainville.  In 1996, the Australian 
government supported the objectives, if not the tactics, of the Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
government in its military operations in Bougainville.  Given this support, the dichotomous 
pattern of reporting suggests that the three newspapers played a legitimising rather than 
adversarial role in reporting the two incidents.   
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Figure 2-1: South and Central Bougainville and Western Solomon Islands.   
Adapted from Dorney (1998, p. 9). 
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Firstly, I discuss the case of Simbo, beginning with an examination of what actually 
happened, before turning to a description and analysis of reporting of the incident by 
the three newspapers. 
Simbo: ‘PNG soldier killed in shootout with rebels’  
We do not know exactly what happened at Simbo as there was no independent 
investigation18. The first Australian press reports on the incident were based on a 
Reuter (1996a) report which appeared under the headline, ‘PNG soldier killed in 
shootout with rebels’.  However, reports from other sources tell a different story.  The 
most convincing account of the incident was made by an eyewitness, Peter Naurai 
(cited in Havini, 1996), who was wounded at Simbo and evacuated to the Solomon 
Islands by the BRA.  He told Bougainvillean refugees in Honiara, the Solomons 
capital, that the attack began at 5 am.  The villagers, he said, heard gunfire and tried to 
run away but the central government forces attacked them at random with high-
powered automatic rifles and grenades.  Naurai (cited in Havini, 1996, p 49) said that:  
About 10 people died and others were injured including women men and children.  
The people in this village were all civilians.  
He named 9 out of the 10 killed. (Havini, 1996).  He also said that a pregnant woman 
was shot dead and her abdomen was cut open with a knife.  The soldiers, he said, 
then: 
…took out the fetus from her uterus….Later when the PNG military left, 
neighbours from the nearby village of Tulagai went and saw the fetus laying on 
the mother’s chest where the PNG military had left it.  The neighbours took the 
bodies & buried them in the cemetery.  (Interview by Bougainvillean refugees, 
cited in Havini, 1996, p. 49.) 
Many of the important details in this account were corroborated in other reports of  
                                                                 
18 There may have been an internal inquiry by the PNGDF, but if so it was not made public (Dorney, 1999).  There was no 
independent inquiry either.  According to Amnesty International (1997) and US Department of State (1998), despite requests 
from the UN to investigate human rights abuses, there was only one such independent inquiry, by a Commonwealth-
appointed Sri Lankan judge, which was made into the murder of Bougainvillean Premier, Theodore Miriung.  The judge 
found that certain PNGDF troops committed the murder. 
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the incident, including two from Bougainville19.  For example, the report by Morris Siriapi of 
the Independent Bougainville Information Service (IBIS, 20 cited in Watts, 1996a, p. 3) said 
that ‘a baby 8 months and 5 children’ were killed and gave the names and ages of the dead as 
follows:  
· Pampam Ligitai    Morou village    20 years 
· Patrick Tumo        Tuaokai village  21 years 
· Minou Roitua        Mainika village 22 years 
· Patrick Utumu       Simbo village    16 years 
· Charles Ona           Simbo village    15 years 
· David Nusirau        Simbo village    7 years 
· Josephine Beti        Simbo village    4 years 
· Theresia Monta      Simbo village    9 years 
· Piruke Siro             Simbo village    11 years 
· Mary Pateri            Simbo village    23 years 
· Usiah or Isiah         Simbo village    8 months 
                                                                 
19 Regarding the number killed and injured, Morris Siriapi (cited in Watts, 1996a, p. 3), from the Independent Bougainville 
Information Service, in Bougainville, stated that: 
Members of the PNGDF and resistance walked into the village … at 4 am … and mercilessly massacred to death 12 
civilians with 2 seriously injured.  Amongst the dead were a young mother, a baby of 8 months and 5 children. 
Ruby Mirinka (cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October, 1996, p. 7), a Bougainvillean nurse who was not allied to any of the 
warring parties, spoke at a conference in Sydney in October 1996 and stated that ten people were killed.  PNGDF sources 
(cited in Reuter, 1996a and Watts, 1999c) said that 15 Bougainvilleans were killed (they may have reported the two injured as 
killed).  The Solomon Star (cited in Havini, 1996) newspaper in Honiara reported that two people died as a result of being 
refused medical treatment in a PNGDF-controlled care centre, after being shot in an incident in the same area in late January. 
As for the report of the pregnant woman and her foetus being killed, this was also corroborated by Ruby Mirinka (cited in 
Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1996, p. 7).  Other reports indicated something similar.  Several other reports indicated that 
the attack occurred at Simbo (Siriapi, cited in Watts, 1999c, Reuter, 1996a, Mirinka, cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 14 
October, 1996, p. 7).  Papua New Guinea (PNG) security forces sources told Reuter (1996a) that ‘details were sketchy but it 
was likely a woman and child were among those killed’.  Likewise, Siriapi (cited in Watts, 1996a) stated that a young mother 
was killed. 
Naurai (cited in Havini, 1996) and Siriapi (cited in Watts, 1999c) also gave very similar accounts of the names, gender and 
ages of the victims.  There were some differences in the details but translation and other difficulties of obtaining information 
could explain these.  Given the diversity of Bougainvillean culture, witnesses and those who recorded and transmitted the 
statements may not have spoken the same language.  Also, communication between independence groups on Bougainville 
was often unreliable (Coles-Janess, 1999, O’Callaghan, 1999a, Palmer, 1999).  Likewise, radio communication between 
Bougainville and the Solomon Islands was rudimentary.  This may have affected the accuracy of the account finally arriving 
in Australia, w hich was originally transmitted by Siriapi.  
20  This organisation was established by Australian human rights lawyer, Rosemarie Gillespie, whilst she was on the island in 
the months before the incident took place. 
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· Andrew Saririn       Simbo village    1 1/2 years 
The two survivors of the massacre were Cecilia Taroroa (20 Years) and Uliar Noutau (? 
Years), now suffering from serious injuries.  
However, PNG security force sources (cited in Reuter, 1996a and Watts, 1999c) indicated, 
explicitly or implicitly, that the victims were BRA soldiers who were killed in a battle.  
Similarly, BRA sources speaking to Dorney (cited in Watts, 1999c) conceded that one 
PNGDF – and one BRA – soldier were killed in the incident.  This version of events is 
inconsistent with those of other sources.  When speaking to Reuter (1996a) BRA sources 
denied any losses at all.  The reports from Siriapi (cited in Watts, 1999c) Mirinka (cited in 
Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October, 1996, p. 7) a nd Naurai (cited in Havini, 1996) only 
mentioned civilian victims.  One PNGDF source in Bougainville told Watts (1996a) that he 
recognised one of the names from Siriapi’s (cited in Watts, 1999c, p. 4) list of civilians as a 
‘BRA killed at Simbo’.  The security forces’ claim that all of the dead were BRA is also 
inconsistent with their own statement (cited in Reuter, 1996a) that a woman and child were 
killed.  In commenting about the incident at Simbo, it is likely that the PNGDF troops 
followed the practice of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, who invariably referred to all dead 
(including women, children and elderly) as ‘Viet Cong’.  The PNGDF, similarly referred to all 
dead as ‘BRA’ or ‘rebels’ (Watts, 1997b).  However, if there was a battle, the important fact 
remains that many defenceless civilians were killed.   
There was some evidence that there was more than one incident at Simbo21.  However, 
though Siriapi (cited in Watts, 1999c) and Naurai (cited in Havini, 1996) gave different dates 
for the massacre22, the names, ages and gender of the victims were too similar to suggest there 
were two incidents.  Therefore, I agree with Watts (1996a), who argued that the reports from 
Siriapi (cited in Watts 1999c), Reuter (1996a) and Dorney (cited in Watts, 1999c) were all of 
the same incident.   
                                                                 
21  Dorney (1999) suggested that there may have been several and other reports indicated some discrepancy over the date.  
Simlilarly, according to Kauona (2000a), villagers would often return to their village after such massacres, only to be attacked 
again a few days later by the PNGDF. 
22 Reuter (1996a), Niesi (1996) and Siriapi (cited in Watts, 1999c) stated that it occurred on Thursday 25 January.  Dorney 
(ABC radio, cited in Watts, 1999c) reported an incident giving almost the exact details as Niesi (1996) and Reuter (1996a).  
However, he said that the incident occurred ‘yesterday’, which, going by the date of his broadcast, would put it on 31 January.  
Naurai (cited in Havini, 1996) said that the incident occurred on 2 February, one day after Dorney’s (cited in Watts, 1999c) 
broadcast.  Naurai may have been wrong, given that he was speaking three months after the event had taken place. 
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Analysis 
Press reports of the massacre gave a very different impression from those offered by 
unofficial and eyewitness reports, which I have discussed above.  The point here is not to 
discover the ‘truth’ about the incident and compare it to the accounts in the press.  Rather, it 
is to discuss how journalists responded to the accounts which were available to the press, on 
the public record.  The following is an analysis of reporting of the incident in three 
newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Australian and the Age.  In presenting this analysis, I 
will address the following questions.   
1. How much attention and prominence was given to the story? 
2. Was the rhetoric in reporting likely to cause outrage in the reader and emphasise the 
severity of the abuse? 
3. How did the press use official as opposed to unofficial sources? 
4. How did writers address the legitimacy of the violence? 
The day after the massacre, on 26 January, Reuter (1996a) released a report on its wire service, 
which was available to all three newspapers in this study (the Sydney Morning Herald, the 
Australian and the Age).  The full article which was based on Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force (PNGDF) and Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) sources was as follows: 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA: PNG SOLDIER KILLED IN SHOOTOUT WITH REBELS. 
PORT MORESBY, Jan 26 (Reuter) – A Papua New Guinea soldier was killed on 
Thursday in a shootout with rebels on the island of Bougainville, security sources on the 
island said on Friday. 
The sources also said 15 rebels were killed in the fighting as government troops and pro-
government irregulars overran a camp of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). 
But rebel sources denied any BRA fighters had been killed. 
The security sources said details were sketchy but it was likely a woman and child were 
among those killed in the battle. 
The soldier is the second reported killed on Bougainville this week in a flareup of the 
fighting between government troops and secessionist rebels that has been going on for 
eight years. 
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Hundreds of people have died in the fighting or due to a lack of medical supplies since the 
hostilities began on the island, 800 km (500 miles) northeast of Port Moresby. 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) representative Dr Hamid Hossainin said earlier 
this month that up to 5,000 children alone were believed to have died from preventable 
diseases due to the lack of medical supplies and treatment. 
A third round of peace talks is expected to be held in Australia in March or April to 
continue discussions on disarming all factions, amnesty for the rebels and the future status 
of the resource-rich island. 
The three newspapers each published their own edited version of this Reuter (1996a) report 
the next day.  The Sydney Morning Herald adopted the same word usage and general portrayal 
of the victims but they deleted certain details and descriptive context from the original 
version.  Under the headline ‘Fighting kills 16 in Bougainville’, the full Sydney Morning Herald 
(cited in Watts, 1999b) article is as follows:  
PORT MORESBY: A Papua New Guinean soldier and 15 rebels were killed on Thursday 
in a shoot-out on the island of Bougainville, security sources on the island said. 
The soldier is the second reported killed on Bougainville this week in a flare-up of the 
fighting between government troops and secessionist rebels that has been going on for 
eight years.  – Reuter. 
As discussed in chapter one, different choices of words produce different meanings.  In the 
case of Simbo, the Sydney Morning Herald adopts the signs used by Reuter – a ‘soldier’ and 
‘rebels’ were killed in a ‘shootout’ during a ‘flareup of the fighting’.  This word usage suggests 
that the act was one of maintaining order rather than abuse.  The other newspapers (the Age 
and Australian) used similar wording and therefore suggested the same meaning.  
In the rest of the reporting, there was little to suggest outrage and to emphasise the severity of 
this instance of human rights abuse.  This is demonstrated by the information which was 
excluded from the accounts in the Sydney Morning Herald, the Age and the Australian.  As Watts 
(1996a) noted, the following elements found in the Reuter (1996a) account were deleted: 
· The BRA sources denied that any of their fighters had been killed. 
· ‘It was likely that a woman and child were among those killed.’  (Reuter, 1996a, cited in 
Watts, 1996a). 
· Hundreds had died during the war due to the lack of medical supplies. 
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· Up to 5000 children had died from preventable diseases due to the lack of medical 
supplies and medical supervision.  
The other newspapers reported the story in much the same way and all deleted the same 
information except the Age (27 January, 1996, p. 10) which tailed the item by saying ‘Rebel 
sources denied any losses’.  The publications left out the ‘contextual’ information about the 
past suffering of Bougainvilleans during the war.  If included, this information would be more 
likely to promote sympathy for the victims and encourage the reader to feel some outrage 
about the event and the war itself. 
A similar effect was at work in the headlines, which read: ‘PNG soldier killed in shootout with 
rebels’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January, cited in Watts, 1996a, p. 1); ‘16 dead in fighting on 
Bougainville’ (Australian, cited in Watts, 1996a, p. 1); and ‘Bougainville shootout’ (Age, 27 
January, p. 10).  
Watts (1996a, p. 3) also noted that: 
Neither Reuter nor the other media comment on the cause of this ‘lack of medical 
supplies’.  The marine and air blockade imposed on Bougainville since April 1990 by the 
PNG/Australian forces is not mentioned. (Emphasis in text.) 
If the sub-editor included this information, it would have suggested outrage against the 
perpetrators of the violence.  
PNGDF sources were used heavily in the original Reuter (1996a) report and in the three 
newspapers.  The Reuter (1996a) correspondent used the PNGDF version in the headline 
and based most of the article on this.  Journalists are trained to place the most important 
information in the lead of the item.  Similarly, the least important details are left until last.  
These rules enable the sub-editor to cut the item easily (Ward, 1995).  Despite the BRA claim 
that none of their fighters were killed, the writer states as a fact, in the lead of the item, that 
15 ‘rebels’ were killed.  The three newspapers emphasised the official version more than the 
original Reuter (1996a) report.  Two of them cut the BRA denial and the other gave it only at 
the end.  In contrast, the BRA claim was placed near the start of the Reuter (1996a) report.  
One element of reporting which suggests the relative ‘worth’ of victims is how the press 
addressed the morality of the violence.  The press may have portrayed the violence 
perpetrated by the PNGDF as more ‘legitimate’ or acceptable than that perpetrated by the 
 46 
BRA.  If this was so it would suggest that the victims of the BRA were ‘unworthy’ compared 
to victims of the PNGDF.  We can use Cerulo’s (1998 and chapter one, above) model to 
ascertain how the press addressed the morality of the violence.   
Cerulo (1998 and above, chapter one) argues that journalists present violence as either 
‘normal’ – therefore legitimate and acceptable; ‘deviant’ – therefore unacceptable; or 
‘ambiguous’ – too difficult to classify into right and wrong.  The last category is divided into 
two subcategories.  The first is a ‘doublecasting’ sequence where:  
…contextual information simultaneously casts the central subject of the story as both 
victim and perpetrator…  (Cerulo, 1998, p. 50) 
The second is a ‘contextual’ sequence where information about the victim and the perpetrator 
is mentioned after ‘contextual’ information.  By using this sequence the narrator entwines the 
victims and perpetrators in a story rather than placing either of them at the centre of that 
story.   
The writers of the three Simbo items invariably viewed the violence, against the 
Bougainvilleans, ambiguously – too difficult to classify into right and wrong.  They used both 
‘contextual’ and ‘doublecasting’ sequences.  
In the headline of the Sydney Morning Herald item, ‘Fighting kills 16 on Bougainville’ (Reuter, 
cited in Watts 1996a, p. 1) the sub-editor uses a ‘contextual’ sequence as shown below: 
Text Identity qualifier 
Fighting 
 
kills  
 
16 in Bougainville 
context  
 
cct 
 
victim (place frame) 
In this headline the sub-editor starts with ‘contextual’ information, puts the act of violence 
next, then mentions the victims but omits the perpetrators of the act.  Thus the reader is led 
into the story with the circumstances of the act and is left without anyone to blame.  By using 
a ‘contextual’ rather than a ‘deviant violence’ sequence to describe the event the sub-editor 
suggests that the violence is more acceptable.  As Cerulo (1998, p. 47) writes: 
Contextual sequences prioritize data on an act’s setting or circumstance.  Such information 
encases the central players into a story.  In so doing, contextual sequences offer reasons 
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and explanations for otherwise unacceptable violence.  Indeed, such formats provide 
potential justifications for violent acts, justifications that appear before readers and viewers 
actually learn of the act itself. 
Providing justifications for the use of violence is characteristic of the portrayal of ‘unworthy 
victims’. 
In the body of the article the journalist provides further justification for the violence by using 
a ‘doublecasting’ sequence.  In other words, the PNGDF soldiers and the rebels are cast in 
dual roles – as both victims and perpetrators.  The sequence is shown in the table below:  
 Text Identity qualifier 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
A Papua New Guinean soldier and 15 rebels  
 
were killed on Thursday 
 
in a shootout on the island of Bougainville, 
security forces on the island said. 
 
The soldier is the second reported 
 
killed on Bougainville this week 
 
in a flare -up in the fighting between government 
troops and secessionist rebels that has been 
going on for eight years. 
 
 
victim role 
 
at (temporal frame) 
 
Cntext puts PNG soldier and 15 rebels in 
perpetrator roles (place frame, source). 
 
victim 
 
act (temporal frame) 
 
 
context, perpetrator role (temporal frame) 
 
 
 
 
Here, the journalist casts the soldier and rebels in double roles – as both victims and 
performers of the violent act.  The victims of both sides were named first and then 
information about the content is provided which also casts them in the perpetrator role.  In 
the first sentence, the narrator tells us that the ‘Papua New Guinean soldier and… rebels were 
killed… in a shootout.’ In line three, the journalist writes that they were killed in a shootout – 
implying that they were performers as well as victims.  In lines four to six, above, the ‘soldier’ 
was killed in fighting between ‘government troops and secessionist rebels.  Here, the writer 
casts the soldier firstly in the victim role and then in the performer role.  By using a 
‘doublecasting’ sequence, the journalist offers a potential justification for the killing of the 15 
Bougainvilleans.  
It is also interesting that the one PNGDF victim is mentioned before the 15 ‘rebels’ in both 
sequences (lines one to three and lines four to six).  In lines four to six, the ‘rebels’ are cast 
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only in the performer role.  Thus, the journalist emphasises that the one soldier rather than 
the 15 ‘rebels’ are the important victims in the story.   
The Australian headline, ‘16 dead in fighting in Bougainville’, puts both PNG and 
Bougainvillean victims in dual roles (Australian, cited in Watts, 1996a).  Again, this presents 
the PNGDF killing of the rebels in a more acceptable light than if the headline read ‘15 
Bougainvilleans killed by PNGDF’.  In the Age (27 January, 1996, p. 10) the headline, 
‘Bougainville shootout’, contains contextual information only. 
The leads in the Age and the Australian also suggest justification for the PNGF violence by 
displaying victim sequences which emphasise the violence allegedly perpetrated by the BRA.  
For example, the sequence in the Age lead is shown below. 
Text Identity qualifier 
A Papua New Guinea soldier 
 
was killed yesterday  
 
 
in a shoot-out with rebels on Bougainville, 
security forces on the island said.  
(Age, 27 January, 1996, p. 10)  
victim-performer 
 
act, (temporal frame)  
 
 
context, performer (place frame, source) 
 
 
In the above case the journalist emphasises the ‘deviant’ violence against the one soldier 
rather than the 15 ‘rebels’ by mentioning the soldier in the victim role first and omitting the 
fate of the ‘rebels’. 
In sum, sub-editors and journalists use ‘deviant violence’ sequences to describe the killing of 
the soldier.  In contrast, they use ‘ambiguous violence’ sequences to describe the killing of 
Bougainvilleans.  This kind of narrative has the effect of both potentially justifying the 
violence of the PNGDF against the ‘rebels’ whilst suggesting that the violence inflicted on the 
PNGDF soldier was unacceptable.  This is consistent with the Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
who argue that victims of friends will be treated as ‘unworthy’ in the press whereas victims of 
enemies will be treated as ‘worthy’.  
The next account of the incident to emerge was from Morris Siriapi of the Independent 
Bougainville Information Service (IBIS).  He sent a message to the Bougainville Freedom 
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Movement in Australia via a radio link in the Solomon Islands, four weeks later on 23 
February, reporting that the PNGDF had massacred unarmed civilians (Watts, 1999c).   
All three publications ignored the Sirapi report, although, as Watts (1996a) observed, the 
Bougainville Freedom Movement in Sydney faxed it to all media.  Two of the newspapers 
(the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian) ignored it because editors believed the source to 
be untrustworthy (Watts, 1996a)23.   
This contrasted with sub-editors’ treatment of the earlier unconfirmed report based on 
PNGDF sources, which was denied by the BRA.  Watts (1996a, p. 4) also presented the new 
report to the original Reuter (1996a) correspondent who replied that it was ‘too late’ to 
correct the mistake.  The papers apparently made no attempt to check the Siriapi story with 
the PNGDF (See Watts, 1996a).  Several weeks later evidence emerged which corroborated 
Siriapi’s version of the massacre.  
In April 1996 Peter Naurai24, the 16-year-old survivor of the massacre (see above, p. 40), was 
evacuated to the Solomon Islands by the BRA for medical treatment.  He arrived in Honiara, 
in the Solomon Islands on 24 April 1996.  His picture and name were immediately published 
in the Solomon Star newspaper.  He told the Honiara newspaper that he was refused medical 
treatment by the PNGDF at a care centre, near Simbo and then escaped.  He also endured a 
gun battle with the PNGDF whilst crossing to the Solomons (Havini, 1996).  However, the 
journalist who wrote the story did not mention the Simbo massacre.  They reported that 
Naurai was wounded at a massacre in late January but that the incident occurred at a ‘care 
centre’ under the control of the PNGDF – not at Simbo.  It is likely that the reporter 
confused the Simbo incident with another incident near Laguai in March where a woman, 
whom they interviewed with Naurai, was shot and wounded by the ‘Resistance’ (see Havini, 
1996).  Hence, the Australian press could not gain any information about the massacre from 
this report.  However, he told his story of the Simbo massacre to Bougainvillean refugees on 
9 May, two weeks after the Solomon Star published his first account.  All reports of the incident 
(besides the reports published in the Australian press), including Naurai’s statement, were 
published in Australia (Havini, 1996) in May, 1996. 
                                                                 
23 As Watts (1996a, p. 3) wrote in relation to the Sydney Morning Herald and Australian: 
When presented [by Watts] with the details the editors explained that the ‘unconfirmed’ Bougainvillean report was of 
absolutely no interest to them. 
24 Also spelt as Nautai. 
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Despite the publicity given to Naurai in the Solomon Islands, the publication of his and other 
accounts in Australia and his availability for interview the three publications still ignored the 
story.  There were minor inconsistencies in the accounts (discussed above, p. 41) but there 
was a credible basis for a story, full of drama and human interest.  Journalists often claimed 
that the reason why they did not report Bougainville was that there were no pictures, due to 
the blockade (Watts, 2000a).  However in this case pictures were available – news 
organisations simply needed to fly photographers to Honiara to obtain them. 
Ruby Mirinka’s account (discussed above, p. 41), emerged in October.  She spoke at a 
women’s conference in Sydney and repeated the main claims: the massacre of civilians at 
Simbo and the killing of the woman and the cutting of the foetus from her womb.  Jopson 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October, p. 7) wrote about these claims and they were published 
the Sydney Morning Herald immediately.  However, the incident was downplayed.  The 
information was contained in one paragraph, towards the end of a small article on another 
topic, in the back pages of the news section in the Sydney Morning Herald (see, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 14 October, p. 7).  This was the only one instance that I could find where one of the 
three newspapers to contain a report of this version of the incident25. 
This article shows that the earlier reports from Siriapi and Naurai were robust enough to be 
published in the Australian quality press.  In the case of Jopson’s article the unconfirmed and 
unofficial report given by Mirinka was deemed fit to publish.  In contrast, because it was 
‘unconfirmed’, sub-editors were uninterested in the Siriapi (cited in Watts, 1996a) report 
which was relayed to Australia.  Also the eyewitness report and a photo of one of the 
wounded – which would seem to make this version more credible than Mirinka’s – was 
ignored by the three newspapers.    
Turning to how Jopson (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October, p. 7) portrayed the legitimacy of 
the violence.  Despite relying on Mirinka’s testimony she still fails to present a victim 
sequence which would portray the violence as ‘deviant’ and therefore unacceptable.  The 
sequence is ‘contextual’, as shown below: 
                                                                 
25 I searched: Age and Good Weekend Quarterly on CD ROM –January 1996 to February, 1997; headlines for items containing the 
word, Bougainville, on ‘Infoquick’ database (State Library of New South Wales, 1998); all Sydney Morning Herald articles listed 
in ‘Infoquick’(State Library of New South Wales, 1998), September 1996 to February, 1997; headlines in Australian listed in 
Reuter’s Business Briefing (1999); all Australian articles, September, 1996 to February, 1997. 
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Text 
 
 
Mrs Mirinka claimed that during a dawn massacre 
 
of 10 villagers at Simbo in South Eastern 
Bougainville 
 
by PNG Defence Force soldiers, 
 
a pregnant woman 
 
was cut open and her foetus left lying on her body. 
Identity qualifier 
 
 
introduction, act (context) 
 
victim (place frame) 
 
 
perpetrator 
 
victim 
 
act 
 
In this instance, Jopson (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October, p. 7) presents a ‘contextual’ 
sequence which suggests that the violence is ‘ambiguous’ – too difficult to classify into right 
or wrong.  Rather than mentioning the victims first, as one would do if the violence was 
judged to be ‘deviant’ (see Cerulo, 1998 and above, chapter one), she begins with the act – the 
massacre.  
Cerulo (1998) argues that by using ‘contextual’ sequences journalists suggest that the violence 
is more acceptable than it otherwise might have been.  Jopson (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 
October, p. 7) focuses the reader’s attention on the context – the massacre – rather than the 
victim.  This takes the reader’s attention away from the fact that innocent people were killed 
by PNGDF soldiers.  Instead, Jopson (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October, p. 7) draws 
attention instead to the fact that a massacre occurred.  This has the effect of downplaying the 
severity of the violence, which is consistent with Herman and Chomsky (1988) who argue 
that stories about victims of friendly states are likely to be downplayed in the mass media. 
_____________________________________ 
So far in this chapter, I have discussed reporting of the Simbo massacre in the three 
newspapers in terms of: the amount of attention given, rhetoric, the treatment of sources and 
the legitimacy of the violence.  I will now turn to the case of Kangu Beach before comparing 
and contrasting the reporting of the two incidents. 
Kangu Beach:  ‘Bougainville killings barbaric act, says Chan’ 
In contrast to the massacre of civilians at Simbo, both sides agreed that a battle occurred at 
Kangu Beach, on 8 September 1996.  Kangu Beach was the base for PNGDF’s ‘D’ Company 
and a strategic location in Southern Bougainville, being the only port for the main town of 
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Buin (Dorney, Radio Australia, 9 September, cited in Reuters Business Briefing, 1999).  Ten 
PNGDF troops and two ‘Resistance’ members were killed on the first day of the battle and 
one PNGDF soldier was killed later in the week.  After one week of fighting, there were eight 
wounded (Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September, 1996) and five captured (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 17 September, 1996, p. 14) PNGDF troops.  One of the first reports in the Age on the 
incident appeared under the headline ‘Bougainville killings barbaric act, says [PNG Prime 
Minister] Chan’.  The PNG government alleged that the some of the soldiers were disarmed 
before being killed.  There was also solid evidence to suggest that at least two bodies were 
later mutilated.  Thus, the Kangu Beach incident could be considered a case of human rights 
abuse.  However, by conventional standards the incident at Kangu Beach was far less serious 
than the case of Simbo.  The BRA did not kill civilians at Kangu Beach and unlike the 
PNGDF at Simbo they took five prisoners, rather than shooting at everyone in sight.   
There are a number of important issues about the incident which are relevant to the press 
reporting.  Firstly, the PNG government’s attitude to peace negotiations at the time of the 
attack.  In March 1996 PNG Prime Minister Chan abandoned the peace process which had 
begun with the Cairns peace talks in December 1995 and unilaterally lifted the ceasefire.  In 
July he launched ‘Operation High Speed II’ which ended a few weeks later in a decisive 
victory by the BRA26.  After that there were sporadic instances of violence.  For example, 
three Australian churchwomen told ABC radio that they were harassed at gunpoint by PNG 
soldiers whilst attending the Bougainville Women’s Forum in August.  The soldiers forced 
them to hand over their video camera, tapes and notes of the meeting (Pacific News Bulletin, 
1996c, p.2).  By September 1996 the PNG government had failed to re-enter any meaningful 
peace process (Pacific News Bulletin, 1996a).   
Secondly, the conditions in ‘care centres’ (internment camps) in Bougainville were very poor.  
The Kangu Beach ‘care centre’ was one of many.  By July 1996 70,000 to 80,000 
Bougainvilleans out of a total population of around 170,000, lived in ‘care centres’ controlled 
by the PNGDF (Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July, 1996, p. 34).  The security forces began to 
establish these camps in 1988 when the conflict began.  According to human rights lawyer, 
Rosemarie Gillespie (1999b), who visited Bougainville several times, the PNGDF used ‘care 
centres’ much like the U.S. used ‘strategic hamlets’ in Vietnam.  She argued that people were 
                                                                 
26 As part of this operation, it had fired on a boat attempting to cross into the Solomon Islands from an Australian supplied 
helicopter.  The Sydney Morning Herald  reported that people in the south of Bougainville, near Kangu Beach, had suffered 
from the bombardment of phosphorus bombs dropped from Australian supplied helicopters by the PNGDF in July (cited in 
Sharp, 1997).  
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rounded up and forced into them, so as to allow their former land to be used as ‘free fire’ 
zones.  The Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) referred to the ‘care centres’ as 
‘concentration camps’.  The UN (1996) reported many cases of torture, harassment, rape and 
execution of civilians in ‘care centres’.  Such were the conditions that sometimes pregnant 
women would rather die in childbirth in the ‘bush’ rather than risk attending a care centre 
(Coles-Janess, 1999).  For some time prior to the 8 September 1996, PNGDF soldiers had 
been abusing the ‘care centre’ residents (PNG Prime Minister Chan, National Broadcasting 
Corporation of PNG, cited in Pacific News Bulletin, 1996a, p. 3) and local women (Amnesty 
International, 1997).  The Pacific News Bulletin (1996a, p. 1) also reported that, shortly before 
the battle, the PNGDF had killed three children at the camp, the oldest of whom was 10 
years. 
Thirdly, who attacked the camp and why?  Before the attack the local ‘Resistance’ members 
were allied to the PNGDF, but were unhappy about the PNGDF abuses and defected to 
BRA (Watts, 1999a).  The BRA and ‘Resistance’ then launched the attack together (PNG 
Prime Minister Chan, National Broadcasting Corporation of PNG, cited in Pacific News 
Bulletin, 1996b, p. 3).  The objective was to free the ‘care centre’ inmates (Kauona, 2000b, 
Watts, 2000b, Coles-Janess, 1999).  They surprised the 32 central government forces who 
guarded the ‘care centre’, killing 12 of them on the Sunday morning.  The BRA and ex-
‘Resistance’ members then dissolved the camp (Coles-Janess, 1999) thus freeing the internees 
who returned to their villages (Kauona, 2000b).  The Pacific News Bulletin (1996a) was to later 
report that the attack might have been a reprisal for the earlier killing of the three children by 
the PNGDF.  
Fourthly, on the Sunday morning, how did the twelve security force members die?  According 
to Amnesty International (1997, 
http:///www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1997/ASA/33400197.htm) a ‘Resistance’ leader was 
reported as saying that his men attacked the PNGDF, ‘disarmed them and then were joined 
by the BRA in ‘the killing of the soldiers’.  However, it is not clear from the Amnesty Report 
whether they gained this statement directly from the ‘Resistance’ leader or from hearsay27.  
The Amnesty International (1997) version also begs many questions.  How did the 
‘Resistance’ manage to disarm the 17 victims (including the 5 who were captured) when there 
were another 15 soldiers at the camp?  If the ‘Resistance’ had disarmed all of the 32 guards 
                                                                 
27 Also, the PNGDF did not allow Amnesty International to visit the site of the massacre and talk to other witnesses.  They 
conducted their investigations in Port Moresby, the Solomon Islands and Buka, a PNG controlled island to the north of the 
Bougainville mainland, far from Kangu Beach, which is at the southern tip (Amnesty International, 1997). 
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before the attack began, why did they not kill or capture all of them?  If they did not disarm 
all of the soldiers how were the BRA and ‘Resistance’ able to execute the twelve without the 
others intervening?  
Former Commander-in-Chief of the BRA, General Sam Kauona (2000b) denied that the 
soldiers were executed.  According to the PNGDF internal inquiry ‘some’ of the soldiers were 
disarmed, giving their guns to the ‘Resistance’ members for ‘safe-keeping’, before being killed 
(Chan, cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October, 1996, p. 10).  Kauona also denied this.  
Furthermore, relatives of the deceased men at Kangu Beach claimed that the PNGDF 
investigation was flawed and questioned its findings28.  
The alternative view is that the soldiers were killed in battle.  According to Thomas Tarei, the 
commander of BRA ‘H’ company who led the attack, it was a big battle (cited in Coles-Janess, 
1999).  Initial reports indicated that this was so.  The Sydney Morning Herald (Ruffini, 11 
September, 1996) reported that up to 200 BRA soldiers took part in the attack.  According to 
Kauona (2000b) the BRA and defecting ‘Resistance’ members knew who had been abusing 
the residents and targeted these soldiers during the battle.  Tarei told Coles-Janess (1999) that 
at the time of the attack some troops were drunk, some were asleep, some were playing 
volleyball and some were fishing.  The battle lasted a week and a patrol boat which attacked 
the beach at one stage was repelled by BRA fire (Reuter, 1996c).   
In summary, we don’t exactly how the soldiers were killed.  None of the reports state 
categorically that the victims were summarily executed.  Rather this is an implication of those 
reports.  The evidence suggesting that the victims were executed is flimsy and, according to 
the internal PNGDF investigation, only some of them were disarmed before being killed.  
However, it is likely that some of the soldiers did not have ready access to the weapons when 
the attack began.  
Fifthly, at least two of the victims’ bodies from Kangu Beach were mutilated after the attack 
(Kauona, 2000a, O’Callaghan, 1999b, Chan, cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October, 1996).  
It is unknown as to whether the ‘Resistance’ members or BRA soldiers were responsible.  
Some of the PNGDF soldiers had repeatedly raped women at the ‘care centre’ including the 
                                                                 
28 The Pacific News Bulletin (1996b, p. 4, citing the PNG Post-Courier  and the independent wire service, Pacnews) reported that:  
The widow of the officer commanding …[the PNGDF troops] at the time of the massacre questioned the length of time 
the investigating Colonel had spent on his investigation and how many soldiers, resistance fighters and civilians he had 
interviewed.  She said that according to her sources he had spent only one day at Kangu and complete [sic] the 
investigation within one week. 
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wives of ‘Resistance’ members.  Apparently, those soldiers whose bodies were mutilated were 
the worst offenders (interview data). 
Analysis 
Initially, there were striking similarities in reporting between the Simbo massacre and the 
Kangu Beach incident.  All three articles appear to have been based on one report written by 
Paul Ruffini who was stationed in Port Moresby for the wire service, Australian Associated 
Press (AAP).  We can recall that the first articles on the Simbo massacre were all based on the 
one wire service report (from Reuter, 1996a).  The first newspaper reports about Simbo 
appeared only as ‘news-in-brief’ items.  Likewise, two publications, the Age and the Australian, 
on the first day ran a ‘news in brief’ item based on the AAP report.  The following is the Age 
(10 September 1996, p. 7) item: 
PNG SKIRMISH.  
Rebel fighters on Bougainville today claimed to have killed 12 Papua New Guinean 
soldiers in a battle at the weekend. -- AAP. 
The Australian ran a slightly longer ‘news-in-brief’ item.  
In contrast to the Simbo case, on the first day of reporting of the Kangu Beach incident, one 
of the publications, the Sydney Morning Herald, published a long front-page report on the 
incident.  Another obvious difference in reporting of the Simbo and Kangu Beach incidents 
was the credence given to the BRA version of events.  For example the Sydney Morning Herald 
article relied heavily on the BRA version.  
As I discussed above, by analysing the sequences in headlines and leads we can see how the 
press presented the violence in moral terms.  Presenting the violence at Kangu Beach as less 
legitimate than the violence at Simbo would suggest that those victims were ‘worthy’ 
compared to the Simbo victims.  On the first day the headlines in the three newspapers read 
as follows: 
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12 PNG soldiers killed in beach fight, say rebels  (Sydney Morning Herald, 10 September 
1996, p. 1)  
Rebels boast 12 killed (Australian, 10 September 1996, p. 8) 
PNG skirmish (Age, 10 September 1996, p. 7) 
Each of the three headlines provides a different moral narrative.  It is interesting that the 
Sydney Morning Herald, which published the most prominent and largest article, used a victim – 
‘deviant violence’ – sequence, as shown below:  
Text Identity qualifier 
12 PNG soldiers  
 
killed  
 
in beach fight say rebels’ 
 
victim,  
 
act  
 
context  
 
 
This suggests that the violence is ‘heinous’ and ‘unacceptable’ (Cerulo, 1998).  Such reporting 
is typical of the treatment given to ‘worthy victims’ in the press because it is sympathetic to 
the victims and emphasises the severity of the violence.  
In contrast, the headline in the Australian presents a performer – ‘normal violence’ – 
sequence, as shown below:  
Text Identity qualifier 
Rebels boast 
 
12 
 
killed 
 
performer, context  
 
victims  
 
act 
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Using this sequence suggests that the violence is acceptable.  According to Cerulo (1998) the 
use of such sequences is prevalent in a lot of war reporting since violence is more acceptable 
in times of war.  The headline in the Age (10 September, 1996, p. 7)  ‘PNG skirmish’  casts the 
two sides – the PNG and BRA soldiers in violent roles by referring to the act as a ‘skirmish’.  
In this sense it is a ‘doublecasting’ sequence, suggesting moral ambiguity in relation to the act.   
The sequencing in this headline presents the violence as more acceptable than it otherwise 
might have been presented.  Thus the headlines in two of the newspapers present the 
violence as more acceptable than it was presented in the Sydney Morning Herald headline.  
However, the items in those two newspapers had little prominence in the press.  The fact that 
the largest and most prominent item used a ‘deviant violence’ sequence in the headline is 
typical of the treatment of ‘worthy victims’ because it draws attention to the unacceptable act.   
We can recall that in the case of Simbo the press showed no interest in following up the story.  
In the case of Kangu Beach it was followed up vigorously in the following days.  On the next 
day, all publications contained moderate-sized articles.  In the Age and the Australian they 
appeared in the first nine pages.  The headlines and leads displayed victim (‘deviant’ violence) 
sequences (one headline and two leads); ‘contextual’ (‘ambiguous violence’) sequences (one 
headline and one lead); and one performer (‘normal violence’) sequence (headline).  The 
prevalence of ‘deviant violence’ sequences and the relative lack of ‘normal violence’ sequences 
is typical of the treatment of ‘worthy victims’ in the press.  
The Age (11 September 1996) article emphasises the ‘barbarity’ of the act.  The item appears 
under the contextual headline ‘Bougainville killings barbaric, says Chan’ (Age, 11 September 
1996, p. 8).  The lead is also contextual as shown below:  
Text Identity qualifier 
The killing  
 
of 12 Papua New Guinean soldiers  
 
by rebel fighters on Bougainville over the 
weekend  
 
was a barbaric act that sabotaged attempts to 
resolve the conflict, the Prime Minister, Sir Julius 
Chan, said today. 
act 
 
victims  
 
perpetrators (place frame, time frame) 
 
 
context. 
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This is a contextual lead because it does not begin with the victim or the perpetrator 
but encases those actors within the event – ‘the killing’.  This suggests that the writer 
thought the violence was morally ambiguous.  It is not a ‘doublecasting’ sequence, 
which casts both sides  
in perpetrator roles.  On the contrary, by using Chan’s statement in the lead the PNG 
government and its defence force is cast as the ‘peacemaker’ rather than as one of the 
antagonists in a war whose troops have just been involved in a battle to defend a 
strategic beach29.    
Again, word usage and content is important.  The combination of the ‘contextual’ 
sequence which downplays the PNGDF’s combatant role and the use of the term 
‘barbaric’ to describe the BRA victory adds to the impression that the violence is not 
‘normal’.  This kind of reporting is typical of that normally given to stories about 
‘worthy victims’ because it emphasises the heinous nature of the act. 
Analysis of content shows that Ruffini (Age, 11 September, 1996, p. 8 and above) 
portrays the BRA as belligerent, the PNGDF as seeking to maintain order and the 
PNG government as seeking peace.  One wonders what Chan meant by his phrase 
‘attempts to resolve the conflict’.  He had already unilaterally lifted the cease-fire in 
March, launched ‘Operation High Speed II’, with the help of Australia (Dorney, 
199830).  Yet he had failed to lift the cease-fire by the time of the battle and had 
refused international requests, including from Australia, to commence peace 
negotiations.  However, Ruffini (Age, 11 September, 1996, p. 8) fails to challenge 
Chan’s statement by making or using counterposing statements.  This failure to 
challenge was the predominant response in all three publications in reporting as a  
                                                                 
29 Kangu Beach was the only port for Buin, the main town of the Siwai district in southwest Bougainville (Dorney, cited in 
Reuters Business Briefing, 1999). 
30 Australia was reluctant to overtly supply lethal aid, but agreed to give a special grant to supply ‘non-lethal’ aid such as 
ration packs, after Brigadeer-General Singirok visited Australia just prior to High Speed II (Dorney, 1998).  Wayne Coles-
Janess (1999) in his visit to Bougainville in 1997 noticed the discarded Australian-donated ration packs, clearly marked as 
such.  This he said, did not go unnoticed by the local population. He said that on his trip around Bougainville he was 
continually asked ‘why is Australia supplying military weapons and equipment to shoot us?’ (Age, 1 March 1997, p. A27)  The 
special aid was in addition to the Defence Cooperation Program aid. The latest annual installment of  $12million of which 
was approved in July 1996, as High Speed II began.  Other aid included the supply of arms and ammunition at reduced rates 
and around $150 million per annum in unconditional aid to the PNG government (Sharp, 1997).   
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whole of this incident31.  Mary-Louise O’Callaghan (1999a), who wrote several articles for the 
Australian on this incident, said that ‘Chan’s idea of an attempt to resolve the conflict was 
High Speed II’.  However, she did not include counterposing statements in her news report 
when she reported Chan’s comments32. 
In the days after the battle, the story of Kangu Beach continued to receive substantial 
attention in the three newspapers.  News writers focussed mainly on two issues. The first was 
the continuation of the battle, after PNG sent reinforcements to Kangu Beach (for example, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1996, p. 8).  The second was that the battle had inflamed 
tensions between PNG and Australia over the supply of military aid (Australian, 12 
September, 1996, p. 2, p. 2).  These issues were canvassed in four articles, including an 
editorial in the Australian, in the next two days.  Between 10 September, when the incident  
                                                                 
31 We can see the failure of the three newspapers to challenge Chan’s comments in their treatment of counterposing 
comments made by Bougainville chiefs.  The PNG Post-Courier  (cited in Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c) reported on 13 September 
that Bougainville chiefs had accused the national government and the security forces of sabotaging the peace initiatives of 
Bougainville leaders.  They had released this statement in support of the PNG-appointed Premier of Bougainville, Theodore 
Miriung.  (He had been appointed as Premier of the Bougainville Transitional Government by PNG Prime Minister Chan in 
January, 1995.)  The chief’s comments reflected the Bougainvilleans’ about a number of incidents (Pacific News Bulletin, 
1996c).  These included the following: 
· The PNG Post-Courier (cited in Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c, p. 1) reported that PNGDF soldiers forced Miriung away from 
the Women’s Inter-Church Forum at Arawa in August.  He was due to open the forum, but the soldiers told him at 
gun-point that he was not allowed to do so and forced him to return to Buka (the administrative centre, an island to the 
north).  Miriung stated that he assumed this was done with the knowledge of the Prime Minister’s office.   
· The PNGDF had restricted the Premier from travelling to mainland Bougainville during the PNG offensive, High Speed 
II (Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c, p. 1).  
· The PNG Minister of Defence, Ijape, made unsubstantiated allegations that Miriung was responsible for the killing of the 
security force members at Kangu Beach (Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c, p. 1).   
· Ijape was contemplating sacking the Premier (Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c, p. 1).   
In relation to these issues, Bougainville chiefs stated:  
We the chiefs and the people of Bougainville are sick and tired of the unnecessary restrictions and allegations made to our 
leaders who are trying their utmost best in finding a lasting solution to the crisis…. The premier and the BTG 
[Bougainville Transitional Government, which is supported by the central government] are trying their best in initiating 
peaceful moves for the lasting resolution of the crisis while the national government and the security forces sabotage these 
peace initiatives by their attitude, deeds and behaviour… (Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c, p. 1, citing PNG Post Courier, 13-15 
September, 1996) 
The three newspapers ignored these comments by the chiefs.  They gave similar treatment to the incidents which led to the 
comments.  One journalist, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan (Australian, 13 September 1996, p. 32) questioned Ijape’s comments of 
about Miriung and mentioned the PNGDF’s treatment of him on Bougainville.  However, this was the exception.  Apart 
from this, the three newspapers completely ignored the incidents which led the chief’s to condemn PNG officials.  
32 She said that she did not criticise Chan, in that news item, because she thought that Chan could ‘hang himself’ 
(O’Callaghan, 1999b). One journalist (who did not wish to be identified) stated that those readers who were following the 
story would have realised that the statement was an example of ‘Chan’s doublespeak’.  Furthermore, they said that Chan had 
a right to have his comments aired in the press. 
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was first reported, and the 13 September there were 10 moderately sized articles on Kangu 
Beach, mainly in the first 10 pages, in the three newspapers.   
The three newspapers continued to give attention to the story over the next three months 
basing the articles on issues arising in the aftermath to the incident.  These stories addressed: 
the plight of prisoners – to whom journalists consistently referred as ‘hostages’ – who were 
being held by the BRA and the negotiations to free them (for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 
17 September 1996, p. 14), the return of the bodies to Port Moresby and associated grieving 
(Australian, 16 September, 1996, p. 14 and Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13); 
the official investigation (for example, Skehan, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 1996, p. 10); 
and the continuing ‘tensions’ between Australia and PNG over the incident (for example, Age, 
16 September 1996, p. 15).  I counted thirteen articles which mentioned the incident 
appearing between 13 September and 22 November 1996 including one editorial.  
Furthermore, writers continued to refer to the incident in December in feature and opinion 
articles and in another editorial.   
The emphasis on the suffering of the victims and the savagery of the killing of the 13 security 
force members (one was killed, apparently in battle, later in the week), was evident in the 
representation of the event in three newspapers.  News stories at first referred to the incident 
as a ‘battle’ (for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 September, 1996, p. 1) and a ‘bloody battle’ 
(Australian, 11 September, 1996, p. 9).  However, it was later often called a ‘massacre’ in the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian, (including four times in headlines, Australian, 21 
September, 1996, p. 16, Australian, 16 October 1996, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 1996, 
p. 10), a ‘slaughter’ (for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13 and 
Australian, 11 September, 1996, p. 9).  The Age and Sydney Morning Herald reported foreign 
minister Downer’s comment that it was ‘tragic’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September, 1996, p. 
8).  In the Sydney Morning Herald, it was called a ‘bloody, stinking, insignificant and meaningless 
battle’ (quoting a deceased soldier’s relative, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13)  
The BRA leaders were referred to as ‘killers and cultists’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 
1996, p. 13) which emphasised that they were at the least deviant.  The use of words such as  
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‘massacre’ and ‘slaughter’ began after PNG Prime Minister Chan announced that several of 
the victims’ bodies had been mutilated and after the remains had been flown back to Port 
Moresby. 
Another aspect of the reporting was the range of opinion which could be expressed.  To what 
extent were writers critical of BRA aggression in the three newspapers?  Professor James 
Griffin, an expatriate Australian adviser to the Papua New Guinea government, took the 
most extreme opinion in the three newspapers denouncing the BRA.  The subtitle to his 
article reads that Australia has a responsibility to help PNG contain Bougainville’s ‘killers and 
cultists’.  Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) then writes that Australia 
should act to ‘rid Bougainville of its secessionist leaders’ and that no Australian government: 
…serious about human rights could countenance Bougainville coming under the control of 
killers and cultists like Kauona and Francis Ona, or being reduced to chaos for the 
indefinite future. 
Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) suggests that Australia should 
become more directly involved in the conflict by:  
· Aiding the PNGDF to ‘locate’ and ‘rid Bougainville of its secessionist leaders’;  
· providing patrol boats and a surveillance ship with helicopters to seal off ‘the arms trade’;  
· taking over the border patrols thus freeing up the PNGDF to do more on the island.  
Furthermore, Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) argues that ‘perhaps’ 
more ‘forceful means, which it is unnecessary to adumbrate here, may be needed at some future 
stage.’  Nothing, he says, ‘can now be achieved without action against the BRA forces and 
their fanatical leaders.’ 
Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) does not provide any evidence of 
the ‘arms trade’, nor that Ona and Kauona were directly linked to the killing of the soldiers at 
Kangu Beach.  Neither did other writers who wrote about the incident in the Age, the 
Australian and Sydney Morning Herald.   
The available evidence suggests that there was, effectively, no such ‘arms trade’.  This was  
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supported by Sean Dorney (1999), a veteran ABC South Pacific correspondent, whom 
journalists regard as the leading authority on Bougainville (interview data).  He told me that 
during or since the war no convincing evidence of an ‘arms trade’ in high-powered weapons  
between the Solomons and Bougainville emerged33.  According to Coles-Janess (1999) the 
BRA’s arsenal consisted of captured PNGDF weapons and ammunition, home made and 
reconditioned World War II weapons and small arms such as shotguns which were on the 
island before the conflict began.  Dorney (1999) and Coles-Janess (1999) conceded that a few 
shotguns may have been brought over from the Solomons.  However, these were of little 
consequence.  
It is true that the BRA were largely responsible for the killings.  However, there is little 
evidence to show that the BRA murdered the soldiers as the rhetoric in Griffin’s (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) article suggests.  Furthermore, there is less 
evidence, still, linking Kauona and Ona with such events (see above, pp. 53-54).  In any case, 
the internal report (according to press reports) found that the killings were mainly the 
responsibility of the former ‘Resistance’  members (Chan, cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 25 
October 1996, p. 10).  There was no indication that the inquiry found that the BRA soldiers 
committed the crime.  There is no evidence presented by neither Griffin nor anyone else in 
the press linking Ona (the President of the Bougainville Interim Government) and General 
Kauona to an alleged murder.  The suggestion of Griffin that General Kauona and President 
Ona murdered the soldiers at Kangu Beach rests on the idea that because they were in 
command of the BRA they were responsible.   
Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) is misleading when he presents 
Kauona as the main agent for continuing the war.  He claims that Kauona was ‘boasting’  
                                                                 
33 The following is a transcript of our conversation:   
Roberts:  There were claims of arms smuggling from the Solomon Islands to Bougainville - is there any truth in that? 
Dorney:  Well there was certainly a premium on shotguns and things like that, which were used in villages and whatever.  
These aren’t double-barreled shotguns I mean these are hunting sort of rifles.  A few of those certainly were bought from 
around Solomons because they became very pricey. …From my own personal observations, most of the weapons that the 
BRA had …[were] captured from the PNGDF.  Bought stolen or captured.  Because there were a number of incidents 
where they killed quite a few.  There were very high powered weapons that they got at Kangu Beach, but years before that 
when Arawa was recaptured by the PNGDF there was an ambush near the golf course and 11 or 12 PNG soldiers were 
killed and the BRA captured quite a few weapons. They also captured quite a few weapons in other isolated incidents.   
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referring to statements made by Kauona in a recent press release.  He quotes Kauona 
as saying that the BRA had captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition in 
recent campaigns and that this would allow them to continue the war for years.  This 
encourages the reader to believe that the BRA leadership is responsible for not only 
the deaths at Kangu Beach but also the continuation of the war in Bougainville.  
However, Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) omits the rest of 
Kauona’s statement, in which he said that the threat to continue the war is only made 
if the PNG government fails to reinstate the cease-fire (Bougainville Interim 
Government, 1996).  
In sum, Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 1996, p. 13) writes that Kauona 
and Ona are ‘killers’.  He does not provide any evidence to support this claim, nor is 
there any such evidence contained in the three newspapers’ reporting of Kangu Beach.  
He also calls for drastic Australian military intervention.  However, Griffin’s article is 
an exception.  Several other opinion writers mentioned Kangu Beach but did not use 
such words against the leadership of the BRA nor suggest such drastic Australian 
intervention.  
It is interesting to look at the sequencing quantitatively in reporting about Kangu 
Beach.  According to Cerulo (1998) the lead is the most important part of any news 
item.  As shown in table 2-1, below, the leads presented slightly more ‘deviant 
violence’ sequences (six) than ‘ambiguous’ (four) or  ‘normal’ (four).  In the headlines 
there was a clear preference for ‘ambiguous’ sequences (ten) rather than ‘deviant’ 
(three) or ‘normal’ (two, table 2-1, below).  The main difference in the reporting of the 
two incidents at Kangu Beach and Simbo was in the use of ‘deviant violence’ 
sequences.  In the case of Kangu Beach close to 30 per cent of the leads presented 
such sequences, suggesting that the killing of the PNGDF soldiers was heinous and 
unacceptable.  In contrast, in the case of Simbo not one of the leads or headlines 
presented ‘deviant violence’ sequences.  The difference in the use of sequences 
suggests that the three newspapers viewed the violence at Kangu Beach as less 
legitimate than the violence at Simbo.  Thus, these publications also suggest that the 
victims at Kangu Beach were more ‘worthy’ than the victims at Simbo.  
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 ‘Normal’  
violence 
‘Ambiguous’  
violence 
‘Deviant’ 
violence 
Not in 
headline/lead 
Total 
 Performer  ‘contextual’   ‘Double-
casting’ 
victim    
 No. (%) 
 
 
No. (%) 
  
 
No. (%) No. (%) 
 
No. (%) 
 
No. 
4 (19%) 1 (5%) leads  4 (19%) 
5 (23%) 
6 (29%) 5 (23%) 21 
9 (43%) 1 (5%) headlines 2 (9%) 
10 (48%) 
3 (14%) 6 (29%) 21 
 
_____________________________________ 
In this chapter, I have argued that there were important differences in the reporting of the 
two massacres in the three newspapers.  According to Herman and Chomsky (1988), the mass 
media tend to portray victims of official enemies as ‘worthy’.  In contrast, they argue that 
victims who have been abused with equal or greater severity by official friends are typically 
portrayed as ‘unworthy’ by the mass media.  The case of Simbo, where victims of the 
PNGDF were killed, is clearly a more severe case of human rights abuse than the case of 
Kangu Beach.  
In chapter one, I argued that we could analyse certain elements in the reporting of incidents 
in 1996 to determine whether the three newspapers treated the victims of the PNGDF as 
‘unworthy’ compared to victims of the BRA.  The analysis in this chapter has shown that, in 
certain elements of reporting, the three newspapers treated the victims of the PNGDF as 
‘unworthy’ compared to the victims of the BRA at Kangu Beach.  In this chapter, the 
elements of reporting that I used were: 
· Prominence and attention;  
· rhetoric in reporting; 
Table 2-1: Reporting in the Age, Sydney Morning Herald and Australian about Kangu Beach: 
Sequences used in headlines and leads, 10 September to 25 October 1996. 
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· use of sources; 
· sequencing in reporting.   
The battle of Kangu Beach was given prominence and attention and the tone of reporting 
was such as to engender sympathy for the victims.  Whilst the PNG government and military 
were portrayed as promoting peace and order, the BIG and BRA were portrayed as 
belligerent and guilty of a ‘barbaric’ act.  Much of the reporting was based on unverified 
sources.  The event received attention in several opinion feature articles and in editorials34.  In 
one opinion article extreme views were expressed promoting the outrageousness of the act 
and the malevolence of the political and military leadership of the self-determination 
movement in Bougainville.   
In contrast, there was very little attention and prominence given to Simbo incident in the 
three newspapers.  The massacre was virtually ignored.  At the time of the massacre all three 
newspapers published only one ‘news in brief’ paragraph on the incident.  The incident was 
then largely forgotten.  Watts  (1996a, p. 4) says that there was no follow-up in the 
mainstream media.  Furthermore, he found that there were no mainstream journalists 
assigned to do any further research on the story.  Throughout 1996 there was only one 
exception to this general neglect.  It was mentioned in October, some eight months later.  
I have argued that the vocabulary, details and context and placement used in the reporting of 
the Simbo massacre was such as to engender little sympathy for the victims or outrage about 
their treatment.  The reporting also suggested little moral repugnance of the act.   
The testimony of Bougainvillean unofficial and dissident sources including one eyewitness 
was ignored.  This ommission occurred despite the fact that the Solomon Islands’ press 
published a story told by and photo of the eyewitness.  The key details, number killed, ages 
and approximate date and time were corroborated, apparently independently.  According to 
the Australian Associated Press journalist who covered the war for several years, Lucy Palmer 
(1999) there was no doubt that the PNGDF perpetrated the massacre of the villagers.  The 
three newspapers had the opportunity to photograph and interview the injured eyewitness but 
did not.  Whilst the unofficial versions were virtually ignored less convincing versions given 
by official stories were printed. 
                                                                 
34 There were two editorials in the first week and a total of four in the three months after the incident. 
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In the case of Simbo, there were no comments published about the outrageousness of the act 
nor the malevolence of PNG troops who committed the massacre or the officials who 
commanded them and did nothing to bring the perpetrators to justice.   
Journalists responded differently during the aftermath of each of the incidents.  The Simbo 
massacre was an obvious case of gross human rights abuse.  It was well documented and well 
publicised (though not in the three newspapers).  The press had ample opportunity, resources 
and availability of sources in the Solomon Islands and Australia to publicise the incident.  
There was an eyewitness available in the Solomon Islands who had a dramatic story to tell of 
violence, heroism and human survival against the odds.  Had the press publicised the incident 
well there would have been at least some public pressure for an official inquiry.  As it stood, 
there was ample justification for editors and opinion writers to call for such an inquiry 
themselves.  In the case of Kangu Beach the press drew attention to the grieving of the 
victim’s relatives and the return of the bodies to Port Moresby.  They also reported the results 
of the inquiry and the reactions of the PNG and Australian governments in a way which 
promoted sympathy for the victims.  It is likely that the Australian press reportage of this 
incident contributed to pressure which resulted in PNG Prime Minister Chan instituting an 
inquiry.  
The violence perpetrated by the BRA at Kangu Beach was presented as less legitimate than in 
the violence perpetrated by the PNGDF at Simbo.  The analysis of the sequencing showed 
that reporting of the Simbo case emphasised the violence on the PNG soldier who was 
allegedly killed during the incident.  It also portrayed the killing of this soldier as ‘deviant’ – 
unacceptable violence.  However, reporting portrayed the PNGDF killing of the civilians at 
Simbo as ‘ambiguous’ – too difficult to classify into right and wrong.  There were examples of 
a specific type of ‘ambiguous’ reporting – the use of ‘doublecasting’ sequences, which cast the 
PNG soldiers and Bougainvilleans as both victims and perpetrators of violence.  The use of 
these sequences emphasised the claim by the PNGDF (cited in Reuter 1996a) that the victims 
at Simbo died in a ‘shootout’.  The use of ‘ambiguous’ – especially ‘doublecasting’ – 
sequences suggested that the violence against the civilians was more acceptable than it 
otherwise might have been.   
In contrast, in the case of Kangu Beach the violence against the PNG security force victims 
was often presented as deviant.  Importantly, the violence of the PNGDF, both during the 
battle and previously at the ‘care centre’ and elsewhere in Bougainville was ignored or 
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downplayed in reporting of Kangu Beach.   In other words, the 13 security force victims were 
cast as victims rather than as both perpetrators and victims.  The differences in the 
sequencing of reporting of the two incidents suggest that the three newspapers portrayed the 
victims at Simbo as ‘unworthy’ compared to the victims at Kangu Beach.  Certainly, these 
publications often used other sequences to describe the violence at Kangu Beach thus 
presenting the violence as more acceptable than if they used only ‘deviant’ sequences.  
However, in cases where sequencing in one part of the article suggested acceptance of the 
violence, sequencing in other parts of the article and content suggested that the violence was 
deviant.   
In sum, my analysis of several elements of the reporting has shown that the victims of the 
BRA at Kangu Beach were portrayed as ‘worthy’ compared to the victims of the PNGDF at 
Simbo.  This supports Herman and Chomsky (1988) who argue that the mass media tend to 
portray victims of official friends as ‘unworthy’ compared to victims of official enemies.  
Given that the Australian government supported the objectives, if not the tactics, of the PNG 
government in its military operations on Bougainville, this pattern of reporting suggests that 
the three newspapers played a legitimising rather than oppositional role in reporting the two 
incidents.  In the next chapter, I will consider the reporting of the incident at Malabita which 
occurred in December 1996.  This case was similar to the case of Simbo, nine civilians were 
massacred by the PNGDF.  However, the Malabita incident was to receive much more 
attention and be reported quite differently to the Simbo massacre. 
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Chapter three 
REPORTING THE MALABITA MASSACRE 
 
On Sunday morning, 28 November, nine civilians, including women and children, 
were killed in a mortar attack on a church by the PNGDF (Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force) at Malabita in southern Bougainville (see map, fig 3-1, below, p. 69). 
In this chapter I ask how did three Australian newspapers, the Australian, the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Age, report this incident?  As I indicated in chapter one, there 
are a variety of theoretical perspectives which can be drawn upon to interpret this 
case.  I begin by discussing the circumstances of the Malabita incident. 
The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) victory at Kangu Beach was a turning 
point in the war and it was to usher in further victories by the BRA in the field (Watts, 
1999b).  The security forces responded to the battle of Kangu Beach with a series of 
‘payback’ killings (Australian, 13 December 1996, p. 13).  For example, John Napatalai, 
co-ordinator of the Kangu beach ‘care centre’ and Theodore Miriung, the PNG-
appointed Premier of Bougainville, because of their perceived role in the Kangu Beach 
attack were assassinated by PNGDF troops (Amnesty International, 1997).  However, 
the BRA continued to overrun PNGDF positions and by the end of November 1996, 
had gained control of much of south of Bougainville (Kauona, 2000a). 
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Figure 3-1: Bougainville and Buka Islands, showing location of Malabita.  (Adapted from 
O’Callaghan, 1999a, p. xi.) 
 70 
According to eyewitnesses (cited in Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9), on 28 November 
1996, a group of family and friends had gathered for a Catholic Mass at Malabita when the 
PNGDF fired seven rounds from their nearby base at Buin.  Two of these rounds cut 
through the roof and exploded on the ground and the rest fell outside (eyewitness cited in 
Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9).  A two-year-old child and five others, mainly women, 
were wounded (Amnesty International, 1997).  The incident was described by Amnesty 
International (1997, http:///www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1997/ASA/33400197.htm) as: 
…an indiscriminate attack on civilians by the PNGDF.  The church was in a BRA 
controlled area but there appear to have been no military targets in the immediate vicinity. 
The Malabita massacre was part of a spate of attacks on civilians in the area (Australian, 13 
December 1996, p. 13).  In late November and early December 1996 there were reports of up 
to one hundred civilians killed by the PNGDF and pro-government militia in several villages 
in the Siwai district in southwest Bougainville (Bougainville Interim Government, cited in 
Sharp, 1997)35.  These attacks were a result of the frustration and anger of the PNGDF and 
‘Resistance’  forces (Kauona, 2000a, O’Callaghan, 1999b).  The occurrence of a high number 
of attacks in the one area within a period of a week and involving so many deaths suggests 
complicity, if not planning, on the part of local PNGDF commanders36.   
This situation is reminiscent of the slaughter of East Timorese by Indonesian troops and their 
allied militia in 1999, though on a much smaller scale.  Whilst the Australian Defence 
Intelligence Organisation was aware of the involvement of higher officials within the 
Indonesian army in the East Timor attacks, the Indonesian and Australian governments 
insisted that the killings were the work of aberrant troops and local militias (Age, 17 March 
2002, pp. 1 and 6).  According to General Kauona (2000a), the former Commander-in-Chief 
of the BRA, the killings (including the Malabita massacre) were not official ‘search and 
destroy’ operations which were common in the earlier stages of the conflict (see Gillespie, 
1999a).  Rather, he said that they were the result of the frustration of local PNGDF  
                                                                 
35 By this time, the BRA had breached the blockade, using automatic weapons mounted on powered ‘banana boats’ and was 
able to regularly cross into the Solomon Islands (Watts, 2000b).  At least seven out of the 16 wounded survivors of two of 
these attacks (at Mokukruru and Malabita) were evacuated to Honiara for medical treatment (O’Callaghan, Australian, 6 
December 1996, p. 9 and O’Callaghan, ibid, 7-8 December 1996, p. 15).  
36 I put this to Mary-Louise O’Callaghan (1999b) and she agreed that local commanders probably gave the troops a ‘free 
hand’.  However, she believed that higher officials were unaware of what had happened.   
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personnel. 
I argue on two grounds that the higher officials of the PNGDF and PNG government, such 
as those in Port Moresby, were largely responsible for the killings.   
Firstly, human rights abuses such as these had been committed, repeatedly, by security forces 
since 1988 (Amnesty International, 1997, United Nations, 1996).  Despite this, PNG officials 
had continued to deploy troops and mount offensives.  Furthermore, they had failed to bring 
any of the perpetrators to justice despite requests from Amnesty International and the United 
Nations to do so.  They had also failed to investigate human rights abuses apart from one 
case, the assassination of Premier Miriung (U.S. department of State, 1997).  Such failure to 
act on the criminal abuses of the PNGDF amounted to a situation where they operated with 
impunity on Bougainville (Amnesty International, 1994).  This responsibility of higher 
officials for human rights abuses in the past was highlighted by an Amnesty International 
(1996) press release, published on the day after the first news report of the Malabita massacre 
appeared.  In the release, entitled ‘Government Yet Again Turns a Blind Eye to the Latest 
Killings on The Island Of Bougainville’, Amnesty International (1996, p. 1) stated that: 
The government has consistently failed to respond adequately to killings, disappearances’ 
and torture by its forces since the eight-year conflict began… 
This lack of action by the government has allowed the security forces to continue 
committing grave human rights violations in the knowledge that they are unlikely to be 
held accountable for their actions. 
Amnesty International (1997) also stated that, consistent with past behaviour of PNG higher 
officials, the Malabita killings were not investigated independently.   
The PNG government and defence force also assisted in the continuation of the human 
rights situation by keeping independent observers away from Bougainville despite UN 
requests to let them in.  As Amnesty International (1996, p. 1) stated: 
Verification of the exact circumstances of the attack has been hampered by lack of access 
for independent observers.   
Unless the authorities allow access to Bougainville for independent human rights 
observers and unless mechanisms are set up for investigating any allegations of violations 
and holding those responsible to account, the people of Bougainville will continue to be  
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defenceless against further killings, ‘disappearances’, arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment. 
The second ground for arguing that the PNG higher officials were responsible for the killings 
is that they occurred in the context of renewed offensive military operations.  As stated 
above, Chan lifted the ceasefire in March 1996 and launched High Speed II in July.  Since 
then, the Australian government, the Solomon Islands government and other groups had 
called for the PNG government to initiate peace proceedings.37  In addition, the BRA had 
been calling for a truce with much the same conditions that were eventually agreed to at the 
Burnham Peace conference in 1997 (see Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c).  However, Chan failed to 
reinstate the ceasefire or make any peace initiatives (see Pacific News Bulletin, 1996c).  
Furthermore, some officials in PNG, including the Minister for Defence Mr. Ijape, were at 
the time planning the ‘Sandline’ mercenary offensive which was aimed at assassinating BRA 
leaders and invading the Panguna mine site and surrounding villages (O’Callaghan, 1999a).   
Information about the attack only emerged because ‘the survivors managed to travel to the 
Solomon Islands to seek medical attention’ (Amnesty International 1997, 
http:///www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1997/ASA/33400197.htm).  Also, due to the BRA’s 
ability to breach the blockade, photos of the bombed church site, showing dismembered 
bodies (‘Bougainville: the War Next Door’, n.d.) and dead children, were sent to Australia (see 
figs. 3-2 and 3-3, pp. 73 -74, below). 
 
Initial reports 
Immediately after the incident at Malabita, the BRA evacuated wounded survivors to the 
Solomon Islands for medical treatment.  These survivors were to become the first and most 
important source for Australian news reporting.  As Amnesty International (1997) found, 
news of the attack was only made because these survivors made it to the Solomons.  Five 
days after the attack and upon arrival at the General Hospital in Honiara some of them spoke 
to the Australian reporter, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9).  Her 
article was to be the first Australian report on the incident. 
                                                                 
37 However, the Australian government was still supplying the PNGDF with much needed military aid (See Sharp, 1997). 
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Figure 3-2: Child's body, from Malabita   (Paul Bobby).  Source: Coles-Janess, (2000). 
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Figure 3-3.  Malabita victims (Paul Bobby).  Source: Coles-Janess (2000) 
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On the same day the BIG (Bougainville Interim Government, which represents the 
movement for self-determination on Bougainville), stated that nine civilians were killed: three 
men, three women and three children (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December, 1996, p. 21).  They 
also released the names of eight of those killed and five of the injured (Reuter, 1996b).  
Initially the story of the massacre was reported prominently in only one of the three 
newspapers.  On 6 December the Australian published two of O’Callaghan’s (Australian, 6 
December 1996) articles, on page one and nine.  The page-nine item was medium sized and at 
the top of the page.  However, the page-one item was small and at the bottom of the page.  It 
was under the headline, ‘PNG troops kill nine in church raid’ and began with:  
PAPUA New Guinea troops killed nine civilians and seriously wounded nine others after 
launching a mortar attack on a church in South Bougainville in one of the worst incidents 
of the eight-year civil war.  
The incident, confirmed yesterday by The Australian, is one of a growing number of 
attacks by PNG troops and resistance fighters in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands in 
the past week. (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 1, emphasis in text) 
O’Callaghan downplayed the severity of the human rights abuse.  The troops ‘killed’ rather 
than ‘massacred’; ‘launched an attack’ rather than ‘committed an atrocity’; and the event is not 
referred to as a ‘human rights abuses’ or similar terms.  The term, ‘resistance fighters’ evokes 
visions of freedom and heroism.  This group is referred to more accurately by Peter Young 
(1999, writing for Jane’s Information Group which publishes Jane’s Defence Weekly) as ‘pro-
government guerillas’.  However, O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9) prefers to 
adopt the PNG official terminology.  
O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9) does give an account from the viewpoint of 
one of the wounded women: 
Ms Kauvina Tom, 24, who suffered shrapnel wound to her upper thighs, told the 
Australian  yesterday that villagers from the rebel-controlled area of Malapita had gathered 
for their usual early morning prayer service around 7 am last Thursday when the attack 
took place.  (Emphasis in text) 
This is a dramatic and personalised story which would be likely to enrage the reader and 
encourage sympathy for the victims.  However, it was left to the second half of the article on 
page nine. 
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She also mentions the suffering of a child as she writes:  
Wounds suffered by the five, including a two-year old boy, Makiwa Baubake, were 
consistent with a mortar attack…(Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9) 
However, this is her only mention of child victims (three of whom were actually killed, 
Amnesty International, 1997).  Returning to the vocabulary used, we may note that Makiwa 
suffered ‘wounds’ rather than being ‘blown open by shrapnel’.  The importance of this detail 
is also played down by its placement in the middle of the second article, on page nine. 
O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996, pp. 1 and 9) omits to mention the most 
newsworthy aspect of the story – and the one which readers would probably view with the 
most seriousness – that among the nine civilians were three women and three children.  It 
was contained in the BIG press release which was issued on the same day as the article 
appeared. The BIG, in Sydney, obtained this information from its contacts amongst the 
Bougainvillean refugees in the Solomon Islands.  O’Callaghan was based in the Solomon 
Islands and had spoken to the eyewitnesses eliciting many other details, such as that seven 
shots were fired in quick succession, that five landed outside the church and that the last two 
cut through the roof.  It is therefore puzzling that she omits one of the most newsworthy 
details – the six dead women and children. 
The Sydney Morning Herald and the Age both reported the story the next day, downplaying the 
seriousness of the incident.  They both supplied fewer details of the suffering of the civilians 
and the headlines ignored the deaths of the women and children.   
The Sydney Morning Herald treated the incident less prominently, than the Australian did.  It ran 
an article mentioning the massacre on p. 21, giving little attention to the atrocity as a separate 
incident.  Instead, it highlighted the problems of the PNGDF and placed the massacre within 
the context of other attacks by them.  The headline for the Sydney Morning Herald article read: 
‘PNG troops accused after 20 die in raids’ (7 December 1996, p. 21). 
The article began: ‘Leaders of the crisis-torn Papua New Guinea Defence Force say they are 
gravely concerned…’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21). 
Certain details which would cause concern in the reader were referred to but downplayed.  
The journalists mentioned that three young children were killed and that several children were 
among the wounded.  But they did not do this until the second paragraph.   In the eighth 
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paragraph, the journalists mentioned that three women were killed.  They mentioned that ‘a 
mortar bomb’ (my emphasis) was fired at the church (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 
1996, p. 21) contradicting their claim, found later in the article, that there were in fact seven 
mortars.  O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9) the day before had quoted an 
eyewitness as stating that 7 mortars were fired, with two hitting the church directly.  Palmer 
and agencies (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21) did not mention this until the 
eighth paragraph, after quoting a PNGDF source stating that they could not confirm nor 
deny the incident and that they were ‘gravely concerned’ about the allegations.  
Palmer and agencies (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21) also made an important 
omission.  Like O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9), they failed to state explicitly 
that the church contained only civilians.  As Amnesty International (1996) emphasised in their 
press release the day before, the incident was an indiscriminate attack on civilians and there 
were no military targets in the area.  
The rhetoric used by (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21) was similar to that used 
by O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9).  The headline stated ‘20 die in raids’ 
(referring to 11 victims of another massacre as well as the nine from Malabita) rather than ‘20 
murdered by PNGDF killers’.  Francis Ona, the President of the BIG referred to the 
PNGDF in such terms in his press release issued the day before the Sydney Morning Herald 
article was published.  As in the headline, the words used in the lead distinctly played down 
the seriousness of the atrocity and described the act as a ‘punishment raid’, as if the victims 
deserved some retribution.   
The Age also downplayed the story.  In the first two months after the Australian published 
O’Callaghan’s (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9) article, the Age published just one short 
article on the Malabita massacre.  It appeared in the middle pages of the newspaper.  The 
article, sourced from AAP (Age, 7 December, 1996, p. 13) placed important details, such as 
the killing of women and children, toward the end and used similar rhetoric to that of 
O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December 1996) and Palmer and agencies (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 
December 1996, p. 21).  It referred to the ‘killing of nine civilians in a mortar attack on a 
Catholic church’ (Age, 7 December, 1996, p. 13).   It also omitted details mentioned by 
Amnesty International (1996) that there were no military targets in the area and that the attack 
appeared to be an indiscriminate attack on civilians.  The article implied that the PNGDF 
might have been aiming at combatants in or near the church.   
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In sum, in the initial period after the massacre whilst the three newspapers reported the story 
they also downplayed it.  The reports were not prominent in the three newspapers except for 
one case.  The reports suggested little moral concern about the violence and downplayed or 
ignored details which emphasised the serious nature of the atrocity, for example that women 
and children were killed. 
The legitimacy of the violence 
Cerulo (1998) has suggested that the sequencing of narratives carry judgements about the 
relative legitimacy of various violent acts.  Using Cerulo’s (1998) approach, I believe we can 
establish how the press both evaluated and represented the moral aspects of the violence.  
As I discussed in chapter one, Cerulo (1998) argues that cultural conventions lead journalists 
to make decisions about how they sequence narratives about violence.  Stories of ‘deviant’, 
‘normal’ and ‘ambiguous’ violence are structured in different ways.  In this section I analyse 
the press reports to answer the question: is the violence presented as ‘deviant’, ‘normal’ or 
‘ambiguous’?  Addressing this question will allow a discussion in chapter four as to why they 
have portrayed the violence in the way that they did. 
The table below shows the sequence used in the headline to the first article, O’Callaghan 
(Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 1).  
Text Identity qualifier 
PNG troops 
 
kill 
 
nine 
 
in church raid 
perpetrator 
 
act 
 
victim 
 
context  
This is a typical perpetrator (‘normal violence’) sequence – Perpetrator, act, victim.  The PNG 
troops are mentioned first, thus the reader is led in to the story from the perspective of the 
perpetrator.  The absence of the victims’ perspective is shown by the place in the sequence.  
This is underscored also in content.  The headline writer fails to identify the victims beyond 
the number killed.  By using this sequence, the reader is led into the story through the 
experience of the perpetrator, rather than the victims.  According to Cerulo (1998) the use of 
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such a sequence suggests that the violence though regrettable is legitimate.  Such sequences, 
she observes, are typically used to describe acts of violence which are assumed as maintaining 
order – such as police shootings. 
In the lead the same perpetrator (‘normal violence’) sequence is repeated, as shown below:   
Text Identity qualifier 
PAPUA New Guinea troops 
 
killed 
 
nine civilians and seriously wounded nine others 
 
after launching a mo rtar attack on a church in 
South Bougainville in one of the worst incidents of 
the eight-year civil war. 
perpetrator 
 
act 
 
victim/consequence 
 
context  
Again, the writer begins with the perpetrator, whilst mentioning the victims toward the end of 
the sequence.  
O’Callaghan (Australian, 6 December, 1996, p. 9) had a second article published in the 
Australian on the same day.  The headline in that article again presents a perpetrator sequence, 
‘PNG troops kill nine in church attack’.  The lead also carries a perpetrator sequence: 
Papua New Guinea troops killed nine civilians and seriously wounded nine others after 
launching a mortar attack on a church in South Bougainville in one of the worst incidents 
of the eight-year civil war. (Australian, 6 December, 1996, p. 9) 
The Age and the Sydney Morning Herald followed up the next day with stories on the massacre.  
The Sydney Morning Herald item told the story of the massacre as one of several recent 
massacres.  The headline read: ‘PNG troops accused after 20 die in raids’ (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 20).  This is different to the perpetrator sequences found in the 
headlines and leads on the previous day.  The PNG troops are not presented as the 
perpetrators.  Rather, they are seen ambiguously as the a ccused.  This provides a context for 
the reader, after which the reader is told about the victims and the act.  This is a ‘contextual’ 
sequence which suggests that the violence is ‘ambiguous’ – too difficult to classify into right 
and wrong.  Convincing evidence had been presented in the press in the days before the 
article appeared that an atrocity had been perpetrated by PNGDF troops.  Given this 
evidence, it is interesting that the sub-editor uses an ‘ambiguous violence’ rather than a 
‘deviant violence’ sequence, which would have suggested that the violence was unacceptable.  
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In the lead, the writer reverts to a perpetrator sequence, as shown below:  
Text Identity qualifier 
Leaders of the crisis torn Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force say they are gravely concerned 
over allegations that 
 
soldiers on Bougainville 
 
have killed 
 
at least 20 civilians and wounded 19 more  
 
in a mortar attack and a punishment raid on a 
village in the past 10 days.  
 
 
intro/context  
 
 
 
perpetrator 
 
act 
 
victim 
 
context  
 
 
The Age headline reads, ‘ PNG army killing civilians: rebels’.  This is a clear-cut perpetrator 
(‘normal violence’) sequence.  The pattern is repeated in the lead, which reads, ‘Bougainville 
secessionist fighters today accused the Papua New Guinean army of killing nine civilians in a 
mortar attack on a Catholic church in the island’s south last week.’ (Age, 7 December, 1996, p. 
13)  This suggests that the violence was ‘normal’ or legitimate.   
On the same day, as the Sydney Morning Herald and Age articles, O’Callaghan (Australian, 1996, 
7-8 December, 1996, p. 15) wrote her third article on the Siwai massacres, but referred little to 
the Malabita case38.  
In total, there were four initial articles mentioning the Malabita massacre.  Three of these 
contained a reference to the violence in the lead.  In sum, the headlines and leads in the first 
reports are primarily in perpetrator sequences.  The only exception is one headline (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21) in which as ‘contextual’ (‘ambiguous’) sequence is 
used.  Following Cerulo (1998) such a pattern, strongly suggests that the violence is ‘normal’ 
and therefore legitimate and acceptable.  The violence is presented as an act of maintaining 
order, rather than of ‘deviance’.  Notably, there is lack of victim sequences, where the reader 
is drawn first to the suffering of the victim so that they respond to the violence as ‘deviant’ 
and therefore unacceptable.  Such reporting downplays the severity of the human rights abuse 
which was perpetrated at Malabita.  
                                                                 
38 She focussed on the nearby Mokukruru massacre and the Malabita massacre was not mentioned in the lead. 
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Reactions by PNG and BIG officials and Amnesty International and the press response. 
How did the three newspapers respond to the PNG government reactions to the massacre?  
PNG officials had little to say about the incident. The PNG government made no official 
comment at all on the massacre (Amnesty International, 1996, Australian 13 December 1996, 
p. 13).   On 6 December, as the story broke General Jerry Singirok, the Commander of the 
PNGDF, was ‘unavailable for comment’ (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9).  On the next 
day it was reported that PNGDF Chief of staff, Colonel Jack Tuat, said that he ‘could not 
confirm or deny’ details of the ‘reported’ incident.  Tuat claims to be ‘gravely concerned’ that 
‘everything is pointing towards the security forces’ and that ‘he would like to see the full 
report’ before commenting (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21). 
Francis Ona, the President of the BIG expressed his concern about the PNG officials.   
According to Reuter (1996b), he said that the PNG Prime Minister, Chan, had totally lost 
control of his military on Bougainville.  Ona (cited in Reuter, 1996b) continued: 
It seems that the PNGDF are trying to kill as many civilians as possible before they are 
withdrawn from Bougainville… we now have an unruly bunch of marauding killers that 
are making Bougainville their killing fields. 
Amnesty International (1996, p. 1) in their press release, issued on the same day as the first 
newspaper report, criticised the silence of the PNG government: 
Serious human rights violations on the island of Bougainville have yet again been met with 
a resounding silence from the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government, as more civilians 
were reportedly killed last week by the security forces… 
Amnesty International (1996, p. 1) noted that, despite the expressions of concern, there had 
been no commitment to investigate the incident:   
PNGDF’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Jack Tuat, commenting on the reports gave no 
commitment that the incident would be investigated and there does not appear to have 
been any reaction yet from the government. 
Amnesty International (1996) also argued that the PNG’s lack of adequate response to such 
abuses in the past had led to a situation on Bougainville where the troops operated with 
impunity.  Furthermore, that PNG officials had failed to demonstrate any recent change in 
this regard:   
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This lack of action by the government has allowed the security forces to continue 
committing grave human rights violations in the knowledge that they are unlikely to be 
held accountable for their actions  (Amnesty International, 1996, p. 1).  
They stated that the PNG government’s response was inadequate given its failure to 
investigate abuses and to prosecute offenders. This, they said, had been the case since the 
beginning of the war.  Notwithstanding this, Amnesty International (1996, p. 2) concentrated 
on the period since the visit of the UN Special Rapporteur in 1995, observing that: 
With only one exception, none of the dozens of reports of extrajudicial killings and 
‘disappearances ’ in the past two years have been addressed by the government.  Members 
of the security forces alleged to have committed violations have not been investigated or 
prosecuted, and many remain stationed on the island. 
The investigation of the assassination of Theodore Miriung in October did not suggest that 
the PNG authorities had changed in this regard.  As Amnesty International (1996, p. 2) stated:  
In November, in an unprecedented move, the PNG Government invited a Sri Lankan judge 
to conduct a coroner’s inquiry into the death of former Bougainville Premier, Theodore 
Miriung, in October.  Last week, the judge released his preliminary findings that PNGDF 
soldiers and members of the Resistance Forces were responsible for the killing. 
Amnesty welcomed the willingness of the government to establish an independent 
coroner’s inquiry into Theodore Miriung’s death, but actions taken by the authorities since 
the preliminary findings do not suggest that this inquiry reflects a consistent change of 
government policy to ensure independent and full investigations of all human rights 
violations on Bougainville. 
Soldiers who are alleged to have been involved in the killing are still stationed in the area 
where the killing took place, despite a recommendation by the coroner’s inquiry that they 
be removed.  
Their final criticism concerned international monitors, including journalists who had been 
barred from the island.  This situation had existed since the PNG government had formally 
established a blockade on Bougainville in May 1989 (Amnesty International, 1994).  They also 
stated that if this situation continued it would result in the commission of more human rights 
abuses: 
Throughout the conflict, human rights violations by the security forces and abuses by the 
armed secessionist BRA have been facilitated by the lack of international and domestic 
scrutiny, as journalists and human rights monitors have been barred from the island.  This 
is despite recommendations from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
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summary or arbitrary executions for greater access to the island (Amnesty International, 
1996, p. 2). 
Two days later, Brigadier General Singirok, Commander-in-Chief of the PNGDF, made his 
first and only statement on the matter: that the PNGDF post at Buka had received no report 
of such an incident and that ‘the security forces maintain there were no shots fired into the 
church at Malabita’ (Broadcast on Radio New Zealand International, on 10 December 1996, 
cited in Pacific News Bulletin, 1997, p. 5).  However,  Radio New Zealand International (RZNI) 
reported on the 10 December, that Tuat in response to further questions said that the 
incident was ‘still being investigated’ (cited in Pacific News Bulletin, 1997, p. 5).   
There was much in the reaction of the PNG officials which the press could legitimately 
criticise.  As I have shown above, the officials did very little to address the concerns raised by 
Amnesty International (1996).  Furthermore, noting what the human rights body said, these 
officials continued to ignore the recommendations of the UN which were made two years 
prior.   
How did the press respond to the official PNG reactions?  There were four items focussing 
on Malabita in this initial period.  In the first published article on the incident O’Callaghan 
(Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 1) quoted a statement by BIG (Bougainville Interim 
Government) President Francis Ona as follows: 
We are extremely concerned that the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, has now totally lost 
control of his military on Bougainville. 
She omits the other important part of Ona’s statement in which he says that ‘the PNGDF are 
trying to kill as many civilians as possible before they are withdrawn from Bougainville’ and 
that the PNGDF were ‘an unruly bunch of marauding killers that are making Bougainville 
their killing fields’ (cited in Reuter, 1996b and above p. 81).  This quote was reported in full 
on the Reuter (1996b) wire service.  Though several newspaper reports quoted various 
statements from BIG this claim was omitted entirely from reporting about Malabita. 
The next day, in the Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996) 
counterposed Tuat’s expression of ‘concern’ with a reference to the assassination of 
Bougainville Premier Theodore Miriung in October, 1996.  She states that:  
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Although the Miriung inquest findings were released a week ago, the soldiers under 
suspicion have not been removed from their unity at Tonu, in southwestern Bougainville, 
or been questioned by police. (Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21) 
This suggests that the PNGDF officials’ ‘concern’ about the lawlessness of PNGDF troops is 
questionable.  However, the thrust of the article supports Tuat’s line.  The article begins:  
Leaders of the crisis -torn Papua New Guinea Defence Force say they are gravely 
concerned over allegations… (Palmer, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1996, p. 21) 
This theme is reiterated with quotes from Tuat in paragraphs four five and six.  The 
counterposing statement about Miriung is left until the second last paragraph.  
The Age, (7 December, 1996, p. 13) said that the PNGDF ‘was waiting to talk to officers on 
the island about the alleged incident.’  Unlike the Sydney Morning Herald (7 December 1997, p. 
21), the Age presented nothing to challenge this statement. 
In sum, the press entirely ignored Amnesty International’s (1996) media release, as they were 
to do later.  They also showed very little interest in criticising the PNG government on the 
same grounds.  The small amount of criticism was placed in the context of the problems 
facing the PNGDF rather than moral criticism of the PNG leadership.  In keeping with this 
theme, writers selectively reported from the BIG press release, avoiding such words as 
‘marauding killers’ and ‘killing fields’.  
In the initial period of reporting the three newspapers played down the seriousness of the 
atrocity at Malabita.  This is demonstrated by my analysis of the attention, prominence and 
rhetoric in reporting.  The analysis of sequences used in headlines and leads demonstrates that 
journalists and sub-editors played down the seriousness of the incident, presenting the 
violence as ‘normal’.  Though the three newspapers suggested that the violence was 
regrettable, they also presented the attack as an act of maintaining order – and therefore 
legitimate and acceptable.  There was also a lack of moral criticism of PNG officials for their 
role in the atrocity, despite the fact that Amnesty International (1997) made such criticisms.   
The issue was virtually ignored by the three publications for another nine days.  There was 
only one specific mention of the Malabita incident between the 7 December, when the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Age published their accounts of the incident and the 15 December.   
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After the release of the photos 
As I discussed at the start of this chapter, the BRA was to smuggle out photos of the 
massacre (two of which are shown in figs 3-2 and fig 3-3, above, pp. 73-74).  On 15 
December 1996, four of the photos including one of the wrapped bodies of the children, (fig 
3-3, above, p. 74) were published in the Solomons Citizen newspaper.   
Two of the newspapers, which took up the story the next day (16 December), tended to 
downplay the suffering of the victims and did not publish the most disturbing photos.  The 
exception was the Sydney Morning Herald which emphasised the suffering of the victims by 
placing a photo showing the children’s bodies (Fig 3-3, above, p. 74), together with an article 
on the front page.  However, the importance of the victims’ plight was diminished by the 
placement of the article and photo on the bottom of the page and the small size of the article.  
It also placed two more pictures on page nine – one of more bodies and another of the 
wrecked ‘bush’ church.  There was no accompanying article, but a large caption which read:  
…bodies lie outside a church near Buin, in the south of Bougainville, after the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force allegedly launched a mortar attack during morning Mass.  The 
secessionist Bougainville Interim Government claims nine people were killed including 
three young children, but PNG has denied the attack.  The rebels say a long-range, 120 
mm launcher fired a mortar bomb on the church and claim that the launcher’s range, 4.2 
kilometres, means the shells must have been fired from an area controlled by the PNGDF.  
(Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1996, p. 9) 
It was the only publication to publish the pictures of the dead children.  The Australian gave 
less emphasis to the suffering of the victims than the Sydney Morning Herald did.  There was no 
front-page article but a small item on the bottom of page ten.  A photo, only of the wrecked 
church rather than the bodies, accompanied it.  The Age ignored the story entirely. 
These images (shown above, pp. 73-74) were disturbing and it might be argued that they were 
not appropriate to publish in a metropolitan daily newspaper.  The first one (Fig. 3-2, above, 
p. 73) was perhaps too graphic.  However, apparently the Sydney Morning Herald believed that 
the second (Fig. 3-3, above, p. 74) was acceptable.  They published it but not one of the other 
three newspapers did.  
After the release of the photos, there was a greater emphasis on the suffering of the victims.  
Both the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian mentioned that three women and three 
children were killed.  However, none of the headlines mentioned that the victims were 
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civilians (in fact they were all civilians) nor that women and children were killed.  These 
details were obviously newsworthy.  
In sum, there was a more sympathetic reaction to the incident after the publication of the 
photos.  However, overall the suffering of victims was still downplayed.  
How did the press portray the legitimacy of the violence after the photos were published?   
In December 1996 there were five more items published after the photos emerged: three in 
the Sydney Morning Herald and two in the Australian (the Age ignored it).  The headlines and 
sequences for each of these articles are shown in table 3-1, below, in chronological order.  
Date  Item Headline (Publication) Sequence  Type 
16/12 
 
 
16/12 
 
 
 
16/12 
 
 
17/12 
 
 
 
20/12 
 
24/12 
 
News 
 
 
News 
 
 
 
Photos 
 
 
News 
 
 
 
Opinion 
 
Opinion 
 
Civilians accuse / PNGDF of / mortar attack  
(Australian) 
 
Photos proof of/ PNG / mortar raid, say 
Bougainville rebels (Sydney Morning 
Herald, p. 1) 
 
Bougainville / massacre: / the bloody 
aftermath  (Sydney Morning Herald, p. 9) 
 
Pressure grows on / defence force /  
over church attack / claims  (Sydney 
Morning Herald) 
 
Overhaul best defence in PNG (Australian) 
 
Australia holds its fire while Bougainville 
bleeds (Australian) 
Context/perpetrator/act.  
 
 
Context/perpetrator/act, 
context  
 
 
Place frame/act/consequence 
 
 
Context/perpetrator/act/  
context  
 
 
Massacre not in headline 
 
Massacre not in headline 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
A = ‘ambiguous’ sequence. 
Table 3-1 Headlines and their sequences in articles about Malabita in the Australian, the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Age, 16-24 December 1996.  
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The sequences in the first three headlines conform to the following pattern – 
context/perpetrator/act (see table 3-1, above).  This pattern is suggestive of ‘ambiguous’ 
violence, because it begins with context rather than the perpetrator or the victim.  Using 
Cerulo’s (1998) model, this suggests that the writer considered the circumstances too 
confusing to understand the violence as either ‘normal’ or ‘deviant’.  Thus, despite the photos 
 Date  
(publi- 
cation) 
 
Item  Lead   Sequence  Type 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
16-12 
(Aus) 
 
 
 
 
16/12 
(SMH, 
p. 1) 
 
 
 
16/12 
(SMH, 
p. 9) 
 
 
 
 
 
17/12 
(SMH) 
 
 
 
 
 
20/12 
(Aus) 
 
24/12 
(SMH) 
News 
 
 
 
 
 
News  
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 
caption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
News 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion 
 
 
Opinion 
Bougainville civilians displayed photographs 
yesterday they claimed proved / the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force / used mortars to kill / nine 
unarmed friends and family, including four children. 
 
 
Secessionists on Bougainville have released 
photographs which they say prove / the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) / slaughtered / nine 
people in a mortar attack on a village church last 
month. 
 
Left, bodies lie outside a church near Buin, in the 
south of Bougainville, after  / the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force / allegedly launched a mortar attack  
during morning Mass.  The secessionist Bougainville 
Interim Government claims / nine people were killed 
including three young children, but PNG has denied 
the attack. 
 
The Australian government yesterday increased 
pressure on Papua New Guinea over allegations that / 
the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) / had killed 
/civilians during attacks on villages in southern 
Bougainville, / calling for priority to be given to 
investigating the claims. 
 
- 
 
 
The slaughter of / women and children on 
Bougainville during recent weeks is cause for 
profound s adness. / Uncontrolled elements of the 
secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
have in the past been responsible for gross human 
rights abuses, including cold-blooded killings. / 
However, of late it has become clear that members of 
the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) have 
been responsible for / some of the most barbarous 
acts. 
Intro, context/ 
perpetrator/act, 
consequence/ 
victim. 
 
 
Intro, context/ 
perpetrator/act/victim
context, temporal 
frame 
 
 
Intro, 
context/perpetrator/ 
act, context/victim, 
context. 
 
 
 
 
Intro, 
context/perpetrator/ 
act/victim, context, 
place/context. 
 
 
 
Not in lead 
 
 
Act/victim, place 
frame, temporal 
frame, consequence/ 
context/temporal 
frame, perpetrator/ 
act. 
 
Perpetrator 
 
 
 
 
 
Perpetrator 
 
 
 
 
 
Perpetrator  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perpetrator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
Contextual 
Table 3-2: Leads and their sequences in articles about Malabita: the Australian, the Sydney 
Morning Herald and the Age, 16-24 December 1996.  
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being released, which provide further proof of the atrocity, the headlines still do not suggest 
that the violence is deviant.  Rather, ‘contextual’ sequences are used, which focus the readers’ 
attention on the circumstances of the violence.  This presents the violence as more acceptable 
than if ‘deviant’ sequences were used. 
The leads for these articles are shown in table 3-2, above. In the first four cases the leads fall 
back into the pattern we saw in the leads and headlines before the release of the photos.  
There is a difference though.  There is much more ‘contextual’ information and in most cases 
this is given at each stage in the sequence.  This could be described as a sequence which is 
half-way to becoming a ‘contextual’ sequence but maintaining the emphasis on the 
perpetrator and therefore still suggesting that the violence is ‘normal’.   
The pattern changes in the leads for the two opinion pieces.  In the first, O’Connor 
(Australian, 20 December, 1996, p. 15) focuses on the context surrounding the massacres at 
Malabita and Mokukruru, in particular, the problems within the PNGDF.  In his lead, he 
writes:  
There is a common saying among military professionals that there are no bad soldiers, 
only bad officers.  The truth of the saying is nowhere more evident than on Bougainville 
where the traditional indiscipline of the Papua New Guinean Defence Force is threatening 
to destroy all attempts to bring peace to the island.  
In the second paragraph, O’Connor (Australian, 20 December, 1996, p. 15) focuses on the 
Malabita massacre: ‘Reports of troops attacking churches…are well known.’  Here, he ignores 
the victims, replacing them with ‘churches’ and gives preference to the ‘troops’. 
In the second opinion article, Skehan (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13, case 
six in table 3-2, above, p. 87) refers to the series of attacks in the Siwai area in November and 
December, of which Malabita was one.  In the same article, the reader is led into the story 
being told of the ‘slaughter of women and children’ then ‘uncontrolled elements within the 
BRA’ who have committed ‘gross human rights abuses’ including ‘cold blooded killings’ in 
the past.  Lastly, the reader is told of how the BRA’s adversary, the PNGDF, has also but 
only of late been responsible for the same type of abuses. 
This is a ‘contextual’ sequence but it is tending towards a ‘doublecasting’ sequence.  A 
‘double-casting’ sequence presents each of the actors in double roles (as both the perpetrator 
and victim).   It would be difficult for a journalist to present a ‘doublecasting’ sequence in 
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these circumstances, given that the victims were all unarmed civilians.  However, Skehan 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13) manages to get close to such a sequence.  As 
we can see in table 3-2 (case six, above, p. 87) he begins with the act and the victims then 
turns to BRA violence and finally refers to the perpetrator of the Malabita massacre – the 
PNGDF. 
As Cerulo (1998) argues, ‘contextual’ sequences typically describe violence which is 
considered ambiguous.  Such sequences lead the reader to certain moral judgements about the 
violence of the perpetrator.  When the storyteller gives details of extenuating circumstances – 
such as that the wife was beaten by her husband for years before she finally killed her son – 
this suggests that the violence is less wrong.  Likewise, Skehan (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 
December 1996, p. 13) by referring to past abuses of the BRA suggests that the PNGDF 
violence is more acceptable.  
We can now examine how the three newspapers portrayed the legitimacy of the violence in 
the periods before and after the photos were released.   
The table below gives a summary of the sequences in the reporting of this incident. 
 Date (page) Publication Headline Lead 
1 6/12 (p. 1) Australian  P P 
2 6/12 (p. 9)  Australian P P 
3 7/12  SMH C P 
4 7/12 Age P P 
5 13/12 Australian C - 
__ ___________ ___________ ________ ____ 
6 16/12 Australian C P 
7 16/12 (p. 1) SMH C P 
8 16/12 (p.9) SMH A P 
9 17/12  SMH C P 
10 20/12 Australian - - 
11 24/12 SMH - C 
 
P = ‘perpetrator’ sequence 
C = ‘contextual’ sequence  
C = ‘contextual’ sequence 
-  =  massacre not mentioned 
The lines show when the photos of the massacre were made available to the press. 
I have not included the Australian article of 7-8/12 because it focussed on another massacre and only 
referred to the Malabita massacre briefly towards the end.  
Table 3-3: Articles about Malabita in December 1996: Sequencing in headlines and leads. 
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As table 3-3 (above) shows, in articles about the Malabita massacre, perpetrator sequences 
dominate in the leads.  Every news item lead presents a perpetrator (‘normal violence’) 
sequence.  However, in the opinion articles the massacre is either left out of the lead (items 5 
and 10) or a ‘contextual’ sequence is used.  Perpetrator sequences are more prevalent in the 
headlines before the photos were released.  After the photos the headlines change to use 
‘contextual’ sequences.  In the opinion articles headlines tend to avoid the actual massacre 
(items 10 and 11).  In one case (item 5) the headline presents a ‘contextual’ sequence.   
In sum, the general trend is to use ‘normal violence’ sequences which portray the violence as 
legitimate and therefore acceptable.  According to Cerulo (1998) such sequences are typically 
used to describe police violence against unruly citizens.  The leads in the news items present 
the violence mainly as ‘normal’, despite the release of the photos.  However, headlines begin 
presenting the violence as ‘normal’ (perpetrator sequence) then change to present it as 
‘ambiguous’ when the photos are released (see the entries below the lines in the table).  This 
suggests that sub-editors were beginning to have doubts that the troops’ action was one of 
maintaining order.  Importantly, whilst the violence is presented as ‘normal’ or ‘ambiguous’ it 
is not presented as ‘deviant’.  The use of these sequences suggests to the reader that the 
PNGDF’s violence at Malabita was more acceptable than it otherwise might have been.  This 
is done by encasing the violent act within a story where the circumstances are presented first.  
As Cerulo (1998, p. 47) writes:  
… contextual sequences offer reasons and explanations for otherwise unacceptable 
violence.  Indeed, such formats provide potential justifications for violent acts, 
justifications that appear before readers and viewers actually learn of the act itself. 
PNG official reactions and press response 
After the photos were published the PNGDF officials said nothing about the massacre, 
continuing the silence since 10 December.  As I will discuss below, there were some 
comments in the three newspapers about PNG’s official silence on the matter.  How critical 
were they toward the PNG government?  
The dominant theme in the press reaction was the crisis being experienced by the PNGDF 
and suggestions of incompetence about their management of this.  In opinion writing, 
O’Connor’s (Australian, 20 December, 1996, p. 15) only concern in relation to PNG’s 
response was its public relations failure: 
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The [PNG] government’s public relations have been a disaster, which has played into the 
hands of the Bougainville rebels.  
Skehan (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13), in the only other opinion piece, 
simply says that the PNG government and military officials ‘went to ground after initially 
responding with half-hearted denials.’ 
As for news items, Skehan, in the Sydney Morning Herald (16 December 1996, p. 1) ignores the 
fact that the PNG officials were silent about the latest evidence of the atrocity.  Instead he 
simply repeated Tuat’s claim of 6 December, that the PNGDF officials were ‘concerned’ and 
waiting further reports from the army’s command on Bougainville.  He also ignored later 
contradictory statements from the PNGDF – one denying PNGDF involvement and the 
other that they were still making investigations.  By doing this, Skehan (Sydney Morning Herald, 
16 December 1996, p. 1) suggested that the PNGDF was, indeed, still ‘concerned’. 
By quoting an outdated statement from the PNGDF, Skehan supported rather than 
challenged the PNGDF position.  Skehan suggested that the PNGDF was at worst 
incompetent (by not responding since the 6 December) rather than dishonest or malevolent. 
The day after the publication of Skehan’s (Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1996, p. 1) 
article the press began to subject the PNG response to some scrutiny.  On 17 December in 
the Sydney Morning Herald an article was published under the headline: ‘Pressure grows on 
defence force over church attack claims’.  The writers, Skehan and Palmer (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 17 December 1996, p. 14), quoted a spokesman from the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs who expected the PNG government to ‘put a priority’ on investigating the 
reports of the massacre.  They wrote:  
The reference to the need for priority to given [sic] to investigating the civilian deaths 
follows a lack of detailed information from the PNG Government and the PNGDF in 
response to the allegations. 
This was despite the fact that more than 20 civilian deaths allegedly occurred at the end of 
November and the beginning of this month. 
Here they do offer some challenge to the PNGDF response.  However, it is consistent with 
the line put earlier in the Sydney Morning Herald that the PNGDF is facing a crisis and 
therefore cannot respond adequately to the killings.  
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The press offered a critical response in three out of the five articles appearing after the release 
of the photos.  However, these writers suggest that the PNG officials have often been 
incompetent in the face of a crisis – rather than malevolent – and criticise them as ‘half-
hearted’ – rather than dishonest.  Their brevity and their placement also obscure these 
criticisms.  For example, Skehan’s (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13) criticism 
is a small sentence half-way through a small opinion piece.  As they did before the release of 
the photos, the writers portrayed the crime as ‘undisciplined’ behaviour and placed it within a 
context of a crisis facing the PNGDF.  They ignored criticisms and facts which were 
inconsistent with this theme.  
What is interesting is which criticisms of the PNG government were included in the three 
newpapers and which were not.  As I discussed above, Amnesty International (1996) criticised 
the PNG government the day of the first Australian press report of the massacre.  These 
criticisms were based on four grounds:  
1. PNG’s lack of commitment to investigate despite statements of concern.  
2. The silence of the PNG government.  
3. That PNG troops operate with impunity on Bougainville.  
4. That PNG government had banned independent observers from travelling to the island.   
I have pointed out above that in the press there was some criticism of the silence of the PNG 
government.  However none of the writers mentioned PNG’s lack of commitment to 
investigating the massacre.   
Only one writer said that troops operated with impunity on Bougainville.  O’Connor 
(Australian, 20 December, 1996, p. 15) wrote:  
PNGDF soldiers now regard themselves as an elite whose members are exempt from the 
restrictions of the civil law… 
Successive PNG governments are not free fro m blame.  The military has been and is 
treated badly by their political leaders.  It has been expected to perform miracles on 
Bougainville without adequate political or financial support. 
He says that the PNG officials are to blame but not for failing to investigate nor for failing to 
comply with UN recommendations but for tactical reasons such as not giving the military 
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enough support.  As for O’Connor’s (Australian, 20 December, 1996, p. 15) mention of civil 
law, it is irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion whether PNG troops were breaking 
civil or military law.  
The writers in the three newspapers avoided the issue of troops operating with impunity by 
omitting details which suggested PNG’s past inadequate action and PNG’s defiance of the 
UN.  There was only one exception to this – when Palmer mentioned that troops involved in 
the assassination of Premier Miriung had not been removed from their posts.  However, this 
detail was downplayed, as I have discussed above.  
Only one writer, O’Callaghan (Australian, 13 December, 1996, p. 13) in a feature article, 
mentioned the barring of observers:  
With the army controlling access to the island and preventing almost everyone, including 
journalists and international agencies, from visiting, it has proved almo st impossible to 
confirm these.  
She doesn’t mention that this had gone on for years and, as Amnesty International (1996) 
argued, that this situation had contributed to the continuation of human rights abuses on the 
island.   
The writers in the three newspapers tended to ignore the lack of investigation into the 
massacre.  There are two reasons why the lack of investigation is important in this case.  One 
is that failure to allow independent observers onto the island made it difficult to verify the 
details of the killings and therefore hampered the ability of the Australian media to cover the 
issue.  The second is that a failure to investigate allows the PNGDF on Bougainville to 
operate with impunity and thereby increases the chances of further human rights abuses 
taking place. 
Amnesty International (1996) reported that PNG refused to allow independent monitors onto 
the island despite calls from the UN to do so.  The Papua New Guinea authorities refused to 
allow an investigation team from the Red Cross to enter mainland Bougainville after the 
incident (Niuswire, 17 December, cited in Pacific News Bulletin, 1997, p. 5).  The writers in the 
three newspapers ignored this.   
In November and December, several bodies called for the involvement of an international 
body on Bougainville.  These bodies included the Papua New Guinea Catholic Commission 
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for Justice Peace and Development, the Papua New Guinea Council of Churches and 
Amnesty International  (Pacific News Bulletin, 1997).  The press also ignored these calls.  
The lack of independent investigation received no comment in the press until February 1997.  
Greg Roberts in an article published in both the Age (15 January 1997, p. 10) and the Sydney 
Morning Herald (15 January, p. 15) made a brief comment that the Malabita massacre was yet 
to be investigated.  However, this was the only comment to be made on the matter in the 
three months after news of the massacre emerged. 
In sum, despite the comments by Amnesty International (1996) and other organizations, the 
writers in the three newspapers ignored PNG’s failure to investigate the atrocity, apart from a 
brief mention two-and-a-half months after the event.  They also tended to avoid or downplay 
the PNG government’s silence, the impunity of troops on Bougainville and the lack of access 
for independent observers.   
There is one criticism which both Amnesty International (1996) and the press avoid and that 
is direct moral criticism of PNG officials.  Instead the writers in the press criticise the troops 
in this fashion. For example, Skehan (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13) says 
that: 
…of late … members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) have been 
responsible for some of the most barbarous acts.  
There is one exception – O’Callaghan (Australian, 13 December, 1996, p. 13) who says: 
As for Port Moresby, leaders there want to give every impression of wanting to disown 
any responsibility for the very demons they have unleashed.  
However, this is a mere hint of a moral criticism and appears at the very end of the article, 
suggesting that it is of little importance.  
_____________________________________ 
In this chapter, I have described and analysed the reporting by focussing on a number of 
elements: 
· attention and prominence; 
· rhetoric; 
 95 
· criticism of the PNG government; 
· sequencing in reporting. 
Firstly, regarding attention and prominence, the victims at Malabita were neither totally 
ignored nor did they receive a large amount of attention in the publications in the sample.  
For example the Age, the largest selling ‘quality’ paper in Australia’s second largest city, 
ignored the incident completely except for one small article in the middle pages.  In all 
likelihood the story would have been forgotten after a few days if not for the release of the 
photos of the massacre.  This lack of attention was despite the story of Malabita containing 
many elements which the press would normally consider to be newsworthy: 
Ø violence;  
Ø human drama and survival against the odds; 
Ø personal stories; 
Ø the presence of victims who were innocent, ordinary people, including three women 
and children who were killed;  
Ø the fact that it occurred on an Island which is geographically very close and within a 
country which we have close commercial, cultural (many Australians used to live and 
work in Bougainville) and political ties.  Indeed, many writers (Oke, 1997, Sharp, 
1997, John, 1999, Amnesty International, 1993 and Gillespie, 1999a) have argued that 
the Australian government’s material and/or diplomatic support for the war was 
instrumental in the continuation of such human rights abuses.   
Initially, the incident was not reported prominently.  The exception was the Australian 
newspaper which published one front-page article.  Again, after the photos were released, 
there was only one front-page article published (in the Sydney Morning Herald). 
Secondly, the rhetoric in reporting suggested little moral concern about the violence inflicted 
by the PNGDF at Malabita.  The journalists used words such as ‘troops’ rather than 
‘perpetrators’ or ‘killers’ and used phrases such as ‘launched an attack’ rather than ‘committed 
an atrocity’.  They also ignored or downplayed details which emphasised the seriousness of 
the offence, its gruesome nature and the suffering of the victims.  Details omitted or 
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downplayed included the fact that women and children were killed, that people were blown 
apart and that the church contained only civilians.  There was more sympathy shown for the 
victims after the publication of the photos.  However, the suffering of the victims, the 
severity of the abuse and the guilt of the perpetrators was still downplayed. 
Thirdly, the criticisms of PNG officials were rare, downplayed and limited to tactical issues.  
The press release from Amnesty International (1996), which criticised PNG officials on a 
number of grounds, was ignored.  The three publications also showed very little interest in 
criticising the PNG government on these same grounds.  The small amount of criticism was 
placed in the context of the problems facing the PNGDF rather than moral criticism of the 
PNG leadership.  In keeping with this theme writers selectively reported from the BIG press 
release, avoiding such words as ‘marauding killers’ and ‘killing fields’.  What is interesting is 
that the press took up some of the criticisms mentioned by Amnesty International (1996) but 
avoided others.  The three newspapers ignored PNG’s failure to investigate the atrocity, apart 
from a brief mention two-and-a-half months after the event (see Age, 15 January, 1997, p. 10).  
They also tended to avoid or downplay the PNG government’s silence, the impunity of 
troops on Bougainville and the lack of access for independent observers.  There was one 
criticism which both Amnesty International (1996) and the press avoided – moral criticism of 
PNG officials. 
There was more criticism after the release of the photos than before their release.  The press 
offered a critical response in three out of the five articles appearing during this time.  
However, these writers suggested that the PNG officials had been incompetent in the face of 
a crisis, rather than malevolent; and criticise them as ‘half-hearted’, rather than dishonest.39   
Fourthly, I analysed the sequencing in the reporting.  This analysis showed that the three 
newspapers played down the severity of the crime by mainly portraying it as ‘normal’ 
(legitimate) violence rather than ‘deviant’ (unacceptable) violence.  The three newspapers 
mainly presented ‘perpetrator’ – ‘normal’ – sequences which suggested that the violence 
inflicted by the PNGDF at Malabita was a legitimate, if regrettable, use of force.  The leads in 
the news items present the violence as ‘normal’ throughout the period of reporting, even after 
the release of the photos.  Headlines began presenting the violence mainly as ‘normal’ 
(perpetrator sequence) then changed, to sometimes present it as ‘ambiguous’ after the photos 
                                                                 
39 The other two opinion/feature writers (Skehan, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13 and O’Connor, Australian, 
20 December, p. 21) commented but they suggested a lack of competence rather than culpability on the part of PNG 
officials.  
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were released.  Importantly, whilst the violence may have been presented as ‘normal’ or 
‘ambiguous’ it was not presented as ‘deviant’.  This suggests that the PNGDF’s violence at 
Malabita was more acceptable.  As Cerulo (1998) argues, the use of ‘contextual’ sequences 
gives the reader justifications for violence which otherwise might have been considered 
unacceptable.   
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Chapter four 
MAKING SENSE OF THE REPORTING 
 
One foreign correspondent, Lindsay Murdoch (Age, 19 February 1997, p. A17), has argued 
that the mass media reported little, if anything, of the human rights abuses in Bougainville in 
1996.  Referring to the Malabita massacre, he offers reasons for this: 
… Papua New Guinea Defence Force soldiers started firing mortars into a village loyal to 
the guerillas.   By the time they stopped, children had been blown apart: six-year-old 
Alvina, five-year-old Danny, 14-year-old Brenda and a dozen others. … 
You never saw the horror of these events on the nightly news, so no politicians talked of 
their outrage, no official investigation was set up and therefore nobody issued warrants to 
bring the killers to justice.  
You don’t see the barbaric acts of the Bougainville war on television because the PNG 
Government maintains a blockade of the island and prohibits journalists going there. There 
is no CNN factor to stir the international community into action. (Murdoch, Age, 19 
February 1997, p. A17)  
My aim in this thesis so far has been to address the question – how did the Sydney Morning 
Herald, the Australian and the Age report three violent incidents in Bougainville in 1996?  Two 
of these incidents look like significant abuses of human rights and the other involved a battle 
between BRA (Bouganville Revolutionary Army) troops and PNGDF (Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force) troops.  I have focussed on the reporting of three incidents, one of which 
was described by Murdoch (Age, 19 February 1997, p. A17) above: 
the Simbo massacre, in which ten to twelve civilians, including an eight month old 
baby, were killed by the PNGDF and their allied ‘Resistance Force’, in January; 
the battle of Kangu Beach, during which 13 Security Force members were killed by 
forces opposed to the central government, in September; 
the Malabita massacre (described by Murdoch, Age, 19 February 1997, p. A17 and  
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above) in which nine civilians were killed when the PNGDF mortar-bombed a packed 
church during Mass, in December.   
In this chapter I attempt to make sense of the reporting.  To do this I firstly ask the question 
– how do we best describe the pattern of reporting of the three incidents contained in the 
three newspapers?  As I have noted, Murdoch (Age, 19 February 1997, p. A17) describes one 
aspect of the reporting of the Bougainville War – that there was little reporting of events such 
as the Malabita massacre.  Yet, this goes only part of the way toward answering this question.  
If we compare the reporting of the three cases using the analyses from chapters two and three 
and by conducting a quantitative analysis of the reporting I think we will get a clearer sense of 
what is at stake.  
The larger question which I address in the rest of this chapter is how do we best explain this 
pattern of reporting?  Murdoch (Age, 19 February 1997, p. A17), in the quote in the previous 
page above, suggests that the main reason for the invisible status of human rights abuses was 
the blockade which was enforced by the PNGDF.  In chapter one I discussed a number of 
theoretical perspectives on the reporting of war in the mass media.  In this chapter, I analyse 
two of these theoretical approaches – the ‘liberal’ and the ‘political-economic’.  I discuss how 
each of the two approaches explains the pattern of reporting which I describe, using evidence 
which I obtained in interviews with journalists who wrote about the incidents.   
The pattern of reporting  
As I argued in chapter one, we can use Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) model to describe the 
pattern of reporting in the three newspapers.  They argue that the mass media will tend to 
portray victims of official friends as ‘unworthy’ compared to victims of official enemies.  I 
argue that the three newspapers portrayed the victims of the BRA at Kangu Beach as 
‘unworthy’ compared to the victims of the PNGDF at Simbo and Malabita.  Let me begin 
with the reporting of the ‘worthy victims’ at Kangu Beach.  
As I discussed in chapter two, the three newspapers reported the victims at Kangu Beach 
sympathetically.  They gave some attention to the battle and reported it prominently.  Whilst 
the PNG government and military were portrayed as promoting peace and order, the BIG 
and BRA were portrayed as belligerent and guilty of a ‘barbaric’ act.  Much of the reporting  
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was based on unverified sources.  The event received attention in several opinion and feature 
articles and in editorials.  In one opinion article, Griffin (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September, 
1996, p. 13) emphasised the seriousness of the violence inflicted on the soldiers and referred 
to the leaders of the self-determination movement in Bougainville as ‘killers and cultists’.  
Using Cerulo’s (1998) model I found that the newspapers often cast the act of killing the 13 
security force members as ‘deviant violence’ and therefore heinous and unacceptable.  In a 
minority of cases, they cast the violence as ‘normal’ and therefore acceptable.   
In contrast, the Simbo massacre was virtually ignored by the three newspapers despite the fact 
that ample information was available.  Whilst writers relied on unverified official sources to 
report the massacre, they failed to use more convincing reports from unofficial sources.  
There were comments published of neither the outrageousness of the act nor the malevolence 
of PNG troops who committed the massacre nor of the officials who commanded them and 
who did nothing to bring the perpetrators to justice.   
In the case of Simbo, the press ignored the aftermath of the incident: the care of the wounded 
survivor in hospital in the Solomons, grieving relatives and the failure of the PNG 
government to institute an inquiry.  Conversely, much of the reporting of the battle of Kangu 
Beach focussed on the aftermath of the incident, such as the grieving relatives and the 
PNGDF inquiry.  The Simbo massacre was an obvious case of gross human rights abuse and 
was deserving of attention in the press.  There was a clear need for an independent inquiry 
and the story of the aftermath was very newsworthy.  For example, the wounded eyewitness 
endured a gun battle with the PNGDF whilst being evacuated to the Solomons by the BRA.   
The Simbo massacre was portrayed as more legitimate than the violence at Kangu Beach.  
The violence at Simbo was portrayed as ambiguous, mostly by placing the victims, whom an 
eyewitness identified as unarmed civilians, in the role of combatants – ‘rebels’.  This 
contrasted with the case of Kangu Beach which, as I have argued, was often portrayed as 
‘deviant’.   
Journalists and editors portrayed the victims at Malabita more sympathetically than those at 
Simbo.  They gave more attention to the Malabita massacre and gave more indication of the 
severity of the crime, especially after the photos of the incident were released.  The three 
newspapers also reported the Malabita massacre more prominently than the Simbo massacre.   
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In the former case, they published two front-page articles.  In contrast, they referred to the 
Simbo incident only in ‘news-in-brief’ items and obscurely in an article under a different topic 
some months after the event.  However, as I discussed in chapter three, the three newspapers 
also downplayed the massacre at Malabita. 
Compared to Kangu Beach victims, the three newspapers cast the Malabita victims as 
‘unworthy’. The newspapers portrayed the victims of Malabita (who were killed by the 
PNGDF) less sympathetically than the victims of the BRA at Kangu Beach.  In chapter three, 
I discussed several elements of the reporting of the Malabita case.  These included: attention, 
rhetoric in reporting, moral criticism of officials, press reaction to the aftermath of the 
incident and the legitimacy of the violence.  In terms of attention, the three newspapers 
published twice as many articles about Kangu Beach as they did for the Malabita case.  
Regarding the rhetoric in reporting, the three newspapers ignored or downplayed the 
suffering of victims and the severity of the crime at Malabita.   This contrasted with the 
reporting of the incident at Kangu Beach, which I discussed in chapter two.  For example, 
terms such as ‘massacre’, ‘barbaric’ and ‘tragic’ were used prominently in the case of Kangu 
Beach but terms such as ‘slaughter’ were used less often and less prominently in the case of 
Malabita.  
The writers portrayed the violence at Malabita as a result of incompetence of the PNG 
leadership and the PNGDF rather than as a result of malevolence.  They portrayed it as a 
breakdown in discipline and framed it within a wider context of a crisis facing the PNGDF.   
They avoided evidence and criticisms which were inconsistent with this theme.  For example, 
all writers ignored the PNGDF’s long record of human rights abuses and the PNG 
government’s failure to bring them to account and to investigate the abuses.  Journalists also 
avoided moral criticism of PNG officials.  The most extreme critic of PNG officials in the 
case of Malabita referred to them as ‘failing to take responsibility for the very demons they 
have unleashed.’ (Australian, 13 December 1996, p. 13)  In contrast, in the case of Kangu 
Beach, writers portrayed the BRA as belligerent.  One opinion writer branded the BRA 
leaders as ‘fanatical…killers and cultists’ for their assumed role in the incident. 
In the case of Malabita the newspapers portrayed the violence as more legitimate than they  
 102 
did in the case of Kangu Beach.  In the main, writers presented the violence at Malabita as 
‘normal’ or legitimate.  According to Cerulo (1998), the most important part of a newspaper 
article is the lead.  Writers presented ‘normal violence’ sequences in all leads about the 
Malabita massacre, suggesting that the violence was a legitimate, if regrettable, use of force.  
In the headlines, the violence was presented as ‘normal’ in all cases except one, where it was 
presented as ‘ambiguous’.  Writers avoided ‘deviant’ violence sequences which suggests that 
the violence is heinous or unacceptable.  In contrast, in the case of Kangu Beach, writers 
tended to portray the violence as ‘deviant’ or ‘ambiguous’ rather than ‘normal’. 
The analysis of sequencing patterns is further evidence that the journalists portrayed the 
Malabita victims as ‘unworthy’ compared to the Kangu Beach victims.  In the case of 
Malabita, they portrayed the violence as more legitimate than in the case of Kangu Beach.  
We can also analyse the differences in reporting of the three incidents somewhat more 
‘quantitatively’.  Table 4.1 (below, p. 103) shows some measures of attention and prominence 
in reporting in the three newspapers.  It shows that the Kangu Beach massacre was given far 
more attention than the Simbo massacres.  Column 4 shows there were three articles about 
the Simbo case as opposed to 20 in the case of Kangu Beach.  It also shows that there were 
twice as many articles for Kangu Beach than Malabita.  Furthermore, there were also nearly 
twice as many articles for Kangu Beach as compared to Malabita and Simbo combined 
(column 4 line 4).  I have accounted for variations in article size by including the number of 
sentences in each item, in column two.  
The Kangu Beach incident was reported more prominently than Simbo.  We can compare the 
differences in prominence by looking at columns 3 and 4 (table 4.1, below, p. 103) The Simbo 
victims were reported far less prominently than those at Kangu Beach were.  For example, 
there were five headlines which mentioned the Kangu Beach victims, whereas there were 
none mentioning those at Simbo. 
The newspapers also reported the Malabita case more prominently than the Simbo case.  In 
terms of headlines and front-page articles, Kangu Beach and Malabita were reported with 
equal prominence. 
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Incident  
                
1 Kangu Beach  8 7 5 20 55 60 26 141 - 1 - 1 4 - 1 5 
2 Simbo  1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 - - - - - - - - 
3 Malabita  5 4 1 10 48 45 9  102 1 1 - 2 2 1 1 4 
                   
4 Total of lines 2 and 
3  
 
 6 5 2 13 49 46 10 105 1 1 - 2 2 1 1 4 
Data based on articles appearing in the month after the first press report of the incident. 
* Number of sentences which refer to the incident.  
** Number of headlines which specifically identify the victim/s of the violence, for example, ‘PNG troops’ or ‘civilians’. 
Table 4-1: Coverage of 3 incidents in 1996 in the Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Age 
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Overall, the quantitative analysis of attention and prominence shows that the victims of the 
BRA (at Kangu Beach) were reported with more sympathy than the victims of the PNGDF, 
at Simbo and Malabita.  However, there were important differences in the representation of 
the cases of Simbo and Malabita.   The latter received coverage that was far more 
sympathetic. We can see this, for example, in the number of front-page articles (two in the 
case of Malabita as opposed to none in the case of Simbo).   
What can a quantitative analysis tell us abo-ut the differences in portrayal of the legitimacy of 
the violence by the two sides?  As I will now demonstrate, such an analysis supports the 
findings of my discussion above.  Table 4-2, below, shows the sequences used in leads in 
reporting of the three incidents.   
 Sequence type   
 ‘Normal’  ‘Ambiguous’ ‘Deviant’ Total 
Incident 
 
 ‘contextual’ ‘doublecasting’   
Simbo 
 
- - 3 - 3 
Kangu 
Beach 
 
4 3 1 7 15 
Malabita  
 
8 1 - - 9 
 
Note: This table only includes the articles which contained leads about the incident and those articles discussed in chapters 
two and three.  
 
The main feature of the results is that the PNGDF violence was not once presented as 
‘deviant’ whereas the violence perpetrated by forces resisting the PNGDF often was.  In the 
case of Kangu Beach, where BRA-aligned forces attacked PNGDF troops, journalists wrote 
just under half of the leads in ‘deviant violence’ sequences.  In contrast, at Malabita, where 
PNGDG troops murdered nine civilians, journalists wrote over 90% of the leads as ‘normal’ 
violence sequences.  In the case of the Simbo massacre, an eyewitness reported that central 
government forces killed 12-14 unarmed civilians (see chapter two).  However, the journalists 
portrayed the violence as ‘ambiguous’.  They cast the victims as perpetrators as well as 
victims.  For example, in all three articles, the civilians were cast as BRA ‘militants’.  (See 
chapter two.)  The press does not always portray violence perpetrated by governments as 
Table 4-2: Sequence types used in leads in articles about three incidents in Bougainville 
1996. 
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legitimate.  Rather, as Cerulo (1998) argues, the violence is more likely to be portrayed as 
legitimate if there is official domestic support for the perpetrator.  It is unlikely that the 
Western press would portray violence by the Taliban against the rebel ‘Northern Alliance’ in 
Afghanistan as legitimate, even though it was perpetrated by the government.  Neither would 
we expect violence perpetrated by the Iraqi government against the Kurds; the Chinese 
government against the Tibetans; the Serbian army against the ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’; the 
Nicaraguan army against the ‘Contra’ rebels; nor the Cuban Army against dissenters to be 
presented as legitimate in the Western mass media.   
We can see the same pattern occurring in the headlines.  Table 4-3, below, shows sequencing 
used in headlines for the three incidents.   
 Sequence type   
 ‘Normal’  ‘Ambiguous’ ‘Deviant’ Total 
(not in 
headline) 
Incident 
 
 ‘contextual’ ‘doublecasting’   
Simbo 
 
- 2 1 - 3 (0) 
Kangu 
Beach 
 
4 7 1 3 15 (6) 
Malabita  3 6 - - 9 (2) 
 
This table shows that the BRA violence at Kangu Beach was portrayed as ‘deviant’ or 
unacceptable in three headlines.  However, the PNGDF violence at Simbo and Malabita was 
never portrayed as such.    
In general, using Cerulo’s (1998) model for analysis, writers, by using certain sequences in 
headlines and leads, portrayed PNGDF violence as more legitimate than BRA violence.  This 
had the effect of downplaying the incidents at Malabita and Simbo in comparison to the 
incident at Kangu Beach.   
In sum, there were important differences in the reporting of the three incidents in the three 
newspapers.  Herman and Chomksy (1988) argue that victims of official enemies will be 
Table 4-3: Sequencing in headlines in articles about three incidents in Bougainville in 1996. 
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portrayed as ‘worthy’ by the mass media.  In contrast, they argue that victims of official 
friends who have been abused with equal or greater severity will be portrayed as ‘unworthy’ 
by the mass media.  The cases of human rights abuse by the PNGDF at Simbo and Malabita 
were clearly more serious than the incident at Kangu Beach.   
There was a dichotomous pattern in the reporting of the three incidents in the three 
newspapers.  Using the terminology of Herman and Chomsky (1988) the newspapers treated 
the victims of the PNGDF at Simbo and Malabita as ‘unworthy’ compared to the victims of 
the BRA at Kangu Beach.  We can see this in the amount of attention and prominence which 
the press gave to the incidents; the rhetoric of reporting; the use of sources; the attention 
given to the suffering of the victims; the criticism of PNG officials in reporting; and the 
portrayal of the legitimacy of the violence.  However, there were important differences in the 
reporting of the two massacres of Bougainvillean civilians by the central government forces at 
Simbo and Malabita.  In many ways, the victims in the latter case were reported more 
sympathetically.  I will now turn to the question of how we can best explain this pattern of 
reporting.  
Explaining the pattern of reporting  
I turn now to a discussion of the evidence from interviews with journalists and key players 
involved in reporting the Bougainville War in 1996.  In this discussion, I will demonstrate that 
whilst the liberal approach explains some aspects of the reporting, the political-economic 
approach, as exemplified by Herman and Chomksy (1988) provides a more satisfactory 
explanation.  I begin by addressing the reporting in the two cases where the victims suffered 
under the PNGDF: Simbo and Malabita. 
As I discussed in chapter one, liberal scholars emphasise ‘non-structural’ factors, such as 
availability of information but tend to ignore political and economic factors.  I argue that this 
approach can help us to understand some but not all of the reporting which I have described.  
I will present evidence concerning the professional integrity of journalists and the availability 
of information (such as eyewitness testimony and photographs).   
‘Liberal’ approaches to war reporting provide good explanations for the differences observed 
in the reporting of the Simbo and Malabita cases.  According to eyewitnesses, central 
government forces murdered the victims at both Simbo and Malabita.  However, whilst the 
publications virtually ignored the Simbo massacre they gave a moderate amount of attention 
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to the Malabita massacre.  There were also qualitative differences.  In the case of Simbo, 
reports from Bougainvilleans, including from one eyewitness, were ignored by the three 
publications. In the case of Malabita, eyewitness stories and other data from unofficial sources 
were used more so by the three publications.  
In the ‘liberal approach’ writers emphasise circumstances such as the lack of verifiable 
information.  Several journalists (Palmer, 1999, O’Callaghan, 2000, Dorney, 1999, Ruffini, 
1999) said that an important reason why the Simbo incident was not reported more was that 
there was a lack of verifiable information.  However, this explanation is not convincing.  
Watts (2000a, e-mail) argued that this claim was ‘simply untrue’.  He said that throughout the 
war ‘journalists did visit Bougainville’ but their stories and/or films were not used in Australia 
before 1997 – ‘after Bougainville had won the war’.  Watts (2000a) cited the case of the 
PNGDF ambush of Australian filmmaker, Wayne Coles-Janess and his unarmed guide in 
1994.  Coles-Janess (1999) managed to capture the shooting on videotape.  Watts (2000a, e-
mail) observed that this footage was shown ‘incomprehensively’ on ABC’s Foreign 
Correspondent, appearing with the subtitle ‘cease-fire violation’ but without any other 
explanation or details.  He observed that despite this evidence the press ignored the story.  
According to Watts (2000a, e-mail), ‘verification is a function of politics’.   
It is likely though that the three newspapers gave more prominence and attention to the 
Malabita massacre because there was strong evidence available  – there were eyewitnesses and 
photos.  Regarding eyewitnesses, the BRA evacuated five wounded survivors of the Malabita 
massacre to the Solomon Islands.  This provided Mary-Louise O’Callaghan with the 
opportunity to interview them and verify a story of human rights abuse by the PNGDF.  
O’Callaghan (1999b) told me that because she had this evidence, it was an opportunity to ‘go 
hard’ on the PNGDF’.  However, there was also one wounded eyewitness available for 
interview in the Solomons from the Simbo massacre.  So, the differences in reporting cannot 
simply be explained by the availability of eyewitnesses.  O’Callaghan (2000) was unaware that 
the Simbo eyewitness had arrived in the Solomons.  In the case of Malabita, she could hardly 
miss it.  At the time, the BRA had claimed that up to 100 people had been killed by the 
PNGDF in several attacks, in the southwest of Bougainville.  Malabita was just one of these 
attacks.  Victims from another of these attacks (at Mokukruru) had also been evacuated to 
Honiara at the same time.  Honiara is a small town and it would not have taken long for the 
word to get around that there were several Bougainvilleans suffering from mortar and 
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gunshot wounds in the hospital.  O’Callaghan’s BRA contacts in the Solomons would 
probably have alerted her to the attacks.   
A series of photographs provided another piece of strong evidence which enabled the 
journalists to report the massacre.  Australian human rights lawyer, Rosemarie Gillespie said 
that the photos were taken, as a very sophisticated tactic, by BRA commander Paul Bobby.  
According to Watts (1999a), the photos were brought out with ‘luck and difficulty’.  He was 
referring to the fact that the photos would have been taken on a BRA banana boat across to 
the Solomon Islands.  The occupants of the boat would have to risk being fired upon by 
PNGDF patrols.  As Watts (1999a) stated: ‘These photos greatly helped the report of the 
mortar story’. 
The importance of the photos is underscored by comparing the reporting of Malabita with yet 
another massacre of civilians by the PNGDF which occurred at around the same time, in the 
same general area, at Mokukruru.  The wounded from Mokukruru also travelled to Honiara 
and were interviewed by Mary-Louise O’Callaghan.  However, their story received far less 
attention in the press than the Malabita massacre. 
Regarding the differences in the reporting of sources, journalists often included material from 
BIG/BRA sources in reporting about Malabita (see chapter three).  In contrast, in reporting 
the Simbo massacre, the three publications relied heavily on the PNGDF account.  
How can we explain this difference in the use of sources?  It is likely that BIG press releases 
were included in the press coverage of Malabita because the Australian had already published 
O’Callaghan’s (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9) article.  According to Sean Dorney (1999), 
BIG press releases were reported regularly in the South Pacific press in the early to mid 
1990s.  However, he said, they were usually avoided by the Australian mass media.  It is 
interesting then that material from BIG was included in reporting about Malabita.  The 
inclusion of BIG material was connected to how newsworthiness is defined in the mass 
media.  I had the following conversation with Sean Dorney about this issue. Firstly, I said that 
journalists writing stories about Malabita (and Kangu Beach) used much material from BIG 
press releases.  He replied: 
…I suspect  [that] most of the media coverage of that would have followed stories I’ve 
done or stories Mary-Louise has done.  … then the other media would have followed up 
because, all of a sudden, it seemed like a good story again. …You have to understand the 
way news minds operate … it becomes newsworthy because the Australian’s run it. … 
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I then asked him: ‘So if Mary-Louise hadn’t have been there, there would have been virtually 
nil in the papers?’  He replied:  
Yes and a lot of her stuff often followed up stuff that I was getting or on PM [ABC radio 
program] or on the TV news. I mean it even gets to the stage, Jack, where I would get so 
frustrated with the lack of interest I could generate, on a program like AM  for instance, that 
Mary-Louise and I would share information.  Once it appeared on the front-page of the 
Australian  then AM would run my piece because it was ‘news’.  Whereas if her’s wasn’t 
there they would say ‘oh well you know’.  A lot of this isn’t based on any ideology or 
anything.  It’s just based on what’s newsworthy today and ‘if the paper thinks its 
newsworthy then, oh shit, maybe it is’.  Its very frustrating ‘cause again and again and 
again you come up with [good] stories [which are not published].  One of the great 
problems in PNG apart from huge stories like Sandline where Mary-Louise got the scoop 
is that a scoop is the worst thing you can have, because your own people say: ‘Well, it 
can’t be important, no one else is running it.’  (Laughs) 
Dorney (1999) explains why the BIG claims were reported at Malabita and not Simbo whilst 
taking the political and economic system for granted.  According to him, these can be 
explained within the framework of the ‘liberal model’.  It implies that changes in reporting 
occur due to circumstances other than the mass media’s role in supporting the state-capitalist 
order, alleged by the political-economy model.  
In sum, the press reported the Malabita massacre with more prominence and attention than 
the Simbo massacre.  They also used more unofficial sources.  These differences can be 
explained by a combination of factors:  
· O’Callaghan found out about the Malabita massacre at least partly because many of the 
wounded rather than just one, arrived in the Solomons for treatment.  
· The BRA smuggled photos out of Bougainville which the Bougainville Freedom 
Movement distributed to the mass media.  
· Once O’Callaghan’s  (Australian, 6 December 1996, p. 9) article was published the 
massacre became ‘newsworthy’ which allowed the press to use statements from the BIG 
about the massacre.  
Thus, the ‘liberal approach’ to war reporting goes some of the way towards explaining the 
differences between the reporting of Malabita and Simbo that we noted above.  These 
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differences can be explained by factors such as journalists being more able to verify 
information.  However, it is likely that other factors also influenced the reporting.  
I argue that one needs to consider the political-economic approach to the study of the mass 
media to more fully understand the pattern of reporting found in chapters two and three, 
above.  The Herman and Chomsky (1988) propaganda model presents a more satisfactory 
explanation for the pattern of reporting than that presented by liberal scholars. Their work is 
representative of a large body of scholarship within a long-standing political-economic 
tradition of analysis.  An important fact, which they stress, is that mass media organisations 
are highly centralised and powerful profit-making institutions which share important interests 
with governments in modern societies.  Herman and Chomsky (1988, p. 306) argue that the 
mass media 
…carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by reliance on market forces, 
internalized assumptions and self censorship and without significant overt coercion. 
The pattern of reporting described in chapters two and three suggests that the three 
newspapers carried out a ‘system-supportive propaganda function’.  I am not arguing that 
journalists consciously set out to promote a biased view of the war.  Rather, I argue that there 
is sufficient evidence that the following factors, outlined by Herman and Chomsky (1988), 
shaped the presentation of news: 
Ø the role of internalised assumptions and beliefs held by journalists;  
Ø the role of government and defence sources (in this case, in PNG and Australia) in 
news- making; 
Ø the influence of ‘flak’ (negative responses to reporting, such as the threat of litigation). 
The dichotomous pattern of reporting, to which I have referred above, is best understood as 
supporting the maintenance of the political and economic relations between Australia, PNG 
and Bougainvilleans.  The particular political and economic relations to which I refer were as 
follows – Australia and PNG had a shared intent and interests in maintaining Bougainville as 
part of PNG.  However, the two countries, by the end of 1996, disagreed on tactical grounds.  
Australia was unhappy with PNGs repeated use of the ‘military solution’ and withdrew some 
military support from PNG.  The reporting of Malabita (which focussed on the indiscipline of 
PNGDF troops), for example, challenged the PNG government on tactical grounds.  
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However, this was consistent with the Australian government agenda.  The reporting failed to 
challenge the PNG government’s strategic goals – to maintain Bougainville as part of PNG.  
Again, this was consistent with the Australian government agenda.  Furthermore, the 
dichotomous reporting promoted the view that Bougainville was best kept under the control 
of PNG rather than be allowed the self-determination which was the object of their struggle.    
However, I do not have direct evidence that these strategic imperatives actually informed the 
reporting processes and so such a relationship is somewhat speculative.  More research into 
the precise role of Australian foreign policy and the Australia-PNG relationship and how this 
relates to press reporting is required.  At best, one could say that there is the potential to 
adapt this aspect of the Herman and Chomsky (1988) model to the reporting of the incidents 
in 1996. 
As I discussed above (p. 109), the ‘liberal approach’ can explain the differences in reporting 
between Simbo and Malabita.  However, the Herman and Chomksy (1988) view can also 
accommodate these differences.  They write that factors such as the relationship between the 
government and the mass media shape the news so that it reflects domestic power interests.  
Using this approach, one would focus on the implications of reporting for Australian foreign 
policy.  Independent journalist, Max Watts (1996a, p. 4) did this writing:  
…the war against Bougainville is completely dependent on Australian …support.  If too 
much of the Bougainville reality were to reach the Australian public, government policy 
and – the war itself – would be endangered. [Emphasis in text .] 
Furthermore, Watts (2000a, e-mail) argued that the suppression of news of human rights 
abuses during the war was important in maintaining the imperialist relationship with the West 
(including Australia) and the Third World (including Bougainville).  He argued that ‘if 
Bougainville can dispossess Rio Tinto’ of their mine at Panguna, ‘this – if reported widely – 
could become a factor in other such struggles.’ 
The Herman and Chomsky (1988) model explains the reporting in the case of Simbo, when 
the massacre was virtually ignored.  However, how can this model accommodate the 
reporting of the Malabita massacre?   Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued that victims in 
friendly states are likely to be portrayed as ‘unworthy’ in the mass media.  In certain respects, 
the reporting of the Malabita massacre challenged this.  The story appeared on the front-page 
on several occasions – more so than the Kangu Beach incident – and journalists sometimes 
used rhetoric condemning the PNGDF.   However, Herman and Chomsky (1988) note that 
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‘the system is not all powerful’ and exceptions do occur.  They write that such exceptions are 
due to conflicting factors which act against the ‘propaganda model’ such as the professional 
integrity of journalists.  Arguably, the case of Malabita was such an exception.  One journalist, 
Mary-Louise O’Callaghan was stationed in Honiara by her own choice – not because she was 
sent there by a news organisation.  When she became aware of evidence of a PNGDF atrocity 
she worked hard to gather the necessary evidence to back the claim.  Once her article was 
published the other newspapers followed suit. 
The problem with this explanation is that it tends to make the Herman and Chomsky (1988) 
model meaningless.  The situation whereby ‘structural’ factors which influence reporting can 
be counteracted by factors such as the professional integrity of journalists is close to the 
liberal model’s view of press behaviour.  However, as Herman (1998) notes, Herman and 
Chomsky (1988) put forward specific limits on the effects of journalists’ integrity on press 
reporting.  They argued that press would tend to criticise government policy only on tactical 
issues rather than on strategic objectives.  
In the case of the Malabita massacre, we can easily adapt this part of the model to explain the 
press reporting.  As I discussed in chapter three, reporting in the three newspapers contained 
some material which was critical of the PNG government and its military forces.  However, 
this criticism was confined to minor issues only – such as the PNG officials losing control of 
troops on Bougainville.  Press reporting of the Malabita massacre did not challenge the 
strategic objective in Australian foreign policy – to maintain Bougainville as part of PNG. 
The Herman and Chomsky (1988) model can also account for the reporting of the Malabita 
massacre if we consider the changing political agendas during 1996.  The Labor government, 
which found it hard to disengage its support for the Bougainville War (Sydney Morning Herald, 
24 December, 1996, p. 13) was in power in January, when the press ignored reports 
suggesting that the PNGDF had committed a war crime at Simbo.  The Liberal government 
which was elected in March 1996, was less weighed down by this ‘historical baggage’ (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13) and were less supportive of the war.  Kangu Beach 
was a turning point in the war, when many political, bureaucratic and military elites in 
Canberra and Port Moresby had become convinced that the PNGDF could not win (Watts, 
1999a, 1997a).   
As Watts (2000a, e-mail) wrote, regarding the more sympathetic coverage given to the 
Malabita massacre as compared to the Simbo case that: There were ‘two fundamental 
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differences’ – in the political agenda between January (when the Simbo massacre occurred) 
and November (when the Malabita massacre occurred).  Firstly, after March, the new, Liberal 
foreign minister Downer, ‘had a different policy’ (as I discussed above).  More importantly, 
‘as of February 1996’ the BRA began to win the war.  There were ‘decisive battles’ between 
June and August, including ‘High Speed II’ when the PNGDF were roundly defeated.  ‘Ils 
violent au secours de la victoire’ (literally – ‘they fly to the help of the victory’).  After this 
point, the Australian ‘media began to note’ that ‘they had been backing a losing horse’. 
Furthermore, Watts (2000a, e-mail) wrote that by the time of the Malabita massacre in 
November 1996, ‘there were serious disagreements’ over tactics between the 
Howard/Downer Australian government and Chan [the Prime Minister of PNG] in Port 
Moresby.  Canberra was aware that the ‘war was lost’ and that to continue would strengthen 
Ona (the BIG – Bougainville Interim Government – President) rather than Kabui (the Vice-
President, ‘who was keen on negotiations).  Chan would not accept that the war was lost and 
was running his ‘own agenda’.  He had previously attempted military victory in 1996 (High 
Speed II) and at the time of the Malabita case was ‘thinking towards mercenaries, which 
would never have worked a nd was putting Canberra off-side.’  The reporting of the Malabita 
case reflected the Australian government’s political agenda.  It was critical of the PNGDF – 
but only on tactical grounds.  For example, O’Callaghan (Australian, 13 December 1996, p. 
13) criticised the Chan’s preference for the ‘military solution’ to the conflict.   
It is interesting that Murdoch (Age, 19 February 1997, p. A17), whose quote I used to begin 
this chapter, wrote his article mentioning Malabita in February 1997.  He uses quite different 
rhetoric to that of all of the journalists who wrote about the incident in December 1996:  
…children had been blown apart.  Six-year-old Alvina, five-year-old Danny, 14-year-old 
Brenda and a dozen others... (Age, 19 February 1997, p. A17, my emphasis).   
According to Watts (2000a), there was another change in the domestic agenda in February 
1997, when Australian officials became more critical of the PNG government’s preference for 
military – rather than political – options in dealing with Bougainville.  The changing political 
agenda was reflected in reporting, in this instance.  
The reporting of the Malabita massacre did not question the shared Australian-PNG strategic 
objective of maintaining Bougainville under the control of Port Moresby.  There were well-
founded criticisms which were a potential challenge to the Australian government agenda 
which were omitted from the press.  The legitimacy of the PNG occupation of Bougainville, 
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for example, was never in question.  Amnesty International (1996) pointed out PNG’s poor 
record on human rights abuses and criticised PNG officials for not allowing human rights 
monitors to visit the island and for not committing themselves to an investigation.  
Furthermore, they pointed out that PNG, in failing to do these things, was acting in defiance 
of UN recommendations.  Amnesty International’s (1996) call for the involvement of 
international monitors was made twice, before and after the photos were released and was 
reported on Radio Australia (cited in Reuters Business Briefing, 1999) on 8 December 1996.  
These criticisms were omitted from the press coverage.  They may have presented some 
challenge to the legitimacy of the PNG occupation of Bougainville and perhaps have 
encouraged self-determination.  Since the Australian government was against self-
determination for Bougainville – they wanted to maintain PNG sovereignty – such criticisms 
were also inconsistent with that agenda.   
The mention of self-determination rather than continued occupation by PNG security forces 
was, for writers in the press, also out of the question.  Yet, this was a key demand of the 
Bougainville independence movement and had been since the war started.  It was also a 
central factor in the conflict.  The withdrawal of PNG troops and a commitment to address 
the future political status of Bougainville was also to be made part of the eventual Burnham 
peace declaration signed in March 1997. 
In sum, both the liberal and the political economic approaches go some of the way to 
explaining the differences in the reporting of the Simbo and Malabita incidents.  However, I 
will argue below that the liberal explanation becomes less convincing when we compare the 
reporting of Malabita (where the PNGDF committed an atrocity) to that of Kangu Beach 
(where the BRA killed 13 security force members).  
As my quantitative and qualitative analysis above suggests, the three newspapers treated the 
victims at Kangu Beach as if they were more ‘worthy’ than the victims at Malabita.  In 
quantitative terms, the three newspapers gave far more attention to the battle of Kangu Beach 
than to the Malabita massacre.  In qualitative terms, there were differences in moral criticism 
in the reporting of Kangu Beach and Malabita.  The three newspapers denounced the BRA 
and its leadership in moral terms but did not denounce the PNG leadership in the same way.  
In the latter case, one opinion writer called the BRA leaders ‘killers and cultists’ (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 30 September 1996, p. 13).  In contrast, in the case of Malabita, the most 
extreme denunciation of the PNG leadership was by O’Callaghan (Australian, 13 December 
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1996, p. 13) who wrote that officials in Port Moresby wanted ‘to give every impression of 
wanting to disown any responsibility for the very demons they have unleashed.’  In the case 
of Kangu Beach, there is a more clear, extreme moral denunciation of the leaders.  In the case 
of Malabita, the denunciation was vague and the moral implications are ambiguous.   
Some interview data supports the liberal view that factors such as access to reliable information 
can account for this difference.  In the case of the Age, I asked Paul Ruffini, who wrote that 
article, about his experiences and thoughts of the reporting of that incident.  He said that 
there were a number of issues involved: he couldn’t compete with Mary-Louise O’Callaghan 
who was already in the Solomon Islands; he was unable to travel there himself because AAP 
would not pay the fare; and there was a ‘stuff up’ at the AAP (Australian Associated Press) 
office and he didn’t get the photos.  He also said that, in general, reporting about Bougainville 
did not suit editorial news agendas.40  For example, one reason why the Age’s only article on 
the Malabita massacre was short, was that editors substantially shortened the original article.  
                                                                 
40 These issues can be seen in more detail in the following excerpts of my conversation with Paul Ruffini (1999).   
Apart from the fact that Mary Louise O’Callaghan had already interviewed witnesses, he said that 
…it was sort of a problem of how to do it - I said we talked about going over there - and the company didn’t want to bear 
the cost as I recall. As I said, we would have liked to have had the story.  (Ruffini, 1999)   
There were also other problems for him in Port Moresby.  
You get a lot of misinformation what have you and I think the photos help the story along as well.  I’m pretty sure the 
Sydney Morning Herald had the photos as well.  I know they tried to give them to us and I had organised for them to do it 
and it was just once again, a conspiracy of stuff ups.  I don’t know if AAP [Australian Associated Press] would like me telling 
you this but apparently they were delivered to the office and, you know, they just went missing… 
Roberts: Does that mean that the Age didn’t get them then? 
Ruffini: They would have got them from Lucy Palmer.  
Roberts: They never published the photos 
Ruffini:  But I recall talking to my editor about it on the Monday because we had organised it on the Friday, you know, we 
have, AAP [Australian Associated Press] tends to have, a lot of casual people on the weekends.  He was pretty furious, 
saying you know, just angry that these would have been great to run, because of their newsworthiness.  Someone hadn’t 
been properly briefed and they disappeared into the works.  Which was disappointing. (Ruffini, 1999) 
I then asked him if having the photos makes a big difference to how much attention a story like that would get in the press. 
He said:  
I think that’s got a lot to do with it. Even, its interesting about the reservations about reporting, as soon as a camera is 
shoved somewhere, the interest seems to be a hell of a lot bigger.  I mean I think you’ve also got to think about there’s no 
commercial TV news really interested - outside of Sean Dorney’s stuff with the ABC.  We had cable TV up there, when a 
volcano went up on Manam Island, which is separate to this, I know, but CNN had someone there filming it.  They spent 
the money and they get a chopper in and they get the pictures and those pictures are then picked up by Australian 
television.  So its probably an indication of the priority of PNG in the scheme of things. (Ruffini, 1999) 
I said that it struck me that they were prepared to put so much effort and expense to cover the volcano and the tidal wave 
(which hit the northwest coast of PNG in 1997), whereas, there was little concern for the war in Bougainville.  I put to him 
that ‘no-one was interested in sending people to the Solomons’ to talk to the thousands of people in refugee camps, who 
would have had ‘plenty of stories to tell’.   He replied:  
Well, news agendas …I don’t know if I want to speak on behalf of them, but  its not, I would have thought, high up on 
their priorities.  (Ruffini, 1999) 
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Paul Ruffini (1999) said that newspapers did not normally cut very much from his articles.  
However, in the case of his Malabita article, he said that it was ‘a heck of a lot shorter.’ 
One could argue that these reasons all support the liberal model of the press.  However, they 
are also consistent with Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) view.  Regarding the fact that no-one 
from either AAP (who at the time supplied the Age with copy about Bougainville) or the Age 
travelled to the Solomons to cover the massacre suggests that editors at the Age had little 
interest in the story.  This is consistent with the ‘political-economic’ view that stories about 
‘unworthy victims’ present little value for the Australian government which was supporting 
PNG’s claim of sovereignty over Bougainville.  This lack of interest is also reflected in the 
fact that AAP would not pay Ruffini plane fare to visit Honiara to follow up the story.  
Ruffini’s (1999) claim that reporting about Bougainville did not suit editorial news agendas 
supports both the liberal and political-economic views of the media, depending on the exact 
nature of these agendas.  The liberal view would suggest that editors were uninterested because 
most Australians are uninterested in the region.  The political-economic view would be that they 
were uninterested because stories about Bougainville generally reflected badly on Australia’s 
policy of supporting the PNG government’s war effort. 
Further support for the political-economic view is given by Watts (2000a) who said that his 
reports ran well in the European media.  In contrast, he said, the same reports were either 
‘systematically spiked’ or did not ‘run’ at all in the Australian press.  It is hard to imagine that the 
European readers were more interested in Bougainville than their Australian counterparts.  
Australia has close ties with Bougainville.  For example, many in this country would have known 
one or more of the 2000 Australian citizens who worked in Bougainville during the operation of 
the mine.   
It may well be that political-economic factors, that Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued for, 
influenced this pattern of reporting, where the victims at Kangu Beach were treated as more 
‘worthy’ than the victims at Malabita.  These factors include the influence of ‘flak’ (negative 
responses to news items) and the tendency of journalists to let the government set the agenda.  
This is supported by data from interviews.  
Regarding ‘flak’, one reason why journalists were strident in their moral denunciation of the 
BRA leadership was because of the threat of litigation.  This is a tool which is more easily 
used by the rich and powerful.  Hence, journalists were less likely to denounce the PNG 
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leadership in moral terms and more likely to denounce the BRA in such terms.  I asked Mary-
Louise O’Callaghan why her criticism of the PNGDF leadership was muted, what she meant 
by it and why she did not use words such as ‘terrorists’ or ‘killers’ to describe the PNG 
leadership.  She replied: 
I think I’m saying that they didn’t want to unleash the demons, I’m not suggesting its by 
mistake.  I’m just perhaps suggesting that … they should be responsible and that if they’re 
trying to disown it, then they know what that means.  You’ve got to realise that there are 
legal constraints on me. … For instance when the coroner …was brought in to investigate 
Miriung’s death, I was able to name people, I was able to talk openly about PNGDF 
involvement in Miriung’s death according to the coroner, but short of that sort of evidence… I 
can’t just accuse …[X a certain PNG politician] of deliberately activating terrorists or using 
the army as terrorists unless I can prove it.  [X] would have just slapped a writ on me.  So, I 
got to get around it by saying things like they’re ‘disowning responsibility for the very 
demons that they have unleashed’. … That’s the practicalities of the craft, you know. 
Especially since he [X] is a very litigious person and one of the things you come to realise 
very quickly is that the rich and powerful are a lot more protected by the law than those 
that aren’t…. In the case of Bougainville, its easier for … [X] to get his Australian lawyers 
on to us, than it is for, say, the head of the ‘Resistance’  if they feel if they have been 
maligned or you know, a BRA rebel, who doesn’t even accept the law of PNG but he 
might want to use it.  (O’Callaghan, 1999c) 
‘Flak’ was also an influential factor in reporting in general about the Bougainville War.  
Therefore, the threat of ‘flak’ could have consciously and unconsciously influenced the 
actions of journalists and editors in their portrayal of the Malabita and Kangu Beach 
incidents.  
My interview data reveals that, on several occasions, during the war, officials from Australia 
and Papua New Guinea created ‘flak’ about news stories on Bougainville.  A good example of 
such ‘flak’ was when one journalist, who wishes not to be identified, wrote an article about a 
massacre of civilians.  They soon received a phone call from an Australian official who 
challenged their story.  The official also contacted other officials in Canberra and told them 
that the story was based on BRA propaganda. 
Differences like these in the moral judgements being made can also be explained by Herman 
and Chomksy’s (1988) view that the media serves domestic power interests.  I put their view 
and the opposing ‘liberal view’ of the pluralistic media to Mary-Louise O’Callaghan.  She 
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replied that domestic power interests influence what journalists write but that the media can 
also act as a ‘force for progress’ as liberal writers believe:   
…people feel free to use those terms [such as ‘killers and terrorists’] on rebels and… they 
don’t do it on the armies because they’re part of the power structure. …  Maybe that’s an 
example of … your theory in action…  I think you’ll find probably that both [the ‘liberal’ 
and the political-economic view apply]…  I mean there is that problem with that cliché, 
whether its ‘paradise lost’ or whether it’s ‘the rebels are the baddies and the killers and the 
murderers and the terrorists’ and the other guys … their just … ‘not doing a very good 
job’…. There are those cliches that people fall into through ignorance or habit or particular 
view of the world they don’t even realise they’ve got but I think there are also other people 
who try to get beyond that a bit.  (O’Callaghan, 1999c)  
It is true that O’Callaghan did ‘get beyond’ these cliches ‘a bit’. She criticised the PNG 
leadership – for not taking responsibility for the army which they themselves had deployed on 
Bougainville – in a way that no other journalist did in the reporting of the Malabita massacre 
in the three newspapers.  However, this did little to challenge the overall picture which was 
presented in the reporting of Kangu Beach and Malabita.  Firstly, whilst she tried to ‘get 
beyond’ the stereotyping of the BRA and PNG officials, her criticism was still muted.  
Secondly, it appeared only at the margins of press coverage – in one newspaper – at the end 
of a feature article in the middle pages. 
The dichotomous reporting of Kangu Beach and Malabita can be explained by a second 
‘structural’ factor.  This is the tendency of Australian journalists to let the Australian 
government set the agenda.  Interview data reveals that journalists tended to behave this way 
when reporting the Bougainville War.  Below is an excerpt from my conversation with 
O’Callaghan on this issue:  
O’Callaghan: [Regarding] Canberra [journalists] – who are the ones charged [with 
reporting about Federal Government issues] – [one of the things about the way that they 
work is that] they [those journalists] are so caught up in news which is being created by 
the government and therefore to a certain extent… controlled by the government.  They’re 
so caught up with just competing with each other on that… 
Roberts: They let the government set the agenda. 
O’Callaghan:  Yes! And they don’t chase … other stuff.  Now it’s not a criticism of the 
individuals because I see how hard those guys work.  … Then there is their papers of 
course, back in Sydney or wherever, are all [wanting] to ma ke sure that if the Sydney 
Morning Herald’s got the story, they’ve got the story.  So its very hard for any of them to 
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stand back and try and look at something a bit differently or follow an issue through. A lot 
of issues are just left at a certain point and the governments know that they can just make the 
right noises and the majority of journalists will not scrape behind those noises. And the 
journalists that do are usually badmouthed by both the government and [by] their colleagues 
‘cause they are rocking the boat for their colleagues.   
…journalists are very lazy. … They are spoon-fed and, for the sake of their careers, they 
can’t afford to ignore what they are being fed, because that is what everyone else is 
spewing forth.   You know.  … I mean, I’ve … been lucky because I’ve …by default 
carved out a niche that allows me not to … be this performing seal.  (O’Callaghan, 1999b) 
Sean Dorney (1999) likewise indicated that the press in Australia tended to follow the 
Australian government reactions to events in the Bougainville War.  Hence, he said, the press 
gave much attention to the Sandline affair because it threatened Australian interests in the 
region.  In contrast, he said that the Bougainville War had been largely ignored up until that 
point.  The following is an excerpt from my conversation with Dorney (1999): 
Roberts: I was quite struck at the time of Sandline … There had been virtually nothing in 
the papers about Bougainville [before that time] … There was a bit in 1996 [on] Malabita 
[etc] and [then, at the time of the Sandline Affair] all of a sudden it was saturation…. Why 
did that happen? 
Dorney:  It’s got a lot to do with the Australian government’s reaction to it. … The 
Australian government saw Sandline as a major shift in the balance of influence in the 
Pacific.   
Roberts:  They were scared, quite rightly, that another country would come in and take 
their place. 
Dorney:  Well, I also think they were pretty worried about this African … tendency …of 
… ‘your hired mercenaries can fix up your problems’.  And I think I wouldn’t discount 
entirely the fact that there was also a human rights worry that was also attached to all of 
that.  But it was also a massive rejection of Australian influence and Australian advice and 
whatever… 
And when the Australian government reacts, the Canberra press gallery reacts and when 
the Canberra press gallery reacts, it becomes a big story. 
As we can see in O’Callaghan’s (1999b) and Dorney’s (1999) responses, there are a number of 
processes which encourage journalists to follow the Australian government line.  One is that 
the Australian government is an important source of news and this allows the government to 
a certain extent to control the news.  A second is that journalists are disciplined to follow the 
government line by their colleagues and by the officials.  Thirdly, journalists are concerned 
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about their careers and therefore tend to follow the government agenda rather than ‘rock the 
boat’. 
The Canberra journalists accepted the Australian government line that the Malabita massacre 
was an ‘internal matter’ for the PNG government.  Lucy Palmer (1999) said that the 
Australian government line, on the Malabita incident, was that it was a sovereignty issue – that 
Bougainville was an internal matter for PNG and that Australia should respect the sovereign 
rights of its government.  Furthermore, she said that although she did not accept that line, the 
journalists who work in Canberra accepted it and believed it.  I asked her was it not the role 
of the press in a democracy to bring the Australian government to account on such issues.  
She replied:  
Yes, but its not the way it works… there is a to and fro debate or a lack of debate … a ping 
pong reality, where Downer says something, Chan says something.  (Palmer, 1999) 
She said that the journalists who report from Canberra are caught up in the day to day 
statements of politicians and generally do not write about the broader issues, though they may 
be relevant.   
The fact that Canberra journalists can get caught up in the government a genda can partly 
explain why the press made no calls for an independent inquiry and why there was little 
denunciation of the PNG government in the three newspapers.  
In sum, the papers reported the incident in a way which followed the PNG government line.  
They also closely followed Australian government reaction.  This could explain why they 
failed to criticise the PNG reaction.  This is consistent with the Herman and Chomksy view 
that the government serves as a major source for the mass media which leads the press to 
report news in line with the government agenda.  There is evidence to suggest that ‘structural’ 
factors, such as the use of ‘flak’ and the tendency of journalists to follow the Australian 
government ‘line’, contributed to the greater moral condemnation of BRA violence in the 
content of reporting about the two incidents at Malabita and Kangu Beach.  Now I will turn 
to the sequencing of narratives.   
As I discussed above, in this chapter, analysis of the sequencing of the narratives also showed 
a dichotomous pattern.  The three newspapers portrayed the BRA violence at Kangu Beach 
as less legitimate than the PNGDF violence at Malabita.  This dichotomous portrayal of the 
legitimacy does not match the circumstances of each of the incidents.  We can recall that the 
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victims at Kangu Beach were soldiers who were killed during a week-long battle (though there 
is some doubt as to whether they were executed or killed in battle).  On the other hand, 
eyewitness reports indicated that the victims at Malabita were all civilians who were murdered 
in an unprovoked attack.  
There were two trends in the sequencing of the narratives about Malabita.  The most 
important was the tendency to portray the violence as ‘normal’ and therefore legitimate.  We 
can see this in the leads.  The one lead which did not show a ‘normal’ sequence, showed an 
‘ambiguous’ sequence. The second trend was to portray the violence at Malabita as 
‘ambiguous’ – some headlines used ‘contextual’ sequences.   
We can explain the predominance of ‘normal’ sequences by looking at the assumptions that 
journalists made about the legitimacy of the PNG occupation of Bougainville. These 
assumptions influenced the way that they reported the violence.  As O’Callaghan (2000) said, 
journalists, before the Sandline crisis, assumed that the PNG government acted in the 
interests of the majority of the population.  In other words, their official military occupation 
of Bougainville was legitimate.  I had put to her that Pol Pot’s or Saddam Hussein’s armies 
had committed atrocities similar to the ones committed by the PNGDF at Malabita and 
Simbo and that the press condemned them as ‘terrorists’ and ‘murderers’.  She stated: 
… PNG was a democratically elected government, so there was an assumption [at the 
outset] … which I think in subsequent years particularly through Sandline has been proved 
to be a false assumption, …that the state would be operating in the… interests of the 
majority of the citizens of the country – which you couldn’t say about Iraq or Pol Pot.  I 
think that is another factor.... I think that the big shock of Sandline was the evidence – the 
irrefutable evidence …  that that wasn’t the case.  That just because it was democratically 
elected didn’t mean that you could assume that it could behave in a responsible way or in 
the interests of the majority of the citizens of the country. (O’Callaghan, 2000) 
The conversation continued:  
Roberts: Do you think people make those assumptions a lot – that just because [the 
government] is democratically elected [and there is a] Westminster system [then] we don’t 
ask certain questions?  
O’Callaghan: Absolutely.   Yeah. Yeah. (O’Callaghan, 2000)  
Since journalists assumed the PNGDF occupation of Bougainville was legitimate they tended 
to portray the violence at Malabita as ‘normal’ and therefore acceptable.  This parallels 
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examples of ‘normal’ portrayal of violence found elsewhere.  Cerulo (1998, p. 43) cites the 
example of police violence in Washington, D.C.  In that case, the lead read: 
D.C. Police officers shot and wounded two suspects Thursday night, both after they 
allegedly tried to run over officers who were trying to stop them in unrelated incidents. 
Since the police represent the legitimate authority, the violence is presented as ‘normal’, 
regardless of possible questions such as was the act of violence justified.  As Cerulo (1998, p. 
43) states: 
This text references all violent action from the perpetrators’ vantage point.  The structure 
of the narrative imposes the violent actor’s perspective on the telling of the event.  In this 
account, the performer sequence forces readers to enter the action at the side of the ‘good 
guy’.   
The second trend in the reporting of Malabita was for journalists and sub-editors to portray 
the violence as ‘ambiguous’ rather than ‘deviant’.  I would argue that one reason for this is 
that journalists were influenced by a ‘party line’, which was consistent with the Australian 
government agenda.  When a journalist stepped out of the ‘party line’ by, for instance, 
referring to PNGDF abuses, they had to show the complexity of the situation.  This was not 
so when discussing BRA violence. 
According to Mary Louise O’Callaghan, journalists can afford to be more ‘lax’ when they are 
following the ‘party line’.  On the other hand, she said that when journalists stepped outside 
the ‘party line’, they needed to be more careful to show the complexity of the situation. As 
she said:  
…that state fostering of journalists is like a parental relationship … There is positive 
reinforcement for the journalists that follow the party line, (…the state line).  … [It’s as if 
the state says] ‘we’ll give you a little favour, well give you a little tip off.’  And the trick of 
journalism is that you don’t cut yourself off entirely from the information flow but you 
stay outside of that game.  … It takes a lot of skill and its something that over the years I 
think that I have become better at and I think the answer for me is to make sure that my 
stories are balanced as much as I can. … If you run with an allegation against the army and 
they won’t deny it, you might mention the fact that they are ill disciplined to give people a 
sort of context that helps. … I don’t believe the world is black and white either all bad or 
all good and its very hard to convey that in four hundred words.   But that’s kind of what’s 
in the back of my mind most days.  That’s what I’m trying to do – to give some sense of 
the complexity of the situation. … Maybe that’s made me mention once too often that the 
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army is ill disciplined and giving you the impression that I’m trying to excuse them…   
(O’Callaghan, 1999d)  
This could explain why the PNGDF violence at Malabita was typically not portrayed as 
‘deviant’ violence.  As evidence against the PNGDF mounted, journalists wrote about the 
violence in a way that showed the complexity of the situation rather than emphasising that the 
violence was unacceptable.  For example, one description of the Malabita massacre was as 
follows:  
The slaughter of women and children on Bougainville during recent weeks is cause for 
profound sadness.  Uncontrolled elements of the secessionist Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA) have in the past been responsible for gross human rights abuses, including 
cold-blooded killings.  However, of late it has become clear that members of the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) have been responsible for some of the most 
barbarous acts. (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 December 1996, p. 13) 
In this example, the PNGDF violence is framed within a context of past human rights abuses 
by the BRA.  This serves to emphasise the complexity of the situation before the writer 
mentions the PNGDF violence.   
The above evidence suggests that if journalists were to report the PNGDF human rights 
abuses at Malabita, they were encouraged to emphasise the complexity of the situation.  This 
could explain why the Kangu Beach massacre was more likely to be portrayed as ‘deviant’ in 
headlines and leads.  However, there would have been no such pressure when reporting BRA 
violence.  The Australian government had a strategic interest in discouraging Bougainvillean 
secession.  Therefore, if a journalist portrayed BRA violence as ‘deviant’, rather than 
‘ambiguous’, they would not have challenged the ‘party line’. 
The portrayal of the legitimacy of the violence at Kangu Beach and Malabita can be explained 
by looking at journalists’ assumptions and pressures on journalists to follow the ‘party line’ (to 
use O’Callaghan’s, 1999d, term).  The portrayal of PNGDF violence as ‘normal’ reflected 
journalists’ assumptions that the PNG government and its defence force was acting 
legitimately in its prosecution of the war on Bougainville.  The portrayal of the violence at 
Malabita as ‘ambiguous’ was, arguably, influenced by the tendency of journalists to follow a 
‘party line’, which was consistent with the Australian government policy on Bougainville.   
_____________________________________ 
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In this chapter, I have analysed the pattern of reporting in the three Australian newspapers of 
three incidents in 1996.  The three newspapers were the Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald 
and the Age.  The three incidents each involved several people being killed and they occurred 
at Simbo, Kangu Beach and Malabita, all in South Bougainville.  I have also attempted to 
explain the pattern of reporting.   
I have argued that there were two important aspects of the reporting.  Firstly, that the 
publications portrayed the victims of the PNGDF in the case of Simbo less sympathetically 
than the victims of the PNGDF at Malabita.  Secondly, that the publications presented the 
victims of the PNGDF as less ‘worthy’ (using Herman and Chomsky’s, 1988, terms) than the 
victims of the BRA at Kangu Beach.   
In attempting to understand this pattern of reporting I used two theoretical approaches: the 
liberal view and the political-economic view of Herman and Chomsky (1988).  The liberal 
view, which focuses on ‘non-structural’ factors such as the lack of availability of verifiable 
information during the Bougainville War, explains the reporting when we compare the cases 
of Simbo and Malabita.  However, it fails to explain the differences in reporting of Kangu 
Beach and Malabita.  In contrast, the Herman and Chomksy model provides a better 
understanding when we compare the reporting of Malabita and Kangu Beach.  It also 
provides a more satisfying explanation of the entire pattern of reporting, when we compare all 
three cases. 
The following factors were important in producing the observed pattern of reporting: 
· The threat of ‘flak’ (negative responses to reporting). 
· The tendency of journalists to follow the Australian government ‘line’ on and the 
Australian government reaction to events in Bougainville. 
· Assumptions held by journalists about the legitimacy of PNG operations in Bougainville.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have described and analysed the reporting in three Australian newspapers 
about three violent incidents which occurred in 1996, during the course of the Bougainville 
War.  The three incidents were:  
the Simbo massacre in which 10-12 civilians, including an eight month old baby, were 
killed by the PNGDF and their allied ‘Resistance Force’, in January; 
the battle of Kangu Beach during which 13 Security Force members were killed by the 
BRA, in September; 
the Malabita massacre in which 9 civilians were killed when the PNGDF mortar-
bombed a packed church during Mass, in December.   
I have focussed on two questions:  
How did the three newspapers report these incidents? 
How can we best understand this process of reporting? 
I have argued that the overall pattern of reporting is well described using a combination of 
the Herman and Chomsky (1988) propaganda model and the Cerulo (1998) model, which is 
used to analyse how journalists portray the moral aspects of violence.  I have demonstrated 
this in my analysis of the reporting in chapters two and three.  
I have shown that the three newspapers portrayed incidents differently depending on the 
perpetrator of the violence.  Using Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) conceptual framework, the 
three newspapers portrayed the victims of the central government forces as ‘unworthy’ 
compared to victims of the BRA.  In chapters two and three I presented quantitative and 
qualitative evidence to support this argument.  For example, in covering the 19 to 21 unarmed 
civilians who were killed by central government forces in massacres at Simbo and Malabita 
the newspapers published a total of 13 articles.  In contrast, in covering the battle of Kangu 
Beach where the BRA killed 13 security force members the newspapers published a total of 
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20 articles.  In chapters two and three I presented qualitative evidence by analysing the 
rhetoric of newspaper coverage.  
It is clear that there were significant differences in the reporting of the two massacres which 
were perpetrated by the central government forces at Simbo and Malabita.   For example, the 
three newspapers gave the Malabita massacre much more attention than the Simbo massacre. 
Quantitative and qualitative measures demonstrated that the three newspapers portrayed the 
victims of the Malabita massacre as less ‘worthy’ than victims of the BRA at Kangu Beach.   
I used two theoretical approaches in my attempt to explain the pattern of reporting.  The first 
is the ‘liberal’ approach which, in explaining reporting, emphasises factors such as access to 
reliable information.  Secondly, I used the ‘political-economic’ approach in which writers 
emphasise factors such as the role of government sources in shaping the news.  I used the 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) propaganda model as an exemplar of the latter approach.   
I argued that both the ‘liberal’ and Herman and Chomsky (1988) models were useful in 
explaining the pattern of reporting in the three newspapers.  As I discussed in chapter four, 
the ‘liberal’ model was particularly useful for explaining the differences in the reporting of the 
two massacres by central government forces at Simbo and Malabita.  For example, the 
increased attention on the Malabita massacre can be explained by greater availability of hard 
evidence.  ‘Liberal’ writing on war reporting suggests that when circumstances permit the 
mass media will play an adversarial role to that of the domestic government.  In chapter four, 
I found that in reporting the Malabita massacre the three newspapers challenged only the 
tactical objectives of the PNG government.  For example, they criticised the indiscipline of 
the PNGDF (Papua New Guinea Defence Force).  The overriding strategic objective of the 
Australian government – to maintain Bougainville as part of PNG – was not subject to any 
challenge in the three publications.   This failure to challenge does not sit well with liberal 
models of an adversarial media.  However, it is consistent with the Herman and Chomsky 
(1988) propaganda model.   
I believe that the Herman and Chomsky (1988) model provides a more satisfactory 
explanation of the overall pattern of reporting as compared to the ‘liberal’ approach to war 
reporting, as I discussed in chapter four. It suggests reasons for the overall pattern whereby 
victims of central government forces were portrayed as ‘unworthy’ compared to the victims 
of the BRA.  This model can also accommodate the case of Malabita where, in certain 
respects, the press were more sympathetic to the victims of the central government forces.   
 127 
What are the implications of these findings?  There was a consistent dichotomous pattern 
throughout the reporting on the three incidents –- victims of the central government forces 
were portrayed as less ‘worthy’ than victims of the BRA.  This pattern is supportive of the 
Australian government objectives for Bougainville in 1996.  The Australian government gave 
substantial military support to PNG for its operations in Bougainville and wanted the island 
to remain part of PNG.  The dichotomous pattern of reporting implies that the three 
newspapers performed a role which was supportive rather than critical of Australian 
government policy on Bougainville.  This suggests that the Australian media does not play an 
adversarial role as liberal models of the media imply. However, the differences in the 
reporting of the Malabita massacre, as compared to the Simbo massacre, suggest that the 
Australian mass media does play a somewhat adversarial role.  The question is how much?  
My findings about the reporting of the Malabita massacre (see p. 126 above) suggests that the 
Australian mass media’s adversarial role in war reporting is limited by the strategic objectives 
of Australian foreign policy.  
My findings imply that certain theoretical models are useful in describing and understanding 
war reporting in the Australian press.  Theoretical models from the liberal, political-economic 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988) and cultural (Cerulo, 1998) traditions were helpful in 
describing the reporting.  I also used theoretical models from both the liberal and political-
economic tradition to attempt to understand the pattern of reporting.  I found that both 
approaches helped to explain the reporting.  
The findings and implications for this thesis are limited by its scope.  I have focussed only on 
three incidents in the Bougainville War.  Further research is required into the following areas: 
Firstly, there needs to be more research into similar cases of violence in the Bougainville War.  
This ought to be done by examining both individual cases and trends in reporting.   Secondly, 
the relation between Australian foreign policy and reporting of the Bougainville War needs 
further detailed investigation.  
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